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Abstract
An observation chart contains a collection of information from several differ-
ent health information systems used at a hospital. Today, health personnel
often has to access these health information systems during patient care and
manually register information from them into the observation chart. Inte-
gration of the health information systems which constitute an observation
chart is therefore needed. Integration means that systems used by a large
amount of users are put together in such a way that all users gain access to
the information they need. An integration will increase the efficiency of in-
formation flow by automatically retrieving information from relevant health
information systems into an electronic observation chart. These improve-
ments in turn will hopefully result in better quality of patient care, reduced
time spent on treating each patient and therefore also reduced costs.
This thesis describes a security focused integration architecture for an
electronic observation chart system (EOC-system). This thesis also explores
standards, strategies, laws and regulations relevant for the architectural de-
scription of the EOC-system. The EOC-system is going to be developed by
CARDIAC, a company focusing on technology within health care, and the
architectural description will be a support in this development process.
The architectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system is based on
the Model-based Architecture description Framework for Information Inte-
gration Abstraction (MAFIIA), which is an architectural description frame-
work for software intensive systems with a specialization towards Informa-
tion Integration Systems (IIS). The architectural description has also fol-
lowed MAFIIA’s two extensions, MAFIIA/H and MAFIIA/RBAC, which
respectively relate to the health care domain and to role-based access con-
trol (RBAC).
The work with this thesis, following the MAFIIA architectural descrip-
tion framework, has resulted in a detailed and structured architectural de-
scription which sees the architecture from several viewpoints and describes
different aspects of it. Security and integration are emphasized in the archi-
tectural description; a combination of a service-oriented and portal-oriented
integration architecture is chosen and the security mechanisms digital sign-
ing, secure communication, auditing and access control are ensured.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter contains a motivation for this thesis, a presentation of the goals
and scope, together with an overview of the document organization.
1.1 Motivation
Development of information systems began little by little. In the beginning
systems were developed to solve only very simple work tasks, but gradually
information systems have become more and more complex. Still, there are
several detached information systems supporting different work processes
within an enterprise. Users therefore often have to access several different
information systems when performing complex work tasks. But, users expect
instant access to all business functions an enterprise can offer, regardless of
which system the functionality may reside in. This requires information
systems to be connected into a larger, integrated solution.
At present, integration of information systems is of special interest in the
health sector. A lot of ongoing work is concerned with integration of health
information systems. Larger hospitals in Norway today have hundreds of
health information systems. Most of these systems are information systems
which only perform simple tasks, such as the processing and storing of lab-
oratory information. An integrated solution supports more complex tasks,
which imply access to several different health information systems. Such a
solution will gather information which is scattered around in several health
information systems. An integrated solution will hopefully give a optimal
information base which is necessary for proper patient treatment. This in
turn will probably contribute to improved continuity of patient care.
This project is carried out in cooperation with CARDIAC AS. CAR-
DIAC is an abbreviation for Computer Aided Research, Development, In-
strumentation and Control, and the name reflects activities in instrumenta-
tion, research, monitoring and control in the health sector. CARDIAC has
developed a middleware platform specially for integration of health informa-
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tion systems, IMATIS1 Platform.
One of CARDIAC’s goals is to develop a health information system
for electronic observation charts (EOCs) based on IMATIS Platform. The
EOCs will look much like the paper-based observation charts which contain
a chronological overview of the most essential information about a patient,
such as vital signs (i.e. pulse, respiration, blood pressure, etc.), selected
patient information, medication, treatment, tests and examinations, ordi-
nations and distributions. Information within a paper-based or electronic
observation chart is a subset of the information contained in a traditional
patient record or electronic patient record (EPR).
As they are used in hospitals today, paper-based observation charts are
actually a collection of information from several different health information
systems. Because the observation chart collects information that is necessary
in order to make a diagnosis and provide proper patient care, it is proba-
bly the most central and mostly used document in a patient record. The
paper-based observation chart is also an important collaboration document
between health personnel during patient care.
One of the weaknesses with paper-based observation charts today is man-
ual registration of patient information, which may involve manual typing
errors. For the improvement of today’s routines, automatic information re-
trieval from medical technical equipment and health information systems,
which are important for the patient care, is required. Therefore, medical
technical equipment, such as sensors and monitoring systems, and health
information systems, such as administrative systems and laboratory sys-
tems, should be integrated with the EOC-system. An integration will also
support health personnel in performing their work tasks, thereby improving
quality of documentation and patient care.
Information security is important because the health information systems
contain sensitive information which has to be secured. It is also stated by
law that the patient’s right to privacy has to be protected when processing
personal data. In addition, some regulations about information security are
given.
When health information systems are integrated, information security
becomes even more important. In addition to securing each system, also the
communication lines between them have to be secured. The access control
becomes even more important since the access control mechanisms within
each of the integrated systems should be enforced in order to allow health
personnel to access the information they need for proper patient care, re-
gardless of which system the information is retrieved from. An integration of
several health information systems often increases the number of users. The
more users, the more important it is to know which actions are performed
by whom.
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1.2 Goal
The goal of this thesis is to create a description of a security focused inte-
gration architecture for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. In order to create this
architectural description several subgoals are identified in this thesis.
First of all, it is necessary to gain knowledge of the EOC-system and its
domain.
Another subgoal is to study prevailing standards, strategies, laws and
regulations which are relevant for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. Based on
the identified laws and regulations, relevant security concerns should be
explored.
An architectural description for integration of health information systems
needs to be based on an integration architecture, so a subgoal is to explore
different integration architectures which may be used in the implementation
of CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
The architectural description presented in this thesis will be based on
the architectural description frameworks: generic MAFIIA, MAFIIA for IIS,
MAFIIA/H and MAFIIA/RBAC. Of these architectural description frame-
works, MAFIIA/RBAC is the newest one, and it has never been tested in
practice. Therefore, a subgoal of this thesis is also to try out MAFIIA/R-
BAC on a specific case.
1.3 Limitation of scope
CARDIAC’s intension is to implement the EOC-system within the National
Health Service, primarily within the Health Region for Central Norway.
Since this project is done in cooperation with CARDIAC AS, this thesis
will only focus on the above mentioned health region. The Health Region
for Central Norway has developed some strategies for integration and archi-
tecture of health information systems, which have to be followed by CAR-
DIAC. These strategies will also set some limitations on the work done in
this master’s thesis project.
Since the EOC-system is in the centre of the integration described in this
thesis, and since EOCs are mostly used within somatic hospitals, the scope
is limited to only cover somatic hospitals.
The operation of CARDIAC’s EOC-system is limited to only running
inside internal networks of a hospital, which means that the system cannot
be accessed through Internet or other LAN networks.
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1.4 Document organization
This report is divided into seven parts.
Part I is an introduction which motivates and presents the goals and
scope for this thesis.
Part II is a prestudy which serves as background information for the
reader. It contains a description of the National Health Service, CARDIAC’s
EOC-system, information security within the health domain, laws and regu-
lations related to information security and possible integration architectures.
Part III gives a brief introduction to the methodology used in creating
the architectural description of the EOC-system. The MAFIIA architectural
description framework and its extensions are the frameworks which are used.
Part IV presents the security focused integration architecture of CAR-
DIAC’s EOC-system.
Part V contains discussions of the work done during this thesis, conclu-
sions on the results achieved and suggestions for further work.
Part VI is the bibliography.
Part VII is the appendix.
Part II
Prestudy

Chapter 2
Introduction
When creating an architectural description for an integrated health infor-
mation system, it is necessary to have knowledge of the domain which the
system will operate in. Additionally, it is important to have proper knowl-
edge of the target system itself and the other systems which are supposed
to be integrated with the target system. It is also important to be aware of
the prevailing laws and regulations which are relevant for the architectural
description.
Security is important in all software systems, specially in the health
domain. Since this thesis has a large focus on security, there is a need
for an identification of relevant security issues. Finally, relevant integration
architectures need to be examined.
With all this information in place, a proper basis for the creation of the
architectural description is laid.
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Chapter 3
Norwegian health service
CARDIAC aims to implement the EOC-system within somatic hospitals in
the Norwegian health service. The first implementation will be within the
Health Region for Central Norway, and the EOC-system therefore has to
satisfy certain standards and strategies introduced by this health region and
the Norwegian Government.
This chapter first presents the organization of the National Health Ser-
vice and the Health Region for Central Norway, before presenting relevant
standards and strategies.
3.1 The National Health Service
In 2002 there was a major change in the National Health Service when the
Norwegian Hospital Reform [41] was carried out. Before 2002, all hospitals
were administrated by the county authorities, but after the reform, the hos-
pitals became health enterprises owned by the Norwegian Government [67].
As shown in Figure 3.1, Norway was divided into five health regions:
• Health Region for Northern Norway
• Health Region for Central Norway
• Health Region for Western Norway
• Health Region for Eastern Norway
• Health Region for Southern Norway
The organization in the National Health Service is shown in Figure 3.2.
For each of the five health regions presented above, there is established a
regional health enterprise. The five regional health enterprises have respon-
sibility for the specialist health services provided within their geographical
12 Norwegian health service
Figure 3.1: Norway’s five health regions.
area, and they own all health enterprises within the health region they be-
long to. Health enterprises run hospitals and other specialist health services,
and they may consist of several hospitals or institutions [69].
This report will mainly focus on somatic hospitals because these hospitals
cover the observation chart’s range of use. A somatic hospital investigates
and treats patients with physical diseases or injuries, and it provides sur-
gical and/or medical treatment of patients [49]. More precisely, the main
focus of this thesis will be on somatic hospitals within the Health Region for
Central Norway because CARDIAC is supposed to deliver their first instal-
lation of the EOC-system within this health region. Thus, an arrow points
on the Health Region for Central Norway in Figure 3.1. The Health Re-
gion for Central Norway consists of six health enterprises and one regional
health enterprise. The Central Norway Regional Health Enterprise has a
superior responsibility for the specialist health service in Nord-Trøndelag,
Sør-Trøndelag and Møre og Romsdal.
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Figure 3.2: Organization in the National Health Service [69].
3.2 Standards and strategies
In the steering document 2004 [35] from the Ministry of Health and Care
Services 1 to the regional health enterprises, information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) is one of the five national priority areas. ICT is of
great importance for the development of the National Health Service be-
cause ICT supports work tasks within strategic areas, such as interaction
and cooperation within the health enterprises.
When introducing ICT into the health sector, there are certain strate-
gies and standards that have to be followed. The most important ones are
described in the following sections.
3.2.1 Te@mwork 2007
Electronic Cooperation in the Health and Social Sector
In March 2004, the national strategy for ICT development in the health and
social sector for the period 2004-2007, Te@mwork 2007 2, was introduced.
The strategy provides coherence and direction for national priority areas for
electronic interaction in the sector for a three-year period.
The vision of Te@mwork 2007 is that ”patients and clients shall experi-
1Former Ministry of Health
2Norwegian: S@mspill 2007
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ence continuity of care when using the services” [34]. This vision demands
for improving the flow of information within the National Health Service.
Improved information flow presupposes working with the following areas:
infrastructure, information structure, information security, EPRs, exchange
of electronic messages and professional support. Working with these areas,
motivates for an integration between health services, information resources
and health information systems.
3.2.2 Common ICT strategy
The common ICT strategy is a strategy for the regional health enterprises
with proposals for common priority areas and measures. The strategy defines
roles and responsibilities of the regional health enterprises in achieving the
goals of Te@mwork 2007 [34]. The common ICT strategy is at the core of
the coordination of strategies and action plans for the development of ICT
in the health sector. The common ICT strategy is a document gathering all
contractual obligations the regional health enterprises have according to the
national action plans. The document also contains goals set by the regional
health enterprises.
The common ICT strategy has six priority areas, some of them are rel-
evant for this thesis:
• Electronic cooperation: Consolidate more extensive use of electronic
message exchange.
• Comprehensive and well-defined information base: A common defin-
ition of concepts is a basis for all electronic interaction in the health
sector.
• Information Security: The establishment of a trade standard for in-
formation security and a set of minimum requirements for information
security in the sector.
Electronic cooperation and comprehensive and well-defined information
base, emphasize the need for integration, while information security itself is
an important area within the health sector. To achieve these three priority
areas certain goals are set:
• Continuity of patient care attained by information following the pa-
tient care and work processes.
• The health enterprises make their work processes more efficient by
avoiding that the same work is done twice.
• The information shall flow effectively between different health infor-
mation systems without mistakes or misunderstandings.
To reach these goals, the many different systems which are involved in
patient care have to be integrated.
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3.2.3 HEMIT’s strategies
HEMIT 3 was established in 2003 as a special IT-unit which gathers all IT-
departments in the Health Region for Central Norway. HEMIT now runs
all the central servers and all software and infrastructure within this health
region.
HEMIT has formulated several IT-strategies. The most relevant for this
work are:
• The integration strategy
• The IT architecture strategy
The purpose of the integration strategy is to integrate health services
independently of the technological platform they are implemented on. The
integration strategy is not yet implemented, and it is meant to be used as
a requirement specification for IT-vendors when purchasing or developing
new systems or IT-equipment [51]. The integration strategy should be seen
in combination with the IT architecture strategy.
The IT architecture strategy is supposed to give a better overview over
all information systems and their services. The architecture is based on a
service-oriented architecture model for the purpose of Web services.
3.2.4 KITH’s EPR-standard
KITH 4 is a centre of competence for the establishment of extensive, efficient
and secure implementation and use of ICT in health care.
KITH has developed an EPR-standard [49] as part of the program on
”Standardization and coordination of information- and communication sys-
tems in the national health care service” initialized by the Ministry of Health
and Care Services 5. KITH’s EPR-standard aims to form a common plat-
form for all EPRs in the National Health Service according to prevailing
laws. The EPR-standard focuses on architecture of patient records, archiv-
ing of EPRs, access control, and integration of EPRs with code standards
and classification systems.
KITH’s standard does not cover all aspects of an EPR, e.g. a limitation
is placed on the requirements for the contents in an EPR. Although KITH is
working on other standards and requirement specifications within the health
sector, this report will only focus on the EPR-standard because it identifies
relevant laws and regulations regarding patient records.
3Norwegian: Helse Midt-Norge IT
4Norwegian: Kompetansesenter for IT i helse- og sosialsektoren AS
5Former Ministry of Health
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3.3 Integration of health information systems
The above mentioned ICT strategies and standards constitute the foun-
dation for a move towards integration of health information systems. An
integration of health information systems provides for:
• Better quality of care, which implies better information quality. For
example, a user does not have to type in the same information more
than once because it is easy to make mistakes when the same infor-
mation has to be typed in several times.
• Continuity of care, which implies that the needed patient information
is available for the right person at the right time.
In addition to better quality of care and continuity of care, integration
of health information systems hopefully results in reduced costs.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has presented relevant standards and strategies. The recom-
mendations and suggestions in these standards and strategies will be ensured
in the architectural description created during this project. The architec-
tural description is for an EOC-system, and EOCs will therefore be described
in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Patient observation chart
A patient record includes necessary and relevant information for the patient
care. This information was originally divided into ten different groups. Be-
cause this project is done in collaboration with CARDIAC, and CARDIAC
aims to develop its own EOC-system, this chapter will only focus on group
F, which contains all kinds of observation charts.
A patient observation chart is an important tool for organizing and
recording patient care activities in the hospitals. The paper-based obser-
vation chart contains essential information about the patient, and it is used
to quickly get an overview of the patient treatment.
An introduction to patient records is given in this chapter, before patient
observation charts and CARDIAC’s EOC-system are presented in detail.
4.1 Patient records
Patient records have been used in Norway since the 19th century for the
purpose of documentation of patient care. Since patient records were intro-
duced, they have gone through dramatic changes. From being hand-written
and organized in paper archives, they have now become electronic with the
possibility to automatically receive and retrieve patient information neces-
sary for the patient care. A patient record is a working tool for health
personnel and should contribute to a proper medical treatment. All medical
treatment for a patient should be documented in a patient record to ensure
the quality and continuity of patient care.
In Norway, the information in a paper-based patient record is classified in
groups from ‘A’ to ‘J’ as seen in Table 4.1. The table only shows a simplified
overview of the information in a paper-based patient record. The contents
of the groups are detailed in Appendix A [11].
Nowadays, EPRs are dominating the Norwegian health service. An EPR
is a patient record in which information is stored electronically and can be
retrieved and reused by means of suitable software [36]. An EPR should
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Group Name Content
A Summaries Contains patient’s biographical data and
details about when, where and why the pa-
tient was hospitalized. It also contains a
nursing summary and a document written
in cooperation with the patient when he is
discharged from the hospital.
B Doctors’ record Contains all internal doctors’ notes which
are not written in the observation chart. It
also contains answers to internal referrals.
C Laboratory results Contains all laboratory and test results
from examinations of blood and other flu-
ids, pus and tissue.
D Organ function Contains all examinations in which the pa-
tient has to be present, except picture di-
agnostics from group E.
E Picture diagnostics X-ray, Computed Tomography (CT), Mag-
netic Resonance (MR) and ultrasound ex-
aminations.
F Observations and
treatment
All kinds of observation charts are con-
tained in this group.
G Nursing documenta-
tion
All documentation about the nursing of the
patient, together with observations, evalu-
ations, decisions and actions.
H Documentation from
other professionals
Contains replies and reports from other
professional groups who have done separate
therapies or treatments on the patient, e.g.
a childbirth is leaded by a midwife and she
is a part of some“other professional group”.
I External correspon-
dence
Contains external referrals, evaluations of
external referrals, hospitalization docu-
ments and other correspondence.
J Attestation/messages/
statements
Contains copies of ALL messages which are
send/received regarding the patient.
Table 4.1: Overview of the contents of a paper-based patient record.
at least include information corresponding to the information archived in a
paper-based patient record.
Group F, observations and treatment, is in Table 4.1 listed as a part
of the paper-based patient record and it should therefore also be a part of
the EPR. Group F usually consists of patient observation charts which are
produced during a patient’s hospital stay.
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This master’s thesis project is done in cooperation with CARDIAC, and
CARDIAC aims to develop an EOC-system. Group F in the paper-based
patient record is therefore of particular interest for this work. Both paper-
based and electronic observation charts are described next.
4.2 Paper-based observation chart
The paper-based observation chart is a binder that contains a chronolog-
ical overview of the most essential information about a patient, such as
vital signs (i.e. pulse, respiration, blood pressure, etc.), selected patient in-
formation, medication, treatment, tests and examinations, ordinations and
distributions [21]. In short, the observation chart is used to quickly get an
overview of the patient treatment, and a good overview helps in improving
the quality of care.
There are many different types of paper-based observation charts and
each hospital is free to use its own types. Within each hospital, observation
charts are specially designed for the ward they are used in, which means
that there can be several different types of observation charts within one
single hospital [11].
A standard observation chart is for example quite different from the ob-
servation chart which is used in an intensive care unit. The chart is, of
course, much more detailed in an intensive care unit. In an intensive care
unit for new-born three different observation charts are used: main observa-
tion chart, medication chart and a special observation chart for observation
of nutrition consumption and a few other variables.
Figure 4.1 shows a detailed picture of a typical paper-based observation
chart used in an intensive care unit for new-born.
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Figure 4.1: Paper-based observation chart.
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4.3 Electronic Observation Charts (EOCs)
As mentioned previously, an EPR has to include all information that is
archived in a paper-based patient record, meaning that it also has to contain
EOCs.
EOCs replace the traditional paper-based observation charts used within
Norwegian hospitals. Since the EOCs are stored electronically, information
in them can be used for other purposes, in addition to documenting the
patient care. For example, the information may be used for statistical and
research purposes or for legal matters.
An EOC can also give a bird’s-eye view of the patient care, and it should
be able to tell [33]:
• How much information there is about the patient. An EOC may pro-
vide functionality of a zoom in function which makes it easier to see
the total amount of information before going into details of it.
• Which periods of the patient’s life he has been medically treated. An
EOC may use the patient’s medical history to emphasize certain peri-
ods of a patient’s life on a time scale.
• Who has treated the patient and what tests have been done. Since all
medical actions must be signed by someone who has made the decision,
it is easy for an EOC to present an overview of who has treated the
patient and what tests have been done.
• What plans are made for future treatment of the patient. It should
be possible to get an overview of ordered laboratory tests, medical
appointments, etc. in the EOC.
4.4 CARDIAC’s EOC-system
CARDIAC aims to develop an EOC-system that will be integrated with
other health information systems. Since the paper-based observation chart
has been such an important and useful part of the work processes for the
health personnel, CARDIAC has chosen to base their EOC-system on the
structure of the paper-based observation chart. As shown in Figure 4.2,
CARDIAC wants the EOC-system to be divided into two parts:
• Navigation caremap
• Patient chart forms
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Figure 4.2: CARDIAC’s EOC-system consists of a navigation caremap and
a patient chart form, in addition to shortcuts to other health information
systems.
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The navigation caremap is intended to be the main navigation window
in the EOC-system. It should be a “read-only” version of the patient ob-
servation chart in which the time scale can be changed to show different
amounts of information; either just a few days or several years of treatment.
The navigation caremap will be divided into different categories which in-
dicate vital signs, medication/prescription, test/result, picture diagnostics,
etc. The time scale will give a categorical overview of historical documenta-
tions and occurrences, the most important, present parameters that describe
the patient’s condition and planned actions for the patient care. The patient
information presented in the time scale will be retrieved from other health
information systems, such as administrative systems, picture archiving sys-
tems and laboratory systems. This means that these health information
systems should be integrated with the EOC-system. With that, users will
easily get an overview of the patient’s condition and its development, includ-
ing observations, occurrences, treatment, documentation and test results.
In the every day work with patients, EOCs will be used. These are
electronic versions of the paper-based observation charts; they look alike
and have the same structure as the paper-based ones, and they allow input.
The EOCs will be used to get an overview of the patient condition during one
day or a week. They may be configured so that the information contained
and presented in the forms is adapted to the work situation. In other words,
EOCs may be specifically adapted to the wards in the hospital.
4.5 Integration of CARDIAC’s EOC-system
As shown in Figure 4.2, CARDIAC wants to base their EOC-system on
the paper-based observation chart. In addition to allowing health personnel
to register observations continuously, the observation chart usually needs
information from several other health information systems. This is shown in
Figure 4.3. An EOC-system should provide the opportunity for the health
personnel to register some observations manually, while others should be
retrieved automatically from other health information systems or medical
technical equipment.
CARDIAC’s idea is that the navigation caremap shall give direct access
to other health information systems. For example, it should be possible to
click on certain icons for requisition or booking of blood tests, picture di-
agnostics, electrocardiogram (ECG) or other examinations. Response func-
tionality for these areas should also be available in the navigation caremap.
For example, the EOC-system may contain a note which says that a blood
test result is finished. By clicking the note or the icon beside the note, the
user will be able to see the results of the test immediately.
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Figure 4.3: EOC in integration with other health information systems.
CARDIAC has identified some health information systems which are
particularly relevant for the EOC-system. These systems all need to be
integrated in order to improve the quality of the information in the EOC-
system and improve the efficiency of patient care.
Relevant health information systems for integration with the EOC-system,
are presented in the subsequent sections.
4.5.1 EPR-system
The information in EPRs resides in several different health information sys-
tems. Throughout this thesis, the EPR-system is referred to as one of these
health information systems. It is referred to as a system only containing
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information about CAVE 1, doctor’s documentation and nursing documen-
tation.
An integration of the EPR-system with the EOC-system is necessary for
proper patient care.
4.5.2 PAS
Patient Administrative System (PAS) handles administrative information
about a patient and the patient’s hospital stay. An integration with PAS is
needed because PAS provides information about patient’s biographical data,
diagnosis and patient care incidences 2.
4.5.3 LIS
Laboratory Information System (LIS) handles laboratory tests and stores
test results. CARDIAC wants to increase the efficiency of patient treatment
by providing direct access to test results in the EOC-system. In order to
achieve this, integration with LIS is also necessary.
4.5.4 PACS/RIS
Picture Archive and Communication System/Roentgen Information System
(PACS/RIS) is a system for storing pictures such as X-rays, Magnetic Res-
onance (MR), Computed Radiography (CR) and other. In the same way as
with LIS, an integration with PACS/RIS is necessary in order to improve
the efficiency of patient treatment.
4.5.5 RoS
An integration with the Requisition and Response system (RoS 3) is neces-
sary in order to allow users of the EOC-system to write requisitions and to
view the response which is given when the requisition has been processed.
Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that LIS and PACS/RIS are inte-
grated with RoS. Hence, the EOC-system only needs to communicate with
RoS in order to get pictures and information about laboratory tests.
4.5.6 Medication
When integrated with the Medication system, the EOC-system will have the
possibility of allowing users to prescribe medications in the system. This may
result in faster and more efficient processing of medication.
1Latin: avoid. Information about allergies or hypersensitivity towards certain types of
medication that a patient may have.
2patient care incidences: points in time when the patient has been hospitalized
3Norwegian: Rekvisisjon og Svar
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At this point, no medication system has been implemented yet, but med-
ication systems are still taken into account when creating the architectural
description of the EOC-system.
4.5.7 EQS
Extend Quality System (EQS) contains quality procedures for performing
different tasks in the patient care. An integration with the EOC-system
would improve the efficiency and quality of patient care because the proce-
dures may be linked to work processes and work tasks. For example, every
time a nurse is supposed to feed the patient intravenously, there will be
procedures for how she is supposed to attach the needle to the patient.
4.5.8 MTU
Medical technical equipment (MTU 4) embraces all equipment which is used
in monitoring a patient’s condition, i.e. instruments such as electrocardio-
gram (ECG) and incubators. An integration between these instruments and
the EOC-system is necessary in order to avoid typing mistakes when health
personnel reads information from the instruments and registers it in the
EOC. CARDIAC has already developed a system for automatic data acqui-
sition from these instruments, IMATIS Medical Data Acquisition System.
IMATIS Medical Data Acquisition System is a system specially designed
for automation, standardization and quality assurance of data from medical
technical equipment. The system is able to present data in real-time or
historically and even for transmission to other systems, such as the EOC-
system.
4.6 Summary
This chapter has presented CARDIAC’s EOC-system and health informa-
tion systems relevant for integration with the EOC-system. The most rel-
evant of the identified systems are the EPR-system, PAS, RoS, Medication
system, EQS and MTU. These will be chosen for integration with the EOC-
system in the architectural description.
The following chapter will focus on legal requirements for information
security which are relevant for the National Health Service in general and
for CARDIAC’s EOC-system specifically. Several important security mech-
anisms are also described in the following chapter.
4Norwegian: Medisinsk Teknisk Utstyr
Chapter 5
Information security in the
health sector
This chapter presents important legal requirements which are relevant for
implementation of CARDIAC’s EOC-system. On the basis of these require-
ments, certain security principles are identified. These security principles
must be ensured when implementing information systems in the health sec-
tor in general, specially in connection with the integration of health infor-
mation systems.
Throughout this thesis, a security principle is defined to be a security
goal which is achieved by a set of security mechanisms.
Security mechanisms are the means which are used to satisfy one or more
security principles.
In this chapter a brief presentation of both national and general security
principles is given, before several security mechanisms for the achievement
of the security principles are defined. The security mechanisms are then
discussed in a health context.
5.1 Laws and regulations regarding observation charts
There is no legislation specifically for EOCs in the Norwegian law today.
Still, EOC is a part of an EPR and a development of an EOC-system must
therefore follow all laws and regulations regarding EPRs in general. In the
following, a selection of relevant laws and regulations is presented:
Personal Data Act1 [40] is supposed to protect natural persons from
violation of their right to privacy through the processing of personal data.
The act applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by au-
tomatic means.
Personal Data Regulations2 [39] are determined under the provision
1Norwegian: Personopplysningsloven
2Norwegian: Personopplysningsforskriften
28 Information security in the health sector
of the Personal Data Act, and it gives regulations about information security
when personal data is processed.
The Personal Health Data Filling System Act3 [37] deals with the
employment of general decisions about patient records in the Personal Data
Act and contains a number of rules directly relevant for EPRs.
The Health Personnel Act4 [36] deals with health personnel’s duties
and responsibility in connection with their work. This includes relations
attached to client confidentiality, the right to information, the duty to report
and the documentation requirement.
Patient Record Regulations5 [43] are determined under the provi-
sions of i.a. the Health Personnel Act, and they give further rules about the
contents of a patient record, the work with patient records and access to the
information in the patient record.
The Archive Act6 [42] says that all public sectors (government, county
authority and municipal authority institutions) have a legal obligation to
have an archive. Therefore, this act also applies to patient records and
other information within public health enterprises.
5.2 Legal requirements
Combined together, the above mentioned laws and regulations make certain
demands for management of patient records, which in turn affect CAR-
DIAC’s EOC-system. The legal requirements for patient records are de-
scribed in the following sections.
5.2.1 Duty to keep patient records
According to the Health Personnel Act and the Patient Record Regulations,
all Norwegian health enterprises, where health services are provided, are
obliged to have a patient record system. One patient record should be
established for each patient, and each patient should only have one record,
even though several health enterprises contribute to the patient care. The
patient care should be documented in the patient record immediately after
the health service is performed. All patient record documentation should be
dated and signed.
It is possible to employ digital signatures or different kinds of approval
for EPRs, but there are no special requirements for approval of EPRs.
3Norwegian: Helseregisterloven
4Norwegian: Helsepersonelloven
5Norwegian: Pasientjournalforskriften
6Norwegian: Arkivloven
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5.2.2 Responsibility
For each established patient record, health institutions should designate one
person with superior responsibility for it, cf. the Health Personnel Act §39.
The superior responsibility for the individual patient record includes mak-
ing decisions relating to what information is to be entered into the patient
record.
The information entered into the patient record is referred to as personal
health data, and this kind of information has to be handled legally. The
data controller is responsible for ensuring sufficiently secured health data, cf.
the Personal Health Data Filing System Act §16: ”The data controller and
the data processor shall by means of planned, systematic measures, ensure
satisfactory data security with regard to confidentiality, integrity, quality and
accessibility in connection with the processing of personal health data...”.
According to this act, a data controller is the person who determines the
purpose of the processing of personal health data and which means are to
be used. The data controller also has the responsibility for the exchange of
health data, cf. the Personal Health Data Filing System Act §16.
5.2.3 Processing of personal health data
All processing of personal health data shall have an explicitly stated purpose,
cf. the Personal Health Data Filing System Act §11. The data controller
shall ensure that the personal health data that are processed are relevant to
and necessary for the stated purpose.
5.2.4 Access to personal health data
Access to personal health data shall, according to the Personal Health Data
Filing System Act §13, only be granted to the data controller, the data
processor or to persons working under the instructions of the controller or
the processor. In addition, access should only be granted if this is necessary
for the work of the person concerned and in accordance with the rules that
apply regarding the duty of secrecy.
5.2.5 Correction and deletion
Rules for correction and deletion are given in the Health Personnel Act
§§42-44.
Wrongful, deficient or improper information or comments in patient
records should be corrected. Correction shall be carried out through re-
entering the information of the patient records, or by adding a dated correc-
tion in the records. Corrections shall not be made by deleting information
or comments.
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Deletion of information in patient records should only be done if it can
be done without implications to public interest, if it is not in accordance
with the Archives Act sections 9 or 18, and if the information is wrong
or misleading and felt to be a burden for the person they relate to or the
information clearly is not necessary in order to provide health care for the
patient.
Correction and deletion are only done upon demand from the person
whom the information relates to, or of the health personnel’s own accord.
5.2.6 Exchanging personal health data
Health personnel is according to the Health Personnel Act obliged to give
necessary patient care. Also, health personnel is, if necessary, obliged to
exchange personal health data, refer to §45 in the Health Personnel Act:
”Unless the patient objects thereto, health personnel as mentioned in section
39 may give the patient record or information therein to others who provide
health care pursuant to this Act when this is necessary in order to provide
health care in a responsible manner”.
The Health Personnel Act does not specify how the information shall
be exchanged, but in the comments to the regulations related to the pa-
tient record in the Patient Record Regulations §10 electronic transmission
is mentioned. Information in the patient record can be transmitted elec-
tronically if the system in use has security solutions corresponding to the
requirements in the Personal Health Data Filing System Act, Personal Data
Act and Personal Data Regulations.
5.2.7 Auditing of access
Auditing of access is also an important matter, refer to §45 in the Health
Personnel Act: ”..It shall be evident from the patient record that other health
personnel has been given access to the patient records pursuant to the first
sentence.”. Because it shall be evident from the patient record that other
health personnel have been given access to the record, all EPRs should
register the one that gave access and the one that has been given access.
Also the Personal Data Regulations §2 require auditing of access to
EPRs: ”..Recording authorized and unauthorized use of information systems,
must be stored in at least 3 months...”.
5.3 Security principles
Chapter 2 in the Personal Data Regulations deals with information secu-
rity in regard to information systems storing personal data, in this context
personal health data. This section presents some security principles which
are mentioned in these regulations and which will be taken into account
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when including information security into the architectural description for
CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
5.3.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality refers to the need to keep information secure and private [6].
It means ensuring that only authorized parties are able to understand the
data. Unauthorized parties may be aware that there is some data, they can
copy the data, but they should not be able to understand it [18].
”A breach of confidentiality is a disclosure to a third party [....].Disclosure
can be oral or written, by telephone or fax, or electronically, for example,
via e-mail or health information networks. The medium is irrelevant, al-
though special security requirements may apply to the electronic transfer of
information” [60].
According to §2-11 of the Personal Data Regulations there should be
measures for the protection of confidentiality of personal health data: ”Mea-
sures shall be taken to prevent unauthorized access to personal data where
confidentiality is necessary. The security measures shall also prevent unau-
thorized access to other data of significance for data security”.
This paragraph also mentions electronic transmission and storing of per-
sonal data: ”Personal data that are transferred electronically by means of
a transfer medium that is beyond the physical control of the data controller
shall be encrypted or protected in another way when confidentiality is nec-
essary. As regards storage media that contain personal data where confi-
dentiality is necessary, the need to protect confidentiality shall be shown by
means of marking or in another way. If the storage medium is no longer used
for the processing of such data, the data shall be erased from the medium”.
5.3.2 Availability
Availability applies to the flow of data and the accessibility of the system.
It should be ensured that complete, updated, correct and relevant informa-
tion is available for those who have a legitimate need for it. For example,
this means that an attack that makes a system crash and the information
unavailable should be avoided.
Within the health service, availability is sometimes really important. For
example, in situations where patients’ lives are in danger, it may be neces-
sary to circumvent the access rights, giving unauthorized health personnel
the availability to access (parts of) the patient record. This availability to
circumvent the access rights in life-threatening situations is called blue light
access.
It is important that auditing is done when blue light access is given. It is
necessary to audit the reason for the blue light access, the operations that are
going to be performed, and the identity of the person that is performing these
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operations. The owner of the record should also be informed immediately.
Auditing is described in Section 5.4.3.
§2-12 in the Personal Data Regulations is about securing accessibility,
and it says that measures shall be taken to secure access to personal data
where accessibility is necessary. In addition, preparations should be made
for alternative processing in the event of the information system being un-
available for normal use. Information that is necessary to restore normal
use shall be copied.
5.3.3 Integrity
In the context of computer security, integrity is defined as the prevention
of unauthorized writing. No user of the system, even if authorized, should
be permitted to modify data items in such a way that information is lost or
corrupted [5].
Another integrity perspective is data integrity, meaning that the data
stored in an information system is the same as the source documents and that
it has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alternation or destruction.
In the context of communication security, integrity is defined as the de-
tection and correction of modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of trans-
mitted data including intentional manipulations and random transmission
errors [10].
Measures to prevent unauthorized changes in personal data where in-
tegrity is necessary are imposed in §2-13 of the Personal Data Regulations.
In addition, security measures should be taken to prevent unauthorized
changes in other data of significance for data security. Security measures
against malicious software should according to this paragraph also be taken.
Integrity in general is closely connected to another security principle,
namely non-repudiation.
5.3.4 Non-repudiation
There are two types of non-repudiation. The first one implies that the
sender is able to prove that the intended recipient actually has received a
sent message. The second type implies that the recipient is able to prove that
the alleged sender actually has sent the message [18]. Non-repudiation can
also be explained as a method of proving either that a user has performed an
action, or that the user has sent or received some information at a particular
time.
Absolute non-repudiation is quite difficult to achieve because a compre-
hensive non-repudiation plan usually requires authentication, authorization,
data integrity, and auditing.
Non-repudiation is not stated by any of the laws or regulations listed in
this chapter. Still, it is described because it is important when it comes to
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juridical information, e.g. during handling of complaints from patients due
to medical malpractice suit.
5.4 Security mechanisms
On the basis of the legal requirements described in Section 5.2 and the
security principles presented in Section 5.3, several security mechanisms are
identified. These security mechanisms are described in the following sections.
5.4.1 Digital signing
As described in Section 5.2.1, all patient documentation should be dated and
signed. There are no specific requirements for signing patient documenta-
tion, but it is possible to employ digital signatures for this purpose. Accord-
ing to the book Computer Security [10], a digital signature is ”a construct
that authenticates both the origin and contents of a message in a manner
that is provable to a disinterested third party”. This means that digital sig-
natures can be used to verify data integrity and to provide non-repudiation,
respectively described in Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4.
A digital signature confirms that a particular person has written and/or
approved the document, and the receiver of the document is able to prove
that this person really signed it and that the document has not been altered
since the signing. In addition, digital signing may also be used for the
purpose of authentication which is described below in Section 5.4.4.
Typically, a public key infrastructure (PKI) solution is used for digital
signatures. PKI is a collective term for technology providing unique digital
identities across networks, where the digital identity is used for authentica-
tion, digital signing of information and encryption of communication [65].
Within the health sector, digital signing is relevant for different purposes.
During patient care, it is important to know which actions are performed by
whom. In an EOC, all insertions and corrections should be digitally signed.
Digital signatures are therefore essential for the traceability of registrations
in the EOC-system. In addition, digital signing of prescriptions, medical
certificates, requisitions and referrals is highly desirable in an EOC-system.
When it comes to integrated health information systems, digital signa-
tures are even more important because integrated health information sys-
tems are more complex than single ones. Traceability of registrations and
alterations is therefore essential, and preserving the data integrity within
the integration is crucial.
5.4.2 Secure communication
In Section 5.2.6, it is stated that information in a patient record can be
transmitted electronically if the system in use has a satisfactory security
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solution. Secure transmission of information and mutual authentication of
the entities participating in the communication are therefore important in
health information systems.
By far the most important automated tool providing secure communi-
cation is encryption. Both asymmetric (also referred to as public-key) and
symmetric (also referred to as conventional) encryption is in common use.
With asymmetric encryption, different keys are used for encryption and de-
cryption. The encryption key can be made public, while the decryption key
has to remain private. With symmetric encryption, a secret key is used for
both encryption and decryption [10].
For example, to begin an authenticated communication between two en-
tities, respectively server A and server B, server A sends a request encrypted
with server B’s public key to server B. B decrypts the request with its pri-
vate key and replies with a message encrypted with A’s public key. Server
A and server B can establish a private channel through a secret key al-
gorithm, where server A chooses an encryption key and sends it to server
B in the authentication message. Once the authentication is complete, all
communication under the agreed secret key can be assumed to be secure.
The example above illustrates that symmetric encryption is used in the
main part of the communication, while asymmetric encryption is commonly
used only to exchange a secret key. Since asymmetric encryption and decryp-
tion requires more system resources than symmetric encryption, and since
it is much easier to distribute keys with asymmetric encryption than with
symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption is used for exchanging secret
keys, and symmetric encryption is used for the rest of the communication.
This example also illustrates that secure communication ensures confi-
dentiality and integrity. It guarantees that transmitted information is nei-
ther accessed nor altered by unauthorized users.
Because an EOC contains a gathering of information needed to make a
diagnosis and for proper patient care, CARDIAC’s EOC-system will retrieve
information from other health information systems such as the EPR-system,
PAS and RoS. Roughly speaking all health information systems contain sen-
sitive information, so secure communication and transmission of information
between these systems are needed.
5.4.3 Auditing
As pointed out in Section 5.2.7, auditing is mandatory when dealing with
patient records. All accesses and modifications should be traceable in an
audit log.
Auditing is an important security functionality for traceability and de-
tection of misuse and intrusions. Auditing is a posteriori technique for de-
tection of security violations or other suspicious events, with the purpose of
ensuring traceability within the system. This should include tracing access
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to sensitive information stored in the information systems as well as access
to the information systems themselves. Each access and/or access attempt
should be recorded in an audit log for later analysis [10].
The audit log should include information about the one accessing in-
formation, services or resources, what he is allowed to access, the accessed
information, services or resources, and the time they are accessed. For this
purpose, it is desirable that each audit record contains the following fields
[14]:
• Subject: The one that initiates an action. A subject is typically a
user, but it might also be a process acting on behalf of users. The
subject’s identity should be recorded in this field.
• Action: The operation performed by the subject on or with an object.
Operations might be login, read, execute, perform I/O, etc.
• Object: The resource that subjects perform their operations on.
• Time-stamp: The exact time the action took place.
In addition to the purpose of traceability and detection of misuse, the
information in an audit log may also be used to ensure non-repudiation,
since all actions are audited together with user information.
Within the health sector, it should also be possible to investigate misuse
and intrusions without violations of the patients’ right to privacy. Therefore,
it is important to keep the audit log in a secure place, in addition to only
allowing privileged users to access it.
When it comes to EOCs, all new registrations and changes of informa-
tion should be audited. As mentioned earlier, integrated systems are more
complex than single ones, and traceability of more users and more actions
has to be handled.
5.4.4 Access control
According to the legal requirements defined in Section 5.2.4, access should
only be granted if this is necessary for the work of the health personnel
concerned.
Access is usually seen as the ability to interact with a computer resource.
Access control is used to explicitly enable or disable the above mentioned
ability in some way. According to the book Role-Based Access Control [6],
access control is the most common and the most used security mechanism
today. Access control can be divided into two main parts: authentication
and authorization.
Authentication is concerned with verifying that the initiator of a request
has the identity which he claims to have. The process of authentication
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usually goes like this; a user identifies himself to the system, then he au-
thenticates his identity by providing a second piece of information that only
he can know, produce or provide.
Authorization determines whether the given identity is allowed to access
a resource or not. Authorization is an important part of every security policy,
i.e. a set of rules that states which actions are permitted or prohibited. The
purpose of authorization is to protect information, services, resources, etc.
against unauthorized use [10].
Access control ensures both availability and integrity of information. It
is therefore crucial in all health information systems where sensitive infor-
mation about a patient is processed and/or stored. This kind of information
should be accessed by authorized users only. It is critical that health per-
sonnel gains access to the right information at the right time.
Several Norwegian health instances have given priority to the improve-
ment of access control in health information systems. For example, access
control is an important part of KITH’s EPR-standard, where the objective
is that the EPR (based on the standard) has an access control mechanism
where the legislation’s intentions are followed with as high usability and
performance as possible. Access control is also mentioned in HEMIT’s IT-
architecture strategy, where single sign-on is required. Single sign-on means
that the user only has to authenticate himself once per session regardless of
which system he may access.
In the health service a combination of different types of access control
is often used. Two of the mostly used access control types are described
below.
Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC), is a special type of access control where
all users of a system are assigned roles and access decisions are based on
these roles. This is shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: RBAC relationships [6].
In RBAC, users are granted membership in a role according to their
competence and responsibility in the organization. The operations that the
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users are permitted to perform are defined according to the role they belong
to. Thus, a role is actually a set of permissions which are given to a user
through the role [6].
RBAC supports, among others, the principle of least privilege. The
principle of least privilege requires that users are given no more privileges
than necessary to perform their tasks. In RBAC, this is achieved by a
configuration that only allows users to perform an action if they are assigned
a role which that action requires.
There are two types of roles which are used in RBAC:
• Static roles are used where a user is registered with one role in the
system and keeps this role as long as he is registered in the system.
Role assignment is done by a system administrator.
• Dynamic roles are used in cases where one person can change roles
quite often. Role assignment in such cases is done automatically by
the system. An example can be rosters used for assigning roles to users
like Active shift worker or Shift supervisor.
Within the health domain dynamic roles are the most relevant.
The motivation for RBAC in health information systems is that health
personnel is dependent on communication with other people for doing their
work tasks. This dependency on the other people is based on their role, not
identity. The identity is irrelevant as long as the person concerned has the
knowledge associated with the particular role.
Context-based
In context-based access control, access decisions are based upon the user’s
context. The context could be time, the location of the user, people or
technical devices the user is close to, communication channel or strength of
user authentication. For example, if the context is the location of the user,
access rights are dependent on the network address the user operates from.
Compared to RBAC, context-based access control is less specific, and it
is more like a property than an access control mechanism.
Nevertheless, integrated health information systems should be context-
sensitive with a combination of role-based and context-based access control,
making access control even stronger and more dynamic. Health personnel
should have roles based on superior profession combined with ward belong-
ing, rosters and patient relations for the purpose of dynamic roles.
Users’ ward belonging restricts access to information only belonging to
patients associated with the particular ward. Health personnel may have
duties on different wards and hospitals, and the ward belonging is dependent
on this. For example, a nurse may have the responsibility as a head nurse
on one duty and the responsibility as a regular nurse on another duty.
38 Information security in the health sector
Rosters should constitute a part of the role definition because they in-
clude access with time constraints. A doctor on duty has the right to access
particular patient information, while a doctor not on duty does not have the
right to access patient information at all.
Roles based on patient relations take different patient relations, such as
doctor-patient, specialist-patient or surgeon-patient, into account, where the
doctor, specialist and surgeon may be the same person.
The access control mechanism within one single health information sys-
tem is probably different from the mechanism within an integrated solution
because an integrated solution consists of several health information systems
with already existing access control mechanisms. An integrated solution
might demand new principles, models and methods for an integrated access
control mechanism. Also, it is most likely that an integrated solution has
more users than a single system, and the access control mechanism within an
integration solution is therefore more complex than the one within a single
system.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has presented important legal requirements and security mech-
anisms which must be kept in mind when creating the architectural descrip-
tion for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. In addition to being security focused,
the architectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system should also fo-
cus on integration. Different integration architectures are described in the
following chapter.
Chapter 6
Integration architectures
Since CARDIAC’s EOC-system will be integrated with other health infor-
mation systems, an integration architecture is needed for the creation of
the architectural description. Four common integration architectures are
therefore described in this chapter.
HEMIT’s proposed integration architecture will also be presented in this
chapter because CARDIAC is supposed to deliver their first installation
of the EOC-system within the Health Region for Central Norway where
HEMIT’s strategies prevail.
CARDIAC has developed a middleware platform, IMATIS Platform,
which should be used in the realization of the integration architecture for the
EOC-system. IMATIS Platform is therefore also described in this chapter.
6.1 Information-oriented system integration
Information-oriented system integration is a simple mechanism for the ex-
change of information between two or more systems. This process is shown
in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: When using information-oriented system integration, informa-
tion is moved between two or more systems [13].
Ideally, integration should occur between the databases or information-
producing APIs of the integrating systems. The information exchanged be-
tween systems is plain information, not processes or system services.
Information-oriented system integration is easy to understand and in
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wide use. It does not contain any notion of behavior which means that it
does not deal with complex issues such as state, logic or sequence.
But, information-oriented system integration is not as simple as it might
seem at first glance. The book Next Generation Application Integration [13]
states that “in order for information-oriented system integration to actually
work, architects and developers need to understand all integrated systems in
detail”. One of the problems that might emerge when using this integration
architecture is that different systems might have different semantics, and in
such cases, systems might end up not understanding each other at all.
Information-oriented system integration does not regard business logic
and methods within the source or target systems. In cases where business
logic and methods are relevant, service-oriented system integration should
be used. Service-oriented system integration is explained in Section 6.3.
6.2 Business process oriented system integration
Business process oriented system integration produces a layer of defined and
centrally managed processes on top of existing processes, application services
and information within any set of systems. The goal is to combine relevant
processes to support the flow of information and to control the logic between
them.
Business process oriented system integration is the ability to define a
common business process model that addresses the sequence, hierarchy,
events, execution logic and information flow between systems residing in
the same organization and systems residing in multiple organizations. This
common business process model is integrated with the underlying systems by
having visibility into their internal system processes, if possible, or perhaps
through more primitive layers, such as the database or application interface.
This integration architecture is complimentary to both information-oriented
and service-oriented system integration, and even portal-oriented in some
cases. As shown in Figure 6.2, business process oriented system integration
is really a complete layer above the other integration architectures with the
goal to abstract both the encapsulated system services and system infor-
mation into a single controlling business process model. The architecture
consists of three layers:
1. Business process oriented system integration. At this layer the
system service of information movement is defined.
2. Transformation, routing and rules. At this layer information
movement and formatting occur.
3. Messaging service. This layer is responsible for moving information
between all participating systems.
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Figure 6.2: Business process oriented system integration provides another
layer of control over information-oriented and service-oriented system inte-
gration.
With this three layered architecture, information ascends through the
layers from the source system where it is processed and descends to the
target system where it is delivered.
6.3 Service-oriented system integration
Service-oriented system integration provides a mechanism for binding differ-
ent information systems together at the service layer. With service-oriented
system integration organizations are allowed to share common system ser-
vices as well as information. A system service is a procedure, method or
object with a stable, published interface that can be invoked [1]. Service-
oriented system integration is accomplished either by defining system ser-
vices that can be shared, and therefore integrated, or by providing the in-
frastructure for such system service sharing. System services may be shared
either by hosting them on a central server or by accessing them through
distributed objects or standard Web services mechanisms [13].
The book Next Generation Application Integration [13] claims that a
proper use of Web services is the future of system integration. Web services
promise to move beyond the simple exchange of information, which is the
dominating mechanism for system integration today, to the concept of ac-
cessing system services that are encapsulated within old and new systems.
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This means that organizations cannot only move information from system
to system, they can also access back-end services found in any number of
systems, local or remote. This is the idea behind service-oriented system
integration, shown in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3: A realization of service-oriented system integration by means of
Web services.
The definition of Web services varies from generic and all-inclusive in-
terpretations, such as ”Web services provide access to remote application
services through the Internet” [13], to more specific and restrictive types,
such as ”Web services describe a standardized way of integrating Web-based
applications using the XML 1, SOAP 2, WSDL 3 and UDDI 4 open standards
over an Internet protocol backbone. XML is used to tag the data, SOAP is
used to transfer the data, WSDL is used for describing the services available,
and UDDI is used for listening what services are available” [62]. As shown in
Figure 6.4, a basic Web services architecture is comprised of SOAP, WSDL
and UDDI.
In short, Web services can be thought of as system services exposed by an
organization or software program that are both discoverable and accessible
by other programs or organizations that are in need of a particular service,
such as purchasing an order or reserving a flight. These services are discrete
business services with value for many organizations.
1XML is the abbreviation for eXtensible Markup Language
2SOAP is the abbreviation for Simple Object Access Protocol
3WSDL is the abbreviation for Web Services Description Language
4UDDI is the abbreviation for Universal Description, Discovery and Integration
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Figure 6.4: Critical elements of a basic Web services architecture [20].
6.4 Portal-oriented system integration
Portal-oriented system integration has become a common and widely used
integration architecture by which system integration is accomplished. It is
the concept of bringing together information from many different systems,
both internal and external systems, within a single user interface.
Portal-oriented system integration avoids the back-end integration prob-
lem altogether by extending the user interface of each system to a common,
aggregated user interface - most often a Web browser. All participating
systems are integrated through the browser, although they are not directly
integrated within or between the organizations; each back-end system is
accessed through a point of integration e.g. a user interface, database or
application server.
In reality, portals are Web-enabled applications consisting of the follow-
ing components [13]:
• Web clients are a PC or any device running a Web browser. The Web
browser makes requests to the Web server and processes the results
from this server.
• Web servers are at the core file servers. Within the concept of por-
tals, Web servers are essential because they enable access to informa-
tion on database servers or application servers.
• Database servers respond to requests and return information.
• Back-end systems exist either within a single organization or across
many organizations. Portals gather the appropriate information from
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these back-end systems and externalize this information through the
user interface typically by means of connectors, adapters or APIs.
• Application servers provide a middle layer between the back-end
systems, databases and the Web servers. They provide the interface
development environments (IDEs) for designing the user interface, pro-
gramming environment for defining system behavior and back-end con-
nectors for moving information in and out of back-end systems.
The portal-oriented integration architecture with its components is shown
in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: The portal-oriented integration architecture and its components
[13].
6.5 HEMIT’s integration architecture
HEMIT’s strategies, which are mentioned in Section 3.2.3, are central in
this thesis since HEMIT operates in the Health Region for Central Norway
where the first installation of CARDIAC’s EOC-system shall run. HEMIT
has proposed an integration strategy [51] and an IT architecture strategy
[47]. HEMIT recommends a service-oriented architecture where services may
be presented through a portal. The service-oriented architecture implies that
the integrated systems expose their functionality as services (Web services).
The suggested service-oriented architecture is divided into layers HEMIT:
Application layer covers the presentation of data to the users. To reduce
complexity regarding integration of health information systems, all different
interfaces between systems have to be removed. One common user interface
is required. The application layer consumes services from the service layer.
Service layer contains and organizes the business logic in a structured
way. As shown in Figure 6.6, the services are grouped into logical service
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areas, such as patient and record, which are related to the business processes
relevant for the application layer.
The service layer should provide services implemented as Microsoft .NET
components accessible as Web services. SOAP, WSDL and UDDI are the
proposed Web service technology [47].
Source system layer comprises existing source systems, such as PAS,
EPR-systems and laboratory systems.
The information model in the source system layer should be non-replication.
Replication of data as a consequence of the integration need should be
avoided. This means that it is not acceptable to replicate information from
system A to another system B.
An example of what these layers may comprise is shown in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: HEMIT’s recommended service-oriented integration architec-
ture.
6.6 IMATIS Platform
CARDIAC has developed a middleware platform called IMATIS Platform,
which they are hoping to use when integrating the EOC-system with other
health information systems. The IMATIS Platform is a system platform of
different modules containing different software adapted to different busi-
nesses and their varying requirements. The IMATIS Platform provides
clients with complex data systems a powerful means to integrate and com-
bine data from numerous sources. The IMATIS Platform gives access to
real-time data from laboratory, warehouse, Web services or other systems
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through a common platform. Historical data and calculations are available
through the Web browser and can be presented as trends, reports, tables or
graphs.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the IMATIS Platform. As shown in this figure,
IMATIS Platform is service-oriented and portal-oriented.
Figure 6.7: IMATIS Platform is a service-oriented and portal-oriented mid-
dleware platform.
6.7 Summary
Sometimes a combination of the integration architectures presented above
is common to completely describe the architecture of integrated health in-
formation systems with different natures.
As mentioned earlier, HEMIT’s two strategies have to be followed when
developing CARDIAC’s EOC-system. These two strategies aim for a service-
oriented architecture where functionality is presented through a common
user interface, a portal.
In addition, CARDIAC has already developed IMATIS Platform, a mid-
dleware platform which is based on a service-oriented and portal-oriented
integration architecture, and they want to implement the EOC-system on
this platform.
Following HEMIT’s recommendations together with the other aspects
mentioned above, CARDIAC’s EOC-system should be developed on the
basis of a service-oriented and portal-oriented integration architecture.
Chapter 7
Summary
Part II puts focus on the Norwegian health service in general and CAR-
DIAC’s EOC-system specifically.
CARDIAC’s EOC-system is supposed to be integrated with several other
health information systems. The following health information systems are
chosen for integration: EPR-system, PAS, RoS, Medication, EQS and MTU.
The prestudy has also identified important security mechanisms which
will be included in the architectural description. These mechanisms are:
digital signing, secure communication, auditing and access control.
Finally, a service-oriented and portal-oriented integration architecture
was chosen for CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
All this information is necessary in order to get a solid basis for describing
a security focused integration architecture for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. In
the next part of the report a methodology for creating an architectural
description is presented.
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Part III
Methodology

Chapter 8
Introduction
Creating an architectural description of a system is a complex task with
many issues that need to be kept in mind. Therefore, it is often useful to
have a methodology or a tool for guidance through the most important parts
of an architectural description.
Model-based Architecture Framework For Information Integration Ab-
straction (MAFIIA) is an architectural description framework which is suit-
able as a method for creating an architectural description for CARDIAC’s
EOC-system.
Figure 8.1: Overview of MAFIIA, specializations and use.
Figure 8.1 gives an overview of the architectural description frameworks
and their relations. The MAFIIA architectural description framework con-
sists of two parts: a generic part and a part which is specially target to-
wards Information Integration Systems (IIS). In addition, two extensions of
MAFIIA are shown in the figure, MAFIIA/H and MAFIIA/RBAC.
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Chapter 9
MAFIIA
This chapter gives an overview of the Model-based Architecture description
Framework for Information Integration Abstraction (MAFIIA) [16], which
is an architectural description framework for software intensive systems.
MAFIIA architectural description framework assists software architects
in developing the architecture of a system. The focus of the framework lies
on development, documentation and specialization for domain and appli-
cation types. MAFIIA is created by SINTEF Telecom and Informatics in
Trondheim.
Although the MAFIIA architectural description framework consists of
two parts, respectively a generic part and a part concerned with informa-
tion integration systems, only the generic part will be described in this
chapter. The reason for this is that integration is central in this thesis and
the importance of the second part of the MAFIIA architectural description
framework is enhanced by placing it in a separate chapter.
9.1 MAFIIA Concepts
The generic part of the MAFIIA architectural description framework, hereby
referred to as generic MAFIIA, defines a number of concepts and explains
their use in an architectural description. These concepts and their relations
are shown in Figure 9.1. A description of each concept is found in the
following sections.
9.2 Concerns
The generic MAFIIA mentions the possibility of having specific concerns
when creating the system. Concerns deal with the documentation of the
functionality of the system. Important functionality, being the system’s
capabilities and services of the system, should be treated as a concern.
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Figure 9.1: MAFIIA concepts and their interrelations. Adapted from the
generic MAFIIA [16].
Some examples of concerns could be flexibility, performance, maintainability,
safety and security.
The concerns in the generic MAFIIA are grouped into two groups: Ap-
plication Specific Functionality Concerns (ASFC) and Quality Related Func-
tionality Concerns (QRFC). ASFC deals with functionality which would be
necessary in an ideal world where system failures and performance problems
are not considered. This kind of functionality may, or may not, be possible
to implement in real life. QRFC is related to all types of functionality which
is used to improve the system quality.
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9.3 System assets
System assets are resources that are considered useful when creating the
architectural description of the target system. These can be specific stan-
dards, general architectural patterns or (software) tools which can help the
process of creating the architectural description.
Assets listed in the generic MAFIIA are Dictionary, Standards and Pat-
terns.
9.4 Reference architecture
In this architectural description framework, a reference architecture is de-
fined as ”a high-level architecture which is used as the basis in development
of concrete system architectures”.
An architecture of this type only separates the target system from the
environment and the interface used between them. Figure 9.2 shows the
generic reference architecture defined in MAFIIA.
Figure 9.2: The reference architecture defined in the generic MAFIIA [16].
9.5 Stakeholders and roles
Different people who are involved in a project have different interests in
the system which is being developed. This means that these people, the
stakeholders, have different roles in the process of creating the architectural
description of the system. The generic MAFIIA does not define specific
stakeholders. The stakeholder definition is based on the description in the
IEEE1471-2000 standard which says that the stakeholders normally fill two
key roles. These are the role of the acquirer and the role of the architect.
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9.6 Modeling language
A modeling language is a semi-formal notation used to express design [8].
An equally understood and agreed upon modeling language helps discuss
and communicate the architectural description. The generic MAFIIA de-
fines UML 1.4 as a modeling language, with the addition of textual descrip-
tions, for the documentation of the different viewpoints. The use of UML is
mandatory.
9.7 Viewpoints
Computer software systems are often so complex that it is difficult to un-
derstand them all at once. An addition to the complexity of discussing the
structure of the system, is the different background and concerns of the
stakeholders. To make the discussion of a system structure manageable, it
is useful to restrict the attention to a smaller subset of the system structure,
namely views and viewpoints.
A view is defined to be the representation of a coherent set of archi-
tectural elements, as written by and read by system stakeholders [2]. A
viewpoint is a description on how to create a view. In other words, a view
is what you see when looking at the system from a specific viewpoint [16].
In the generic MAFIIA, a viewpoint consists of one or more models, a
description of how to view a system and recommendations for what diagrams
to use in each of the models. Five viewpoints are defined in the generic
MAFIIA:
• Context viewpoint is concerned with the environment of the system,
such as stakeholders of the system and other systems which the actual
system is connected to.
• Requirement viewpoint has its focus on functionality and quality
of the system.
• Component viewpoint deals with the decomposition of the system
into physical and logical components.
• Distribution viewpoint takes care of the logical organization of the
system, e.g. the logical distribution of software and hardware compo-
nents.
• Realization viewpoint describes the realization of the subsystems
and possible constraints on implementation and deployment of the
system’s components.
Table 9.1 gives an overview of all viewpoints in the generic MAFIIA and
the models recommended for use in each viewpoint.
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Viewpoint Models required Description
Context
viewpoint
Business Aspects
Model
Gives an understanding of what
problems the system is sup-
posed to solve and what func-
tionality it should implement.
Only users of the system and
the processes they carry out are
included.
Environment Systems
Model
Concerned with other systems
in the environment and their re-
lations to the target system.
Business to System
Mapping Model
Shows the mapping of Business
Aspects Model to technical so-
lutions of the Environment Sys-
tem Model.
Requirement
viewpoint
Requirement Model Lists all the relevant require-
ments for the system.
Target System Inter-
face Model
Gives a more complete and eas-
ier specification of the require-
ments from the Requirements
Model
Component
viewpoint
System Information
Model
Shows relationships between in-
formation objects in the system.
System Decomposi-
tion Model
Shows the division of the sys-
tem into subsystems and rela-
tions between them.
System Collaboration
Model
Concerned with how the sub-
systems or components interact
with each other.
Component and In-
terface Specification
Model
Shows the details of the compo-
nents and interfaces which were
already defined in the System
Decomposition Model and Sys-
tem Collaboration Model.
Distribution
viewpoint
System Distribution
Model
Gives an overview of the logical
components of the system and
how they are organized.
Role Distribution
Model
Shows the distribution of the
roles which are defined in the
system.
Realization
viewpoint
System Deployment
Model
Shows the physical relations be-
tween software and hardware
components of the system.
Technology Mapping
Model
Shows how the system compo-
nents map into the actual im-
plementation in hardware and
software.
System Integration
Test Model
Describes test scenarios for use
in verification of the correctness
of the system behavior.
Table 9.1: Overview of viewpoints and models in the generic MAFIIA.
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9.8 Context viewpoint
The purpose of the context viewpoint is to describe the environments to
the target system in terms of its business-related aspects, other involved
technical systems and the mapping of business aspects to the target system.
The context view shall only document the environments of the target system,
and not the target systems itself.
Stakeholders that are addressed in this viewpoint are acquirers, such as
buyers, customers, owners, users or purchasers and architects.
Required models in the context view are:
• Business Aspects Model
• Environment System Model
• Business to System Mapping Model
9.8.1 Business Aspects Model
The business aspects model shall document any business related concern
that will increase the understanding of what problems the target system shall
solve, or what functionality it shall implement. It takes customer supplied
information as input, i.e. requirements to target system and business related
information. This model may result in a textual description, a UML class
diagram, a UML use case diagram or a UML collaboration diagram.
9.8.2 Environment Systems Model
The environment systems model shall document other technical systems
(environment systems) that will be involved in the implementation of the
Business Aspects Model, or influence the operation of the target system.
The input to this model is customer supplied information, i.e. target system
requirement specifications and environment system documentation. The
output from such a model may be a textual description, a UML sequence
diagram, a UML use case diagram or a UML collaboration diagram.
9.8.3 Business to System Mapping Model
The purpose of the Business to System Mapping Model is to document what
parts of the documented Business Aspects Model are mapped to technical so-
lutions constituted by environment systems and the target system, and how
the different parts of the Business Aspect Model are mapped to the different
involved systems. The input comes through customer supplied information,
i.e. target system requirement specifications and requirements/needs re-
lated to the business aspects. The output of this model is either a textual
description or a UML use case.
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9.9 Requirement viewpoint
The requirement viewpoint deals with describing functional and non-functional
(quality) requirements of the target system. It consists of the following mod-
els:
• Requirement Model
• Target System Interface Model
9.9.1 Requirement Model
The Requirement Model shall be complete in identifying and eventually
specifying all relevant requirements to the target system where a requirement
shall be verified. The input to this model comes from the context viewpoint
and the output may be a textual description, a UML sequence diagram, a
UML collaboration diagram, a UML use case or a UML class diagram.
9.9.2 Target System Interface Model
The Target System Interface Model should be a supplementary specification
to the Requirement Model to obtain more complete and easier understand-
able specification of the target system’s interfacing to its environments. In-
put to this model is the Business to System Mapping Model and the Require-
ment Model. This model may be presented by a UML sequence diagram, a
UML use case diagram or a UML collaboration diagram.
9.10 Component viewpoint
Component viewpoint has its focus on information, system decomposition,
system collaboration and component and interface specification.
The viewpoint consists of the following models:
• System Information Model
• System Decomposition Model
• System Collaboration Model
• Component and Interface Specification Model
9.10.1 System Information Model
The purpose of the System Information Model is to specify the relationships
between and properties of the central information objects in the system
that must always be true (invariants). Input to this model comes from the
requirement viewpoint. UML class diagrams and textual descriptions are
suggested outputs for this model.
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9.10.2 System Decomposition Model
The System Decomposition Model describes how the system is divided into
different subsystems or components, and how these are related to form a
coherent whole. This model takes input from the requirement viewpoint.
UML class diagrams are suggested as output for this model.
9.10.3 System Collaboration Model
The purpose of the System Collaboration Model is to describe the main
interactions in the system as a set of collaborating components. Input to
this model comes from the Target System Interface Model (Requirement
viewpoint). Recommended output is a UML class diagram, a UML activ-
ity diagram, a UML sequence diagram, a UML collaboration diagram or a
textual description (area of concern).
9.10.4 Component and Interface Specification Model
This models describes each of the main components and interfaces of the tar-
get system, including operation signatures and behavior. Input to this model
should be the requirement viewpoint, the System Decomposition Model
and/or the System Collaboration Model (Component viewpoint). Recom-
mended output may be a UML class diagram, a UML state chart diagram
or a textual description.
9.11 Distribution viewpoint
The distribution viewpoint deals with the logical separation of components.
The following models are a part of this viewpoint:
• System Distribution Model
• Role Distribution Model
9.11.1 System Distribution Model
The System Distribution Model shall describe logical units or components
that must be distributed and deployed together. Input to this model is the
System Decomposition Model and the System Collaboration Model (Com-
ponent viewpoint). Possible output may be a UML deployment diagram or
a textual description (rationale).
9.11.2 Role Distribution Model
This model describes the distribution of the different roles that are a part
of the target system. The input to this model may be the Business Aspects
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Model (Context viewpoint) and the System Distribution Model (Distribu-
tion viewpoint). Recommended output is a UML deployment diagram or a
textual description.
9.12 Realization viewpoint
The realization viewpoint is concerned with the implementation of the target
system. It consists of the following models:
• System Deployment Model
• Technology Mapping Model
• System Integration Test Model
9.12.1 System Deployment Model
The purpose of this model is to describe the set of system deployment config-
urations. Input to this model could be the System Distribution Model (Dis-
tribution viewpoint) or the Requirement Model (Requirement viewpoint).
Possible output from this model may be a UML deployment diagram or a
textual description.
9.12.2 Technology Mapping Model
The Technology Mapping Model shall describe how system components map
to technological solutions, concepts and mechanisms. Recommended input
to this model may be the Requirement Model (Requirement viewpoint),
Component and Interface Specification Model (Component viewpoint), Sys-
tem Distribution Model (Distribution viewpoint) and System Deployment
Model (Realization Viewpoint). Possible output may be a UML component
diagram, a UML deployment diagram or a textual description.
9.12.3 System Integration Test Model
The purpose of the System Integration Test Model is to describe a set of
test scenarios to be conducted during system deployment (subsystem in-
tegration). The input to this model comes from the Requirement Model
(Requirement viewpoint) and the System Deployment Model (Realization
viewpoint). The output may be given in textual descriptions.
9.13 Summary
This chapter has introduced and described the generic part of the MAFIIA
architectural description framework. The generic MAFIIA defines a set of
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concepts and prescribes how to use these in the architectural description
of a system. Central parts of the generic MAFIIA are: Concerns, Assets,
Reference architecture, Stakeholders and roles, Modeling language and View-
points.
As mentioned earlier, the MAFIIA architectural description framework
consists of one generic part and one specific part for integration systems.
The generic part is the one presented in this chapter, and it is later referred
to as the generic MAFIIA. The specific part is introduced in the following
chapter and referred to as MAFIIA for IIS.
Chapter 10
MAFIIA for Information
Integration Systems (IIS)
The MAFIIA architectural description framework contains a part which
is specially targeted towards Information Integration Systems (IIS). Still,
throughout this thesis MAFIIA for IIS is handled as a separate architectural
description framework because this thesis has a special focus on integration.
IIS deals with integration of environment systems into a target system,
meaning that two or more environment systems must be interfaced with the
target system and that the functionality of the target system will perform
physical and/or logical integration of information from the environment sys-
tems. In addition, the target system may produce information or events that
shall be communicated to the environment systems.
MAFIIA for IIS contains guidance and recommendations for the devel-
opment and documentation of the architecture of IIS systems.
10.1 IIS specific concepts
The structuring of this chapter follows the structure of the generic MAFIIA
and contains the same concepts, namely:
• Concerns
• System assets
• Reference architecture
• Stakeholders and roles
• Modeling language
• Viewpoints
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10.2 IIS specific concerns
Two specific concerns are presented in an information integration context,
functionality and security. All new functionality introduced must be in-
cluded as functional requirements in the requirement viewpoint of the frame-
work and be reflected in the other viewpoints. Security is considered to be
very important when integrating information from different systems and
should therefore be treated as a separate concern in MAFIIA for IIS.
10.3 IIS specific system assets
A separate dictionary is created for integration of information systems. Data
warehouses, federated databases, information transformation and integra-
tion are concepts which are defined in the dictionary.
Use of different standards for middleware services, communication pro-
tocols and databases and information exchange is suggested.
MAFIIA for IIS also contains suggestions for use of several architectural
and design patterns. The use of architectural and design patterns helps cap-
turing best practice solutions; they reuse experience. The patterns suggested
in MAFIIA for IIS are:
• Adapter pattern converts interfaces of existing resources to the ex-
pected interfaces [9].
• Blackboard pattern assemblies knowledge from several specialized
subsystems to build a possibly partial or approximate solution.
• Client-Server-Dispatcher pattern provides location transparency
between clients and servers [3].
• Composite pattern lets clients treat individual objects and compo-
sitions of objects uniformly [9].
• Fac¸ade pattern constructs a fac¸ade interface, which is a unified in-
terface to a set of interfaces in a subsystem. Clients only access the
subsystem through the fac¸ade [9].
• Flyweight pattern uses sharing to support large numbers of fine-
grained objects efficiently [9].
• Forwarder-Receiver pattern provides transparent interprocessing
communication for software systems with a peer-to-peer interaction
model [3].
• Master-Slave pattern constructs a master component which distrib-
utes work to identical slave components and computes a final result
from the results these slaves return [3].
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• Pipes and Filters pattern divides tasks of a system into a sequence
of processing steps [3].
• Proxy pattern makes the clients of a component communicate with
a representative rather that the component itself [3].
• Publisher-Subscriber pattern synchronizes the state of cooperat-
ing components by a one-way propagation of changes: one publisher
notifies any number of subscribers about changes to its state [3].
• Reflection pattern provides a mechanism for changing the structure
and behavior of software systems dynamically [3].
• Wrapper Fac¸ade pattern constructs a wrapper fac¸ade interface
which encapsulates functionality only available through non-object-
oriented API’s [4].
10.4 IIS specific reference architecture
Figure 10.1 shows a basic reference architecture for IIS systems. The only
difference between this reference architecture and the generic reference ar-
chitecture presented in Chapter 9, is the environment part of the reference
architecture. The IIS specific reference architecture is targeted towards in-
tegration of systems, and it therefore connects the environment interface of
the target system towards the user interface of other systems.
Figure 10.1: IIS specific reference architecture.
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10.5 IIS specific viewpoints
MAFIIA for IIS suggests two new models, namely the System Security Model
in the component viewpoint and the System Security Model in the distribu-
tion viewpoint. These two models are described in the subsequent sections.
10.5.1 System Security Model (Component viewpoint)
The purpose with the System Security Model is to describe how security
concerns are handled by the components in the target system. Input to this
model is the requirement viewpoint and the Decomposition Model (Com-
ponent viewpoint). Recommended output from this model is a UML class
diagram, a UML sequence diagram, a UML state chart diagram or textual
description.
10.5.2 System Security Model (Distribution viewpoint)
The System Security Model in the distribution viewpoint shall describe the
effects of the security concerns on the other models defined in the distrib-
ution viewpoint. Input is the System Security Model from the component
viewpoint, while output may be a UML use case diagram, UML collabora-
tion diagram or textual description.
10.6 Summary
MAFIIA for IIS is a specialization of the generic MAFIIA. MAFIIA for IIS
contains guidance and recommendations for development and documenta-
tion of the architecture of IIS systems.
MAFIIA for IIS recommends that security is specified as a concern.
MAFIIA for IIS also extends the generic MAFIIA with two new models:
System Security Model in the component viewpoint and System Security
Model in the distribution viewpoint.
Chapter 11
MAFIIA/H
MAFIIA/H [17] is an extension of the MAFIIA architectural framework
which is specifically targeted towards the health domain. MAFIIA/H is
developed by SINTEF Telecom and Informatics in Trondheim. It describes
system assets and concerns that are typical for IIS systems in the health
domain. These system assets and concerns should be taken into account
when developing an architectural description for IIS systems, and they are
therefore described further below.
11.1 Health care specific assets
In the following, relevant assets for the health domain will be described.
11.1.1 Dictionaries
Some available health care dictionaries are listed below:
• Systemized Nomenclature of Human and veterinary Medi-
cine (SNOMED) is recognized globally as a comprehensive, mul-
tiaxial, controlled terminology created for the indexing of the entire
medical record [54].
• Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) supports the de-
velopment of systems that help health professionals and researchers
retrieve and integrate electronic biomedical information from a vari-
ety of sources and make it easy for users to link disparate information
systems [53].
• The GALEN project aims at the development of a reference model
for medical concepts [52].
• International Classification of Diseases (ICD) is an international
standard diagnostic classification for all general epidemiological and
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many health management purposes [55]. Translated to Norwegian by
KITH and others.
• International Classification of Primary Care (ICPC) is a two-
axis system primarily oriented towards body systems [55]. Translated
to Norwegian by KITH and others.
When integrating information from semantically heterogeneous sources,
it is necessary to use a dictionary. The original information sources must
be related to the dictionary according to certain rules for translations in
order to provide a common information model for the integrated system.
The mapping or translation can be done by using standard patterns for
information integration.
The interfacing systems’ information models and dictionaries should be
identified and documented as part of the context viewpoint, while the strat-
egy for mapping or translation should be described in the System Informa-
tion Model as part of the component viewpoint.
11.1.2 Standards
There are many types of standards that have to be followed when architect-
ing a new IIS. Some of them are international, while others are national, e.g.
legislations regarding documentation of work done by health care providers.
Some relevant Norwegian legislations and regulations are listed below:
• Health Personnel Act 1 [36].
• Patients’ Rights Act 2 [38].
• Patient Record Regulations 3 [43].
MAFIIA/H also lists some international standards for standardizing the
information models within the health domain:
• CEN TC251 is a standardization to achieve compatibility and in-
teroperability between independent systems and to enable modularity
[48].
• Health Level 7 (HL7) is an ANSI4 standard for health care specific
data exchange between computer applications. The name Health Level
7 refers to the top layer (Level 7) of the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) layer protocol for the health environment [44].
1Norwegian: Helsepersonelloven
2Norwegian: Pasientrettighetsloven
3Norwegian: Pasientjournalforskriften
4American National Standards Institute
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• ISO 18308: Health Informatics standard technically specifies
how to assemble and collate a set of clinical and technical requirements
for an EPR architecture that supports using, sharing, and exchanging
EPRs across different health sectors, different countries, and differ-
ent models of health care delivery. It suggests requirements for the
architecture but not the specifications of the architecture itself [45].
• Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce
and Transport (EDIFACT) is used as a messaging standard in
health care [66].
• DICOM is a picture standard that covers all areas related to the
transportation, storage and display of medical pictures [66].
In the health domain, the World Health Organization (WHO) plays an
important role in the standardization process. In Norway, KITH is respon-
sible for the standardization work.
11.2 Health care specific concerns
Health informatics involves a high degree of sensitive information. Security
is therefore treated as a separate concern in MAFIIA/H. In MAFIIA/H, four
major aspects of medical security is identified. These aspects are presented
in the subsequent sections.
11.2.1 Reliability
More and more health care organizations become dependent on the func-
tioning of their information systems. This implies that reliability is a major
concern for these kinds of systems.
11.2.2 Data completeness
When integrating data from heterogeneous information sources, some record
fields may become incomplete. Incomplete data may result in uncertainty.
When data are not found in the patient record, this might mean that no
abnormalities were found, the data were not available or collected, or that
it was lost during integration. Thus, data completeness must be handled
thoroughly during information integration.
11.2.3 Data accuracy
MAFIIA/H characterizes data accuracy as correctness or conformity. Cor-
rectness is a measure of the error rate of the data. Errors can be made
during data collection and during integration of data. Conformity of data
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pertains to following standards of classification systems for data recording.
Sometimes instructions of the classification systems are not conformed.
Integration of data from systems being operated and maintained by dif-
ferent departments may lead to data inaccuracy and errors.
11.2.4 Data precision
Data precision deals with the degree of refinement or granularity by which
a measurement is expressed, such as the number of decimal places.
11.3 Summary
In this chapter, MAFIIA/H is introduced. MAFIIA/H is an extension of
MAFIIA, and it describes concerns and assets related to the health domain.
These concerns and assets should be taken into account when developing an
architectural description of an IIS system.
Chapter 12
MAFIIA/RBAC
MAFIIA/RBAC is the result of a student project done by Andreas G. Fu-
ruseth and Mirela Divic, during the fall of 2004 [32]. MAFIIA/RBAC is an
extension of the MAFIIA architectural description framework [16], which
was described in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10. The purpose with MAFIIA/R-
BAC is to add a specific concern to MAFIIA, and this concern is to achieve
access control with the use of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
As stated in MAFIIA/RBAC [32], this extension is a theoretically cre-
ated architectural description framework and future work in MAFIIA/R-
BAC suggests to use it in creating an architectural description of a real
system. One of the motivations behind this thesis is to try MAFIIA/R-
BAC on a real case within the health domain and verify the quality of this
framework.
12.1 RBAC specific concepts
MAFIIA/RBAC follows the structure and naming principle in the generic
MAFIIA. But with special attention on RBAC, MAFIIA/RBAC presents
certain changes to some of the concepts from MAFIIA and adds some new
models and ideas to the framework.
12.2 RBAC specific concerns
In MAFIIA/RBAC, RBAC is handled as a separate concern.
12.3 RBAC specific system assets
12.3.1 Standards
MAFIIA/RBAC presents two standards that are relevant for RBAC, namely:
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• The proposed NIST standard presents a reference model which
defines sets of basic RBAC elements and relations. Basic RBAC ele-
ments are subjects, roles, permissions and operations [6].
• Common Criteria is a standard that defines criteria for evaluation
of IT security. Different criteria for evaluation of IT security have been
developed in USA, Canada and Europe. Common Criteria combines
all these criteria into one common international standard [26].
12.3.2 Role-cards
MAFIIA/RBAC introduces the concept of role-cards for use when iden-
tifying roles relevant for the target systems. This technique is based on
the UML use case collaboration process from the book UML Distilled [8]
and the Class-Responsibility-Collaboration (CRC) card technique, which is
explained more in Using CRC cards [61]. Role-cards can be used on wide-
ranging roles, but their strength is seen when moving toward design level
roles. An advantage of using the role-card method is that stakeholders are
presented and familiarized with roles.
An example of role-cards is shown in Figure 12.1. The fields SSD and
DSD in the figure are concerned with separation of duties in RBAC.
SSD is an abbreviation for static separation of duties and puts constraints
on role assignment to users. A user who is assigned to one role may be
prevented from being a member of a second role.
DSD stands for dynamic separation of duties. It allows users to be
authorized for roles that may conflict, but it introduces limitations while
the user is active in the system [6]. DSD may for example deny a user to
be active in both roles at the same time, if the roles are in conflict (e.g.
mutually exclusive).
Figure 12.1: Sample figure of a role-card used for documenting/discussing
different roles. Idea to the sample role taken from CAPA [70].
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12.3.3 RBAC specific patterns
While no patterns are suggested in the generic MAFIIA, three different
patterns are suggested for use in MAFIIA/RBAC. These patterns are:
• Single access point pattern provides only one entry point for ac-
cessing a system or application.
• Check point pattern provides a structure for security checks accord-
ing to the given security policy.
• Role-based access control pattern assigns access rights to users
according to their roles in the organization.
12.4 RBAC specific reference architecture
MAFIIA/RBAC does not take environment systems into account. The refer-
ence architecture of MAFIIA/RBAC therefore does not include interfacing
towards environment systems. The reference architecture of MAFIIA/R-
BAC is shown in Figure 12.2.
Figure 12.2: The reference architecture of MAFIIA/RBAC.
12.5 Modeling language
In the generic MAFIIA it is mandatory to use Unified Modeling Language
(UML). MAFIIA/RBAC suggests use of UMLsec as a modeling language
in addition to the generic UML. UMLsec is a profile which allows security-
related information and concepts (e.g. smart cards, encryption, secrecy, ac-
cess control, integrity, etc.) in UML models. The profile contains stereotypes
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with tags and constraints to communicate security requirements and secu-
rity attainment. MAFIIA/RBAC only uses a subset of the defined stereo-
types from UMLsec. These stereotypes are: protected, role, right and guard.
UMLsec is described more thoroughly in C.10.
12.6 RBAC specific viewpoints
As mentioned earlier, MAFIIA/RBAC follows the structure and naming
principle of the generic MAFIIA and defines the same concepts and the
same viewpoints. In the case where the same models are used in MAFI-
IA/RBAC as in the generic MAFIIA, they are used in a new way, with
RBAC in mind. For more information on MAFIIA/RBAC, or the changes
from generic MAFIIA to MAFIIA/RBAC, see [32]. In addition to adding
RBAC to the models in the generic MAFIIA architectural description frame-
work, MAFIIA/RBAC also adds two new models to the framework. These
models are described in the subsequent sections.
12.6.1 Target Organization Security Policy Model
Target Organization Security Policy Model in the requirement viewpoint
identifies and connects the architectural description to the security policy of
the target system’s organization.
12.6.2 System Access Control Model
System Access Control Model in the component viewpoint describes the
relationship and properties of components in the system that form the access
control subsystem and how they enforce the security policy.
12.7 Summary
MAFIIA/RBAC is an extension of the MAFIIA architectural description
framework which is concerned with access control, more precisely RBAC.
MAFIIA/RBAC only focuses on RBAC inside the target system and does
not include interfacing environment systems in its reference architecture.
MAFIIA/RBAC adds role-cards, UMLsec, Target Organization Security
Policy Model (Requirement viewpoint) and System Access Control Model
(Component viewpoint).
Chapter 13
Summary
This part of the report has presented the architectural description frame-
works which will be used as tools in creating the architectural description
for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. Throughout the rest of this report, the ar-
chitectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system will primarily be based
on the generic MAFIIA. Where there is a special need for integration input,
MAFIIA for IIS will be used. Accordingly, where the health domain or role-
based access control play an important role, the extensions MAFIIA/H or
MAFIIA/RBAC will be used.
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Part IV
Architectural Description

Chapter 14
Introduction
The aim of this thesis is to create a description of a security focused integra-
tion architecture for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. This part constitutes the
architectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. The architectural
description is based on the MAFIIA architectural description frameworks,
and this part will therefore be organized following the structure in these
frameworks.
First concerns, assets and reference architecture are described. Then,
each viewpoint in MAFIIA is presented in subsequent chapters. The de-
scription of each viewpoint is a set of models, textual descriptions, tables
and diagrams which present various approaches to the architectural descrip-
tion.
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Chapter 15
Concepts
This chapter presents some of the MAFIIA concepts in relation to the system
that shall be developed based on this architectural description. The partic-
ular system is CARDIAC’s EOC-system. The EOC-system shall contain a
gathering of patient information from several different health information
systems.
Concepts described in this chapter are concerns, assets, reference archi-
tecture, stakeholders, roles and modeling language.
15.1 Concerns
An integration of health information systems in general has several advan-
tages:
• redundancy of information is prevented
• manual typing errors are reduced
• a common and comprehensive information base is available
The goal of such an integration is better quality of patient care and
increased efficiency of provided health services within the hospital.
But despite the above mentioned improvements, there are certain chal-
lenges that have to be managed when integrating health information sys-
tems. There are several laws and regulations concerning registration of a
patient’s medical history. In short, all information about a patient’s med-
ical treatment has to be stored in a patient record. The information in a
patient record is extremely sensitive and therefore needs to be highly pro-
tected. It is therefore important to maintain a high level of security in the
health information systems which constitute a patient record.
This section identifies security concerns that are of particular impor-
tance for an integration of health information systems, specially those sys-
tems which compose an EOC-system. The listed concerns will be specially
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treated in the viewpoints and models of the MAFIIA architectural descrip-
tion frameworks, and they will influence the architectural description for
CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
15.1.1 Digital signing
The value of a human life is immeasurable. When a person is hospitalized,
he is treated by several different doctors and nurses during one hospital stay.
It is therefore extremely important to be able to find out which doctor or
which nurse performed the treatment that may have caused a patient’s death
or deterioration in the clinical picture of a patient. Every action performed
towards a patient must therefore be registered in the EOC and signed by
the person responsible for it.
When integrating health information systems, the number of users in-
creases dramatically, and digital signing becomes even more important.
The mechanism used for digital signing of certificates or other documents
is a digital signature. A digital signature confirms that a particular person
has written and/or approved a document, and the receiver of the document
is able to prove that this person really signed it and that the document has
not been altered since the signing.
Typically, public key infrastructure (PKI) is used for digital signatures.
PKI is a collective term for technology providing unique digital identities
across networks, where digital identity is used for authentication, digital
signing of information and secure communication [65].
15.1.2 Secure communication
An integration of health information systems implies connecting the systems
through a network. In order to protect the sensitive patient information
which flows between the integrated systems, secure communication must be
enforced.
Secure communication includes secure transmission of information and
mutual authentication of the entities participating in the communication.
By far the most important automated tool providing secure communi-
cation is encryption. Both asymmetric (also referred to as public-key) and
symmetric (also referred to as conventional) encryption is in common use.
With asymmetric encryption, different keys are used for encryption and de-
cryption. The encryption key can be made public, while the decryption key
has to remain private. With symmetric encryption, a secret key is used for
both encryption and decryption [10]. Most commonly, symmetric encryption
is used in the main part of the communication, while asymmetric encryption
is used only to exchange a secret key.
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15.1.3 Auditing
When dealing with several integrated health information systems, it is im-
portant to have the possibility to analyze the behavior of users or possible
intruders, in order to detect security violations and improve the protection
of the system’s security. This analysis is often performed automatically on
the basis of an audit log.
Auditing is a posteriori technique for detection of security violations or
other suspicious events, with the purpose of ensuring traceability within the
system. This should include tracing access to sensitive information stored
in the information systems as well as access to the information systems
themselves. Each access and/or access attempt should be recorded in an
audit log for later analysis [10].
The audit log should include information about the one who is accessing
information, services or resources inside the system, the actual information,
services or resources which are accessed, and the time they are accessed.
15.1.4 Access control
Access control is known to be one of the most complex security mechanisms
in the health domain. Different users should have different access rights
to the information inside a system. Role-based access control (RBAC) is
mostly used within health information systems.
With RBAC, access decisions are based on users’ role(s) within the or-
ganization. Access rights are grouped by role name, and access is restricted
to users authorized to assume the associated role. In the health sector, users
should have roles based on superior profession combined with ward belong-
ing, rosters and patient relations for the purpose of dynamic roles. By adding
context-based constraints, such as rosters, to RBAC, access control is de-
termined dynamically based upon the current context of the request, rather
than just the role the user holds.
When integrating health information systems access control becomes
even more complex than described above. A person may be registered as a
user in two different systems. When these systems are integrated the user
should be able to access information in both systems. Keeping track of one
person, with separate userIDs in each subsystem, is a challenge. Making
sure that every user can access all the information he is allowed to access -
no more and no less - is a complex task.
Access control is usually implemented by means of two security mecha-
nisms; authentication and authorization. Authentication is concerned with
verifying that the initiator of a request has the identity which he claims
to have. Authorization determines whether the given identity is allowed
to access a resource or not. Authentication can be achieved with digital
signatures, while authorization can be ensured by use of roles.
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15.2 Assets
This section presents several definitions, standards, strategies, laws and reg-
ulations, role-cards and patterns relevant for integration of health informa-
tion systems. Information sources specially relevant for information security
are emphasized.
15.2.1 Dictionary
To avoid semantic misunderstandings, the following provides definitions for
key concepts used in this report:
• General health care concepts are presented and defined in Table 15.1.
• Information security related concepts are presented and defined in Ta-
ble 15.2.
• Architecture related concepts are presented and defined in Table 15.3.
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Concept Definition
CAVE Latin: avoid. Information about medicine al-
lergy, other allergies, etc.
Doctor A person who is authorized and licensed as a
doctor.
Electronic Observa-
tion Chart (EOC)
An observation chart in which information is
stored electronically and can be retrieved and
reused by means of suitable software. An EOC
is a part of the electronic patient record (EPR).
Electronic Patient
Record (EPR)
A patient record in which information is stored
electronically and can be retrieved and reused by
means of suitable software [36].
Enrolled nurse Health personnel who assists in the nursing care
under the direction and supervision of a regis-
tered nurse.
EPR-system A health information system with focus on doc-
ument handling for medical judgments, descrip-
tions and conclusions.
Health information Both medical and administrative information
about a patient.
Health information
system
An information system that electronically stores
health information.
Health personnel Personnel with an authorization or a license, per-
sonnel in the health services or in pharmacies
who perform acts as mentioned in §3, or pupils
and students who in training as health personnel
perform acts as mentioned in §3 in the Health
Personnel Act [36].
Lifeline A patient’s medical history from birth to death
shown as a time scale in the EOC-system.
Navigation caremap A read-only, navigation window in CARDIAC’s
EOC-system.
Patient A person that applies to the National Health Ser-
vice about health care or a person that the Na-
tional Health Service in individual cases give or
provide health services to [58].
Patient chart form A part of the EOC-system where users are al-
lowed to register information.
Registered nurse Health personnel who assists in patient care un-
der the direction of a doctor.
Table 15.1: Definition of general health care concepts essen-
tial for the architectural description.
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Concept Definition
Access Control Access control consists of authentication and au-
thorization. It is protection of resources against
unauthorized access; a process by which use of
resources is regulated according to a security pol-
icy and is permitted by only authorized system
entities according to that policy [19].
Auditing A posteriori technique for detection of security
violations or other suspicious events ensuring the
traceability within the system [10].
Authentication The process of determining that a user’s claimed
identity is legitimate [6].
Authorization The process of giving someone permission to do
or have something done [6].
Availability Security ensuring that a service fulfils definite
stability requirements such that relevant infor-
mation is available when needed [7].
Confidentiality Security ensuring that only authorized persons
gain access to sensitive or classified information,
and that the person in advance is validity iden-
tified and authenticated [7].
Digital signature A construct that authenticates both the origin
and contents of a message in a manner that is
provable to a disinterested third party [10].
Integrity Security ensuring that the information and infor-
mation processing is complete, precise and valid,
and a result of authorized and controlled activity
[7].
Information security Protection against violations of confidentiality,
availability, integrity and non-repudiation for the
information processed by the system and for the
information in the system itself [7].
Permission Permissions are authorizations to perform some
action on the system [6].
Principle of least
privilege
The principle of least privilege is the practice
of selectively assigning permissions to users such
that the user is given no more permission than
is necessary to perform his job function [6].
Public key in-
frastructure (PKI)
PKI is a collective term for technology providing
unique digital identities across networks, where
digital identity is used for authentication, digital
signing of information and secure communication
[65].
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Table 15.2 – continued from previous page
Concept Definition
Role/Role-based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC)
A role is a set of transactions that one user or
a set of users can perform within the context of
an organization. RBAC is a mean for controlling
user access through roles [23].
Secure communica-
tion
Secure transmission of information and mutual
authentication of the entities participating in the
transmission.
Security policy A set of rules and practices that specify or reg-
ulate how a system or organization provides se-
curity services to protect resources [19].
Table 15.2: Definition of information security related con-
cepts essential for the architectural description.
Concept Definition
Architecture The fundamental organization of a system em-
bodied in its components, their relationships to
each other, and to the environment, and the prin-
ciples guiding its design and evolution [16].
Architectural de-
scription
A collection of products to document an archi-
tecture [16].
Architectural de-
scription framework
Assistance for the development and documenta-
tion of the architecture.
Integration The process by which software systems are com-
bined into a functional whole.
Target system The system that is the goal of the specific archi-
tectural description.
User The person using the target system.
Table 15.3: Definition of architecture related concepts.
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15.2.2 Standards
The purpose with standards is to ensure interoperability and compatibil-
ity between solutions based on the standards. This enables information
exchange and integration.
This section identifies standards which are relevant for the architectural
description of CARDIAC’s EOC-system. Because the architectural descrip-
tion is based on both service-oriented and portal-oriented integration ar-
chitecture, some security standards relevant for this type of integration are
listed below [1]:
• W3C’s XML Signature specification [64] aims to provide data in-
tegrity and authentication (both message and signer authentication)
features, wrapped inside an XML format.
• W3C’s XML Encryption specification [68] addresses the issue of
data confidentiality using encryption techniques. Encrypted data is
wrapped inside XML tags defined by the XML Encryption specifica-
tion.
• OASIS’ WS-Security [46] defines a mechanism for including confi-
dentiality, integrity and single message authentication features within
a SOAP message. WS-Security makes use of the XML Signature and
XML Encryption specifications and defines how to include digital sig-
natures, message digests, and encrypted data in a SOAP message.
• OASIS’ Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) provides
a means for partner systems to share user authentication and autho-
rization information. This is essentially the single sign-on feature.
With the advent of SAML, authentication information can be wrapped
inside XML in a standard way, so that cookies in HTTP communica-
tion are not needed and interoperable single sign-on can be achieved.
• OASIS’ eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
makes it possible to express access control policies in XML. XACML
defines a vocabulary to specify subjects, rights, objects and conditions.
In addition to these security standards, the architectural description is
based on the following standards for health informatics and electronic patient
records:
• KITH’s EPR-standard. KITH, a centre of competence for ICT
in the National Health Service, has developed a standard for EPRs.
The EPR-standard includes fundamental principles for access control
in health information systems, and it is therefore essential for this
architectural description [49].
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• CEN TC251. European standardization of health informatics - Stan-
dardization in the field of health ICT to achieve compatibility and in-
teroperability between independent systems and to enable modularity
[48].
• Health Level 7 (HL7). One of several ANSI1 standards for health
care specific data exchange between computer applications. The name
“Health Level 7” refers to the top layer (Level 7) of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) layer protocol for the health environment [44].
• ISO 18308: Health Informatics standard. This standard techni-
cally specifies how to assemble and collate a set of clinical and techni-
cal requirements for an EPR architecture that supports using, sharing,
and exchanging EPRs across different health sectors, different coun-
tries, and different models of health care delivery. It suggests require-
ments for the architecture but not the specifications of the architecture
itself [45].
• EDIFACT. Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Com-
merce and Transport. Used as a messaging standard in health care
[66].
• DICOM. Picture standard that covers all areas related to the trans-
portation, storage and display of medical pictures [66].
15.2.3 Strategies
For this architectural description, some strategies have to be followed. Be-
cause the target system is an EOC-system which integrates information from
several different health information systems, integration strategies are of par-
ticular interest. The strategies presented in this section are formulated by
HEMIT, and they are in force within the Health Region for Central Norway.
The most relevant strategies are:
• HEMIT’s integration strategy. The purpose with this integration
strategy is to integrate health services independently of the techno-
logical platform they are implemented on. The integration strategy is
a requirement specification for IT-vendors when purchasing or devel-
oping new systems or IT-equipment. This strategy should be seen in
combination with the IT architecture strategy.
• HEMIT’s IT architecture strategy. The IT architecture strategy
documents that the Health Region for Central Norway has chosen a
service-oriented architecture model, which all future solutions shall
be realized on. The IT architecture strategy requests all systems to
1American National Standards Institute
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provide its functionality as services (Web services). Microsoft .NET is
chosen as basis technology for the implementation of a service-oriented
architecture model.
15.2.4 Laws and regulations
When developing information systems for electronic processing of sensitive
health information, it is important that the information processing is in
accordance with prevailing laws and regulations within the area.
The legal basis for patient records, and implicit for EOCs, is constituted
of the following laws and regulations:
• Personal Data Act2 [40] is supposed to protect natural persons from
violation of their right to privacy through the processing of personal
data. The act applies for the processing of personal data wholly or
partly by automatic means.
• Personal Data Regulations3 [39] are determined under the provi-
sion of the Personal Data Act, and they give regulations about infor-
mation security when personal data is processed.
• The Personal Health Data Filling System Act4 [37] is a special
law in proportion to the Personal Data Act. It deals with the employ-
ment of general decisions about patient records in the Personal Data
Act and contains a number of rules directly relevant for EPRs.
• The Health Personnel Act5 [36] deals with health personnel’s du-
ties and responsibility in connection with their work. This includes
relations attached to client confidentiality, the right to information,
the duty to report and the documentation requirement.
• Patient Record Regulations6 [43] are determined under the pro-
visions of i.a. the Health Personnel Act, and they give further rules
about the contents of a patient record, the work with patient records
and access to the information in the patient record.
These laws and regulations primarily have an influence on the archi-
tectural description by demanding a certain level of information security,
which the technical solutions have to support and ensure. Laws and regula-
tions presented here have been the basis for choosing the security concerns
described in Section 15.1.
2Norwegian: Personopplysningsloven
3Norwegian: Personopplysningsforskriften
4Norwegian: Helseregisterloven
5Norwegian: Helsepersonelloven
6Norwegian: Pasientjournalforskriften
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15.2.5 Role-cards
Establishment of roles is an important aspect with access control in health
information systems. As mentioned in MAFIIA/RBAC, role-cards can be
helpful in the process of identifying roles for users of the system. The concept
of role-cards is based on the UML use case collaboration process from the
book UML Distilled [8] and the Class-Responsibility-Collaboration (CRC)
card technique, which is explained in detail in [61].
The most important users of the EOC-system are doctors, registered
nurses and enrolled nurses. Figure 15.1 shows a role-card which describes
the role of a doctor, Figure 15.2 describes the role of a registered nurse,
while Figure 15.3 describes the role of an enrolled nurse.
Figure 15.1: Role-card for the role of a doctor.
Figure 15.2: Role-card for the role of a registered nurse.
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Figure 15.3: Role-card for the role of an enrolled nurse.
15.2.6 Patterns
A (software) pattern is a model of a standardized solution on a problem/chal-
lenge which often occurs during software development. This section identi-
fies relevant patterns, and gives a brief introduction of them, while they are
described in more detail in Appendix B.
The following patterns are of current interest for the system which shall
be developed based on this architectural description:
Adapter
Adapter pattern converts interfaces of existing resources to the interface the
client expects. Adapters let classes work together that could not otherwise
because of incompatible interfaces [9].
Fac¸ade
Fac¸ade pattern provides a unified interface to a set of interfaces in a sub-
system. It constructs a higher-level interface, and the clients only access
the subsystem through this fac¸ade interface. The fac¸ade interface uses the
original interfaces of the subsystem [9].
Single access point
Single access point pattern provides a security module and a way to log in
to the system. It prevents the use of multiple entries and back doors by
providing only one single choke point [30].
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Check point
Check point pattern is applicable when authentication and authorization of
system users are necessary. Authentication and authorization checks have
to be done according to the given security policy, i.e. a set of rules that
states which actions are permitted and which actions are prohibited. When
enforcing the security policy, the check points can respond to violations.
Role-based access control
Role-based access control pattern is a mean for controlling user access through
roles that individual users have as part of an organization.
15.3 Reference Architecture
A reference architecture is a high-level, generic architecture which is used as
the basis in development of concrete system architectures.
The reference architecture for this architectural description is based on
the reference architecture of MAFIIA for IIS, as described in Section 10.4.
As shown in Figure 15.4, a reference architecture of this type connects the
environment interface of the target system towards the user interface of the
environment systems.
Figure 15.4: IIS specific reference architecture.
The target system in this thesis is based on a combination of service-
oriented and portal-oriented integration architecture. These integration
architectures are fitted into the MAFIIA reference architecture in Figure
15.5. The reference architecture for a portal-oriented system integration
94 Concepts
is shown in the upper-right corner, while the reference architecture for a
service-oriented system integration is shown in the upper-left corner. These
two integration architectures are mixed together and fitted into MAFIIA’s
reference architecture at the bottom of the figure.
Figure 15.5 hints on the use of the Adapter pattern, which is described
in Appendix B. Adapters may be included in the business service or the
resource service tier.
Also, Figure 15.5 has been extended with environment systems, and the
use of an Application Server in the Environment Interfacing to the environ-
ment systems. The shaded rectangles with dashed lines inside the Appli-
cation Server are examples of the functionality an application server may
provide.
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Figure 15.5: Reference architecture for a combination of service-oriented
and portal-oriented system integration.
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15.4 Stakeholders and roles
Figure 15.6: Overview of stakeholders for the EOC-system.
Figure 15.6 shows the most important stakeholders in relation to the
EOC-system. Four groups of stakeholders are identified, and each group
consists of a number of stakeholders with different roles in relation to the
EOC:
• National interest groups
- HEMIT is a special IT-unit which gathers all IT-departments
within the Health Region for Central Norway.
- KITH is a centre of competence for ICT in the National Health
Service.
• National authorities
- The Norwegian Government formulates laws and regulations with
impact on the EOC.
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- The Norwegian Board of Health 7 is an independent supervision
authority, with responsibility for general supervision of health
and social services in the country [57].
- The Ministry of Health and Care Services 8 holds the superior
responsibility concerning health policy, public health, health care
services and health legislation in Norway [69].
- The Directorate of Health and Social Affairs 9 is an administrative
and competence body which contributes to the implementation
of national politic within the health and social sector. It is a
advisory service for central authorities, health enterprises etc [59].
- The Data Inspectorate 10 is an independent administrative body
under the Norwegian Ministry of Labor and Government Admin-
istration. It was set up in 1980 to ensure enforcement of the Data
Register Act of 1978, now made obsolete by the commencement
of the Personal Data Act of 2000 [56].
• Specialist health services
- Somatic hospitals are hospitals that investigate and treat patients
with physical diseases or injuries.
- Health personnel relevant for the EOC-system are:
- Doctors
- Enrolled Nurses
- Registered Nurses
- Others
• Patient
15.5 Modeling language
In the generic MAFIIA it is mandatory to use Unified Modeling Language
(UML). MAFIIA/RBAC suggests use of a special security related profile,
UMLsec, in addition to UML. This architectural description makes use of
both UML and UMLsec. Therefore, it is presumed that the reader has basic
knowledge of UML version 1.4 and has a certain knowledge of UMLsec. A
short introduction to UML and UMLsec is given in Appendix C. For more
information on UML, see [8] and for UMLsec read [12].
7Norwegian: Statens helsetilsyn. In short Helsetilsynet
8Norwegian: Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet
9Norwegian: Sosial- og helsedirektoratet
10Norwegian: Datatilsynet
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15.6 Summary
This chapter has detailed some of the concepts applied in the architectural
description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. Certain concerns and assets rel-
evant for the development of the EOC-system are identified. The security
mechanisms digital signing, secure communication, auditing and access con-
trol are important aspects of this architectural description. When developing
the architectural description, information sources from the National Health
Service, HEMIT, KITH and others are used. This chapter also gives an
example for how a service-oriented and portal-oriented integration architec-
ture may be mapped to the reference architecture. Stakeholders and roles
are identified, and UML version 1.4 is chosen as formal description modeling
language for the models in the following chapters.
Chapter 16
Context Viewpoint
The context viewpoint documents the target system’s environment. This
includes identification of stakeholders and their relation to the target system.
Context viewpoint primary consists of three different models used to describe
different parts of the environment:
• Business Aspects Model documents information, stakeholders and processes
related to the target system.
• Environment System Model identifies other systems in the target sys-
tem’s environment.
• Business to System Mapping Model describes what the target system
shall realize based on the two other models.
16.1 Business Aspects Model
Model Business Aspects Model
Purpose Shall document any business related concern that will
increase the understanding of what problems the tar-
get system shall solve, or what functionality it shall
implement.
Input Customer supplied information (i.e. requirements to
target system, business related information).
Output UML class diagram, UML use case diagram, UML col-
laboration diagram, Textual description.
Table 16.1: Business Aspects Model as described in the generic MAFIIA.
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As mentioned in Section 15.1, the EOC-system shall help in reducing
the redundancy of information and preventing manual typing errors. The
overall goal of the target system is to provide:
• better quality of patient care
• increased efficiency of provided health services within the hospital
• a common and comprehensive information base
The above mentioned aspects will be implemented by functionality such
as:
• single sign-on against relevant health information systems.
• shortcuts to several health information systems.
• automatic data acquisition from relevant medical technical equipments
and health information systems.
• flexible observation charts for different wards.
• a time-dependent overview of the patient care.
These functions will be described more thoroughly throughout this ar-
chitectural description.
Non of the recommended outputs for the Business Aspects Model were
suitable for documenting the problems that the target system should solve.
Therefore, a UML activity diagram is the chosen output.
Figure 16.1 shows an activity diagram highlighting important work processes
for health personnel related to the EOC during patient care. As mentioned
earlier, the EOC is mostly used by registered nurses, enrolled nurses and
doctors. A doctor is responsible for examining the patient and deciding
what kind of medical treatment the patient shall receive during his stay in
the hospital. On the other hand, registered nurses and enrolled nurses are
responsible for carrying out most of the suggested medical treatment.
More precisely, regarding CARDIAC’s EOC-system patient care should
start when a hospital receives the patient. If the patient has been hospital-
ized before, the health personnel should be able to retrieve the navigation
caremap from the EOC-system and view the lifeline, which will give an
overview of the patient’s medical history. If the patient has not been hos-
pitalized before, patient information, such as biographical data and CAVE,
should be retrieved and presented in the EOC-system. Health personnel
should be able to configure observation charts according to the needs
of the particular ward or patient.
During the patient care, health personnel will have to follow some qual-
ity procedures. They will have to digitally sign that they have followed
the proposed quality procedure, or if the entire procedure or just parts of it
is omitted.
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Figure 16.1: Business Aspects Model showing the work processes in an EOC
system.
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Patient care includes both nursing and examining the patient, which
again includes registration of observations, prescription of medication, writ-
ing requisitions and referrals, in addition to viewing results, previous obser-
vations and lifelines.
Both registered nurses, enrolled nurses and doctors should have the possi-
bility to register observations in the patient chart form-part of the EOC-
system, but will mostly be done by registered or enrolled nurses. Registra-
tion of observations may involve manual registration of data from medical
technical equipment, shown in Figure 16.1 as manage MTU data. All
registrations will have to be signed digitally by the health personnel that
registered them.
Usually, doctors should be able to prescribe medication in the EOC-
system, but some registered nurses may have medical qualifications to do
this. A registered nurse will only be allowed to prescribe non-prescription
medication, shown as nurse prescribes medication in the figure. Health
personnel should digitally sign all prescriptions of medication.
Only doctors should be allowed to write requisitions and to write
referrals, while all health personnel related to the EOC should be allowed
to view the results. Requisitions result in laboratory results, X-rays, etc.,
while referrals result in epicrisis. Both requisitions and referrals will require
a digital signature from the doctor who wrote them.
Patient care is a continuous process. This is shown at the bottom of
Figure 16.1 as a branch labeled ”Patient care finished?”. If patient care is
not finished, health personnel will carry on with their work tasks. If the
patient care is finished, the patient will usually be transferred to another
ward or be discharged.
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16.2 Environment Systems Model
Model Environment Systems Model
Purpose Shall document other technical systems (environment
systems) that will be involved in the implementation
of the Business Aspects Model, or influences the oper-
ation of the target system.
Input Customer supplied information (i.e. target system
requirement specifications, environment system doc-
umentation)
Output UML sequence diagram, UML use case diagram, UML
collaboration diagram, Textual description.
Table 16.2: Description of the Environment System Model as described in
the generic MAFIIA.
Recall that CARDIAC’s EOC-system shall retrieve information from
other health information systems. This information retrieval implies that
CARDIAC’s EOC-system is integrated with these health information sys-
tems. Such integration contributes to a common information base and im-
proved continuity of patient care. CARDIAC’s EOC-system shall give health
personnel an overview of the patient condition, and it shall serve as the main
navigation system for health personnel during the period of patient care.
The probability for incorrect registrations is also reduced because manual
typing of information is reduced.
Figure 16.2 identifies health information systems that constitute a part
of CARDIAC’s EOC-system. This is shown in a package diagram where the
identified systems are shown as packages. The EOC-system is dependent on
an electronic patient record system (EPR-system), a patient administrative
system (PAS), a requisition and response system (RoS 1), a medication sys-
tem, a quality procedure system (EQS 2) and medical technical equipment
(MTU 3).
As already mentioned, CARDIAC has developed IMATIS Medical Data
Acquisition System, which retrieves data from MTU. Thus, it is important
to remember that the MTU-package actually represents the IMATIS Med-
ical Data Acquisition System. IMATIS Medical Data Acquisition System is
hereby referred to as MTU throughout this architectural description.
Package diagrams are suitable when documenting environment systems,
and this kind of diagrams is therefore chosen as output for the Environment
System Model although it is not recommended in the generic MAFIIA.
1Norwegian: Rekvisisjon og Svar
2Extend Quality System
3Norwegian: Medisinsk Teknisk Utstyr
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Figure 16.2: Health information systems integrated in the EOC-system.
16.3 Business to System Mapping Model
Model Business to System Mapping Model
Purpose Shall document what parts of the documented Busi-
ness Aspects Model are mapped to technical solutions
constituted by environment systems and the target
system, and how the different parts of the Business
Aspects Model are mapped to the different involved
systems.
Input Customer supplied information (i.e. target system re-
quirement specifications, requirements/needs related
to the business aspects).
Output UML use case diagram, Textual description.
Table 16.3: Description of the Business to System Mapping Model following
the format from the generic MAFIIA.
Table 16.4 combines the processes from the Business Aspects Model with
the environment systems, which were identified in the Environment Systems
Model, and shows how they are mapped together.
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Health information
system
Process
EPR-system Provides information about the patients
earlier medical treatments and informa-
tion about allergies, i.e. CAVE.
EOC Gives a possibility to configure an EOC on
the basis of predefined templates. Takes
as input all observations and registrations
which are performed and signed by health
personnel. Generates lifelines on the ba-
sis of data which is collected from other
health information systems.
PAS Provides biographical data about the pa-
tient, e.g. name, address, date of birth and
social service number.
RoS Handles requisitions from the doctor. Pro-
vides response in the form of lab results,
test results, pictures, etc.
Medication system Handles medication prescription which is
mainly performed by a doctor.
EQS Improves the quality of patient treatment
by providing the health personnel with
procedures for best practice treatment of
patients.
MTU Information from some of the instruments,
sensors and monitors is captured automat-
ically in the system, while other informa-
tion must be registered in the EOC-system
manually .
Table 16.4: Information and processes in the systems which comprise an
EOC-system.
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Based on the Business Aspects Model relevant users of CARDIAC’s
EOC-system are identified in Figure 16.3. According to CARDIAC, the
patient is left out from the diagram because a patient never shall be alone
when looking into his EOC. A registered nurse, enrolled nurse or a doctor
should always be present in order to explain the meaning of test results and
observations for the patient and in order to avoid misunderstandings. The
nurse or the doctor should log in to the system and show relevant information
for the patient.
Figure 16.3: Stakeholders which are included in the process of making and
processing an EOC.
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16.4 Summary
The context viewpoint documents which work processes within a hospital
the EOC-system shall support and which health information systems it shall
be integrated with. Registered nurses, enrolled nurses and doctors are also
identified as users of the EOC-system.
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Chapter 17
Requirement Viewpoint
The requirement viewpoint specifies requirements to the target system. The
main basis for the requirements is the context viewpoint documentation,
which implicitly represents requirements to CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
The requirement viewpoint consists of three models as specified in the
following sections:
• Requirement Model identifies requirements related to the target sys-
tem.
• Target System Interface Model concerns the target system’s interfacing
to its environment.
• Target Organization Security Policy Model describes the target orga-
nization’s security policy.
17.1 Requirement Model
Model Requirement Model
Purpose Shall be complete in identifying and eventually spec-
ifying all relevant requirements to the target system
where a requirement shall be verified.
Input Context viewpoint.
Output UML sequence diagram, UML collaboration diagram,
UML and UMLsec use case, UMLsec class diagram,
Textual description.
Table 17.1: Requirement Model as described in the generic MAFIIA and
MAFIIA/RBAC.
Requirements specified in the Requirement Model are listed in Table
17.2.
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REQ. ID REQUIREMENT IDENTIFICATIONS
R1 Viewpoint related requirements
R1.1 Context viewpoint
R1.1.1 The context of the target system shall be within somatic
hospitals primarily in the Health Region for Central Nor-
way.
R1.2 Requirement viewpoint
R1.2.1 Target system shall fulfil the requirements listed in this
table.
R1.3 Component viewpoint
R1.3.1 Target system shall have the possibility to be decomposed
into subsystems, components and information objects.
R1.3.2 Target system shall be based on both service-oriented and
portal-oriented system integration architecture.
R1.4 Distribution viewpoint
R1.4.1 The distribution of components must be transparent for
the users.
R1.5 Realization viewpoint
R1.5.1 Target system shall be realized on the technological plat-
form required by HEMIT.
R1.5.2 Target system shall be realized on CARDIAC’s IMATIS
Platform.
R2 Concern related requirements
R2.1 Application functionality concerns
R2.1.1 Target system shall retrieve relevant information from the
environment systems.
R2.1.2 Target system shall present the retrieved information to
the users through a common user interface, a portal.
R2.1.3 Target system shall present all user functionality through
the portal.
R2.1.4 Target system shall support automatic synchronization
of information.
R2.1.5 Target system shall support writing of requisitions.
R2.1.6 Target system shall support writing of referrals.
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Table 17.2 – continued from previous page
REQ. ID REQUIREMENT IDENTIFICATIONS
R2.1.7 Target system shall support prescription of medication.
R2.1.8 Target system shall support reading of information.
R2.1.9 Target system shall support registration of information.
R2.1.10 Target system shall support editing of information within
the system.
R2.1.11 Target system shall support notification.
R2.1.12 All users shall have the possibility to choose the amount
of information presented through the target system’s
zoom in and zoom out functionality.
R2.2 Quality related concerns
R2.2.1 Security obtained by means of digital signing, secure com-
munication, auditing, authentication and authorization.
R2.2.1.1 Digital signing
R2.2.1.1.1 Each user shall have an unique digital identity.
R2.2.1.1.2 Target system shall support digital signatures.
R2.2.1.1.3 Target system shall demand users to digitally sign all
user registrations, followed/omitted quality procedures,
requisitions, referrals and prescriptions.
R2.2.1.2 Secure communication
R2.2.1.2.1 Target system shall enforce mutual authentication of en-
tities (systems, system resources, etc.) participating in
the communication.
R2.2.1.2.2 Target system shall run within a hospital, i.e. within a
hospital network with secure zones.
R2.2.1.2.3 Target system shall provide secure transmission of infor-
mation, i.e. encryption, between entities participating in
the communication.
R2.2.1.2.4 Target system shall support strong encryption, i.e. asym-
metric encryption with minimum 1024 bits key size or
symmetric encryption with minimum 128 bits key size.
R2.2.1.3 Auditing
R2.2.1.3.1 Auditing shall be performed on the service-level. Com-
ment: The service which receives the request is responsi-
ble for auditing.
R2.2.1.3.2 Audit log shall be automatic and computer generated.
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Table 17.2 – continued from previous page
REQ. ID REQUIREMENT IDENTIFICATIONS
R2.2.1.3.3 Audit log shall include a time stamp (date/time), full
name or userID of the user initiating the action/opera-
tion, the action/operation performed and the object that
the user performs the action/operation on.
R2.2.1.3.4 Audit log shall record all user logins.
R2.2.1.3.5 Auditing shall be performed during retrieving of informa-
tion.
R2.2.1.3.6 Auditing shall be performed during registration of infor-
mation.
R2.2.1.3.7 Auditing shall be performed during editing of informa-
tion.
R2.2.1.3.8 Audit logs shall be available for review and copying by
regulatory authority.
R2.2.1.3.9 Audit logs shall be available for review and copying by a
system administrator.
R2.2.1.3.10 Audit logs shall not be available for modifications or dele-
tions.
R2.2.1.3.11 Audit log reports shall be read-only reports.
R2.2.1.3.12 Audit log shall be stored in a secure place.
R2.2.1.3.13 Audit log shall minimum be stored in three months.
R2.2.1.3.14 Target system shall detect and record all attempted ac-
cesses that fail identification, authentication or authoriza-
tion requirements.
R2.2.1.3.15 All failed attempted accesses shall be notified daily.
R2.2.1.4 Access Control
R2.2.1.4.1 Target system shall only provide user authentication
through its portal.
R2.2.1.4.2 Target system shall provide two-factor user authentica-
tion, i.e. the user authenticates himself with something
that he knows, such as username and password, in addi-
tion to something that he has, such as a token or digital
certificate.
R2.2.1.4.3 If passwords are used, target system shall provide suit-
able password management. Strong passwords shall be
used, i.e. a minimum number of characters in the user-
name and password is required and the password shall
be a combination of numbers and characters. Mandatory
change of passwords is required at regular intervals.
R2.2.1.4.4 Target system shall support registration of new users.
17.1 Requirement Model 113
Table 17.2 – continued from previous page
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R2.2.1.4.5 Target system shall identify all of its users before allowing
them to use its capabilities.
R2.2.1.4.6 Target system shall re-verify the identity of all of its users
before allowing them to update their user profile.
R2.2.1.4.7 Target system shall identify all of its clients before allow-
ing them to use its capabilities.
R2.2.1.4.8 Target system shall provide single sign-on, i.e. an indi-
vidual user is not required to identify himself multiple
times during a single session.
R2.2.1.4.9 Target system shall allow each user to obtain access to
all of his own personal settings.
R2.2.1.4.10 Target system shall not allow any user to access any per-
sonal information of any other user.
R2.2.1.4.11 Target system shall only allow authorized users to access
information and system resources.
R2.2.1.4.12 Target system shall provide complete, updated, correct
and relevant information to those who have a legitimate
need for it.
R2.2.1.4.13 Target system shall ensure the access control mechanism
within each of the underlying systems.
R2.2.1.4.14 Target system shall provide for a combination of role-
based and context-based access control.
R2.2.1.4.15 Target system shall support dynamic role assignment.
R2.2.1.4.16 Target system shall support delegation of access rights,
i.e. one user can delegate access rights to another user.
R2.2.1.4.17 Target system shall automatically log the user out of the
system after a certain time of inactivity.
R2.2.1.5 Security Threats
R2.2.1.5.1 Target system shall prevent and detect unauthorized lo-
gins.
R2.2.1.5.2 Target system shall prevent and detect unauthorized use
of the system, i.e. illegitimate reads, writes or edits.
R2.2.1.5.3 Target system shall prevent tapping of communication
lines, e.g. security attacks releasing message contents or
modification of messages.
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R3 Model assets related requirements
R3.1 Standards
R3.1.1 Follow KITH’s EPR-standard.
R3.1.2 Use UMLsec to emphasize security related elements in
models.
R3.1.3 Follow the Common Criteria - RBAC protection profile
[26].
R3.2 Strategies
R3.2.1 Follow HEMIT’s integration strategy.
R3.2.2 Follow HEMIT’s IT architecture strategy.
R3.3 Pattern
R3.3.1 Use of Adapter pattern.
R3.3.2 Use of Fac¸ade pattern.
R3.3.3 Use of Single access point pattern.
R3.3.4 Use of Check point pattern.
R3.3.5 Use of Role-based access control pattern.
R4 Reference architecture related requirements
R4.1 Environments
R4.1.1 Environment systems
R4.1.1.1 The target system shall integrate the following systems:
• Electronic Patient Record System (EPR-system)
• Patient Administrative System (PAS)
• Requisition and Response (RoS)
• Medication system
• Extend Quality System (EQS)
• Medical Technical Equipment (MTU)
R4.1.2 Environment systems interface
R4.1.2.1 The communication between the target system and its
environment systems shall be transaction based.
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R4.2 Target System
R4.2.1 Target System Configuration
R4.2.1.1
R4.2.2 Target System Interfaces
R4.2.2.1
R4.2.3 Functionality and data in target system components
R4.2.3.1 The user interface functionality includes a portal.
R4.2.3.2 The portal shall provide the following (user service) func-
tionalities:
- role-based access control.
- easily accessible shortcuts to the subsystems: EPR-
system, PAS, RoS, Medication, EQS and MTU.
- presentation of the navigation caremap and the pa-
tient chart form.
R4.2.3.3 Target system shall retrieve, filter and present patients’
biographical data from PAS in the navigation caremap.
R4.2.3.4 Target system shall retrieve, filter and present informa-
tion about patient diagnosis from PAS in the navigation
caremap.
R4.2.3.5 Target system shall retrieve, filter and present informa-
tion about patient care incidences from PAS in the navi-
gation caremap.
R4.2.3.6 Target system shall retrieve and present CAVE-
information from the EPR-system in the navigation
caremap.
R4.2.3.7 Target system shall retrieve documents from the EPR-
system for the particular time interval the patient chart
form shows.
R4.2.3.8 Target system shall provide functionality for reading of
the retrieved documents from the EPR-system.
R4.2.3.9 Target system shall present documents retrieved from the
EPR-system as icons in the navigation caremap.
R4.2.3.10 Target system shall retrieve and present laboratory re-
sults, X-ray results and test results from RoS in the nav-
igation caremap.
R4.2.3.11 Target system shall provide functionality for writing of
requisitions to RoS.
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R4.2.3.12 Target system shall retrieve graphs, trend curves, obser-
vations and measurements from MTU.
R4.2.3.13 Target system shall show the retrieved graphs and trend
curves in real time and historically in the navigation
caremap.
R4.2.3.14 Target system shall support automatic registrations of
observations and measurements from MTU in the patient
chart form.
R4.2.3.15 Target system shall support entries in EQS.
R4.2.3.16 Target system shall support user registrations of obser-
vations and measurements in the patient chart form.
R4.2.3.17 Target system shall retrieve, filter and present the med-
ication history of a patient from the Medication system
in the navigation caremap.
R4.2.3.18 Target system shall provide functionality for prescription
of medication to the Medication system.
R4.2.3.19 Target system shall retrieve and present information from
the patient chart form in the navigation caremap.
R4.2.3.20 Target system shall have the possibility to generate and
present graphical representations of the retrieved infor-
mation from the environment systems in the navigation
caremap.
Table 17.2: Requirement Model
17.2 Target System Interface Model
Model Target System Interface Model
Purpose To be a supplementary specification to the Require-
ment Model to obtain more complete and easier un-
derstandable specification of the target system’s inter-
facing to its environments.
Input Context viewpoint (Business to System Mapping
Model), Requirement Model.
Output UML sequence diagram, UML use case diagram, UML
collaboration diagram.
Table 17.3: Target System Interface Model as described in the generic
MAFIIA.
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As described in the generic MAFIIA, Target System Interface Model is
supposed to document the target system’s interfacing to its environment by
emphasizing who performs the actions, what responses are given and what
functionality is included in this process. This is described further in the
UML use case diagrams in Section 17.2.1.
As a supplement to the Requirement Model, this Target System Interface
Model also identifies some security threats. Security threats are illustrated
in the UML misuse case diagrams in Section 17.2.2.
17.2.1 Use cases
Figure 17.1 gives an overview of which actions a user of the EOC-system
should be able to perform. The user will have to log in to the EOC-system
before reading, writing or editing information. Each action is shown in
connection with some security mechanisms which have to be ensured during
the performance of the action.
Figure 17.1: Use case showing the four general actions which may be per-
formed in the EOC-system in connection with the security mechanisms.
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More precisely, when a user logs in to the EOC-system, the EOC-system
will have to check whether the login is valid or not. This check should be
done in accordance to the access control mechanisms within the EOC-
system and the environment systems. As stated in the Requirement Model,
all logins shall be audited. This is shown by the Audit action use case in
Figure 17.1.
When a read-action is performed, information stored in the EOC-system
or the environment systems should be decrypted and presented to the user.
The access control mechanism must ensure that the user only reads infor-
mation he is authorized for. All read-actions should also be audited.
The user should be able to write and store information inside the EOC-
system, i.e. observations and measurements. The user should also be allowed
to write information towards RoS and the Medication system. Still, writing
of information towards RoS and the Medication system will not imply any
sending of information from the EOC-system to these systems. Instead,
writing should be performed by opening the user interface from RoS or the
Medication system in the EOC interface. Then the user should be allowed
to write information directly into RoS or the Medication system.
Writing of information towards RoS implies writing requisitions, while
writing towards the Medication system implies prescribing medication. In
addition to these two write-actions, a user must be allowed to write referrals.
So far there is no health information system handling referrals electronically,
but writing referrals is visualized anyway, because it belongs to the group
of work processes which should be performed by a doctor.
All write-actions in the EOC-system shall be access controlled, signed,
audited and encrypted, as shown in the Figure 17.1.
The user should not be allowed to delete or edit any information pre-
sented in the EOC-system, except when e.g. typing errors are discovered.
Then editing, not deletion, of information will be allowed, but only if the
changes are audited and signed. It is important to note that editing of infor-
mation presupposes a decryption and a read-action. The edit-action itself
is similar to the write-action and should be followed by an encryption.
The read-action, write-action, and edit-action will be shown more thor-
oughly in the following use case diagrams. Figure 17.2 shows what actions
a doctor will be able to perform. Figure 17.3 shows the actions which a
registered nurse should be allowed to perform in the EOC-system, while
Figure 17.4 shows the actions should be performed by an enrolled nurse.
The difference between the enrolled nurse and the registered nurse is that
the enrolled nurse will not be allowed to prescribe any medication at all.
The doctor will be the only one who is allowed to prescribe medication, but
a registered nurse will be able to prescribe non-prescription medication, e.g.
pain relieving medication.
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Figure 17.2: Use case showing the general actions performed by a doctor
using the EOC-system.
Figure 17.3: Use case showing the general actions performed by a registered
nurse using the EOC-system.
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Figure 17.4: Use case showing the general actions performed by an enrolled
nurse using the EOC-system.
Figure 17.5 shows a use case diagram documenting a typical read-action
in the EOC-system, together with the security mechanisms which should be
connected to such an operation. It is assumed that the user is logged in to
the EOC-system before this use case is triggered. The EOC-system should
generate a lifeline on the basis of information registered in PAS and present
it in the navigation caremap. The first lifeline presented to the user will
therefore just be an overview of all patient care incidences in the patient’s
medical history. By using the zoom in functionality, the user should be able
to choose one patient care incidence and get a more detailed view of events,
registrations, etc. for this particular incidence. When the user requests more
information by using the zoom in functionality, the EOC-system will retrieve
this information from the other health information systems which are listed
in the diagram. The user shall also have the possibility to scroll forwards
and backwards inside the lifeline, e.g. by moving one second, minute, hour,
day, month or year per step.
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Figure 17.5: Use case showing an example of a read-action.
Figure 17.6 shows a use case diagram documenting a typical write-action
in the EOC-system and the security mechanisms which have to follow this
operation. It is assumed that the user is logged in to the EOC-system
before this use case is triggered. As mentioned earlier, all write-actions will
be signed and audited. Health personnel will be forced to follow certain
quality procedures when treating a patient. If the procedures are omitted
or if they are not followed step by step, then a comment must be written.
Regardless of whether the quality procedures are followed or omitted, the
user will need to digitally sign the followed/omitted procedure.
Figure 17.6: Use case showing an example of a write-action.
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Figure 17.7 shows a use case diagram documenting an edit-action in the
EOC-system. It is assumed that the user is logged in to the EOC-system
before this use case is triggered. When e.g. a typing error is detected, the
user should be allowed to edit the registration. All edits will be audited
and must be signed before they are valid. When editing is done, an edit
history will be required for traceability in the EOC. This edit history should
be visible for all users who are later reading the information which has been
edited.
Figure 17.7: Use case showing an example of an edit-action.
17.2.2 Misuse cases
Use cases concentrate on what the system should do, while misuse cases are
the inverse of use cases, concentrating on system behavior that should be
avoided. In a misuse case diagram, misuses are depicted as inverted use
cases, while the actor who initiates the misuses, the crook, is depicted as an
inverted actor. Misuse cases are described further in Appendix C in Section
C.2.
The Requirement Model in Section 17.1 identifies five security threats
that the target system shall prevent, detect or both prevent and detect. Each
of the security threats can be seen in connection with some of the target sys-
tem functionality. Misuse cases with corresponding use cases are illustrated
in Figure 17.8 - Figure 17.10. For making the figures more understandable,
the environment systems are not shown.
In Figure 17.8, login functionality is utilized for unauthorized login by
the crook. Unauthorized login should be prevented or detected by respec-
tively an extensive access control mechanism or auditing mechanism within
the EOC-system.
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Figure 17.8: Misuse case showing unauthorized login to the target system.
In Figure 17.9, the crook might misuse the EOC-system by illegitimate
reading of information. Illegitimate reading has to be prevented by the
access control mechanism within the EOC-system and by encryption of in-
formation. Illegitimate reading of information shall be detected in an audit
log.
Figure 17.9: Misuse case showing illegitimate reading of information in the
target system.
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Figure 17.10 shows both illegitimate writes and edits of information in
the target system. Write and edit actions are quite similar; they both require
the user to digitally sign registrations or modifications, and they both involve
encryption after the information is registered or modified.
The use cases Write information or Edit information may be utilized
for respectively illegitimate writes or illegitimate edits by the crook.
Both illegitimate writes and edits should be prevented by the access control
mechanism within the EOC-system. Additionally, they should be detected
by the auditing mechanism within the EOC-system.
Figure 17.10 also shows how the crook may misuse the EOC-system by
tapping communication lines. This should be prevented by encryption
of information.
Figure 17.10: Misuse case showing illegitimate writes and edits, in addition
to communication line tapping.
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17.3 Target Organization Security Policy Model
Model Target Organization Security Policy Model
Purpose Identify and connect the architectural description to
the security policy of the target system’s organization.
Input Customer supplied information (i.e. security policy,
Governmental requirements, etc.).
Output Textual description.
Table 17.4: Description of the Target Organization Security Policy Model
as described in MAFIIA/RBAC.
Target Organization Security Policy Model should document the security
policy of the target system’s organization. CARDIAC primarily aims to
implement their EOC-system within the Health Region for Central Norway,
and they therefore have to follow the security policy of this health region.
The Health Region for Central Norway is one of the five health regions
within the National Health Service where national standards, strategies, laws
and regulations for information security prevail. CARDIAC therefore has
to follow these national standards, strategies, laws and regulations in addi-
tion to the particular security policy within the Health Region for Central
Norway.
Some of the documentation that forms the security policy of the target
system’s organization was described in Section 15.2. In addition to the assets
from Section 15.2, there is an ongoing development of a norm for information
security in the health sector [50]. The goal of this norm is to ensure a
satisfactory level of security around health- and personal information.
17.4 Summary
The requirement viewpoint identifies both functional and non-functional re-
quirements to the target system. Functional requirements are further de-
picted in UML use case diagrams, while some security related requirements
are depicted in UML misuse case diagrams.
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Chapter 18
Component Viewpoint
The component viewpoint describes the target system by its subsystems,
components and information objects. The component viewpoint also de-
scribes the interaction between the target system’s subsystems, components
and information objects. These descriptions are at a functional level and as
far as possible technology independent.
The component viewpoint includes six different models:
• System Information Model defines the information semantics for rele-
vant concepts that must be understood in a common way in the system.
• System Decomposition Model decomposes the target system into sub-
systems and components.
• System Collaboration Model describes how subsystems and compo-
nents collaborate to form central mechanisms in the target system.
• Component and Interface Specification Model details each interface
and component that was identified in the two previous models.
• System Security Model describes how security is handled by the com-
ponents.
• System Access Control Model concerns how access control is handled
within the target system.
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18.1 System Information Model
Model System Information Model
Purpose Specify the relationships between and properties of the
central information objects in the system that must
always be true (invariants).
Input Requirement viewpoint.
Output UML and UMLsec class diagram, Textual description.
Table 18.1: System Information Model as described in generic MAFIIA and
MAFIIA/RBAC.
Figure 18.1 gives an overview of concrete domain information objects
in the target system. A patient gives health personnel the consent to
process and insert patient care information in an EOC. Health personnel
has the possibility to base the particular EOC on several templates, which
provide for flexible observation charts for different patients, wards and hos-
pitals.
The EOC is a gathering of patient care information from several differ-
ent health information systems. Health personnel registers requested tests
and examinations by writing requisitions, referrals or prescriptions. In
return they get test results. Medication related information, observa-
tions and measurements regarding the patient are also registered in the
EOC. In addition, it is possible to view textual documentation, graphs
and trend curves. When patient care is given, health personnel has to
follow some quality procedures.
Figure 18.2 describes the meta-information that is needed to integrate
and process the information objects in the target system. Rules for selection,
transformation, insertion and securing the information are shown in the fig-
ure. These rules refer to the requirement viewpoint, more precisely to the
concern related requirements. For example, selection rules are concerned
with the retrieving and presentation of information, while transformation
rules are concerned with the sending, synchronization and editing of infor-
mation. Insertion rules deal with registration of information, while security
rules deal with quality related concerns, such as digital signing, secure com-
munication, auditing and access control.
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Figure 18.1: System Information Model showing concrete domain informa-
tion objects and their relations.
Figure 18.2: System Information Model showing generic meta-information
in the target system.
130 Component Viewpoint
18.2 System Decomposition Model
Model System Decomposition Model
Purpose Describe how the system is divided into different sub-
systems or components, and how these are related to
form a coherent whole.
Input Requirement viewpoint.
Output UML and UMLsec class diagram.
Table 18.2: System Decomposition Model as described in generic MAFIIA
and MAFIIA/RBAC.
Figure 18.3 shows a decomposition of the target system into subsystems.
Each of these subsystems is described in the subsequent sections where they
will be further decomposed into components.
Figure 18.3: The target system divided into subsystems.
The security subsystems Access Control, Access Rights Administration,
Auditing and Digital Signature respectively preserve the security concerns
identified in Section 15.1.
18.2.1 Navigation Caremap
The Navigation Caremap subsystem consists of several components, shown
in Figure 18.4. These components are stereotyped, some of them from the
reference architecture and some of them newly defined. The reference ar-
chitecture stereotypes are UserInterface, UserService, BusinessService, Re-
sourceService and EnvironementInterfacing, while the newly defined stereo-
type is ApplServer.
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Reference architecture stereotypes refer to the different layers in the ref-
erence architecture. Components with these stereotypes reflect functionality
and services provided in the particular layer. ApplServer is a generalization
of the stereotype EnvironmentInterfacing. ApplServer is an abbreviation
for application server, and components with this stereotype are concerned
with the target system’s interfacing to the environment. For a combination
of service-oriented and portal-oriented integration architecture, application
servers are important integration means. Application servers host system
logic, interface processing and resource connections, which may include sup-
port for Web services.
The components in the Navigation Caremap subsystem, which are de-
picted in Figure 18.4, are described below. Dependencies between these
components are shown as arrows.
Figure 18.4: System Decomposition Model showing the Navigation Caremap
subsystem of the target system.
TheNavigationCaremapUI component indicates the Navigation Caremap
user interface.
The NavigationCaremapTool component handles user related logic,
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and it provides a categorical overview of the patient care. For this purpose,
the NavigationCaremapTool is dependent on two BusinessService compo-
nents, the InfoIntegrator and the ServiceIntegrator.
The InfoIntegrator component integrates information. For this pur-
pose, it is dependent on the ServiceIntegrator, which separates information
from services. InfoIntegrator is also dependent on the TransformationHan-
dler and the SelectionHandler because information is selected and in some
cases transformed during integration.
The ServiceIntegrator component invokes services provided by the en-
vironment systems. When the invocation is done, it may separate informa-
tion from the services. Similar to the InfoIntegrator, the ServiceIntegrator
component is dependent on the SelectionHandler. The ServiceHandler also
depends upon services provided by environment systems, e.g. EPRServices,
PASServices, etc.
The SelectionHandler selects and retrieves information and services
for the purpose of information and service integration. Information is mainly
retrieved from the ObservationChartStorage, while services are requested
from the environment systems.
The TransformationHandler transforms information after it is re-
trieved from the environment systems or the ObservationChartStorage or
before it is stored in the ObservationChartStorage.
Services are provided by the ApplServer stereotyped components, EPRSer-
vices, PASServices, RoSServices,MedicationServices, EQSServices
andMTUServices, which correspond to the following information sources/
environment systems: EPR-system, PAS, RoS, Medication, EQS and MTU.
Figure 18.4 also shows that registered information is stored in the Ob-
servationChartStorage.
The Fac¸ade pattern is used in this subsystem. Figure 18.4 shows how
the InfoIntegrator is used as fac¸ade against more detailed components. The
InfoIntegrator gives coarse-grained access to information, while the Selec-
tionHandler and TransformationHandler give fine-grained access. By split-
ting up components for read and update, their implementation is simplified.
In addition, this provides a better overview of the components. The Fac¸ade
pattern is described in Appendix B.
18.2.2 Patient Chart Form
As shown in Figure 18.5, it is possible to decompose the Patient Chart Form
subsystem into several components. These components are quite similar to
the components in the Navigation Caremap subsystem, which were shown in
Figure 18.4. Still, there are some differences because the navigation caremap
is read-only and the patient chart form is not.
The Patient Chart Form subsystem supports locally adapted observation
charts through configurable templates, which are handled by the components
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Figure 18.5: System Decomposition Model showing the Patient Chart Form
subsystem of the target system.
ObservationChartTemplate and TemplateTransformator. The Ob-
servationChartTemplate component provides configurable observation charts
templates, while the TemplateTransformator component provides support
for configuration of the templates. TemplateTransformator needs to retrieve
observation chart templates from the PatientChartFormStorage. This indi-
cates that TemplateTransformator is dependent on PatientChartFormStor-
age, which is shown by an arrow in Figure 18.5.
The ObservationChartFactory component makes new observation
charts based on different templates.
The components InfoIntegrator, ServiceIntegrator, Transforma-
tionHandler and SelectionHandler were described in the Navigation
Caremap subsystem and will not be mentioned again here.
InsertionHandler indicates that insertions or registrations of informa-
tion are allowed in the Patient Chart Form subsystem.
The environment systems EQS andMTU provide services. TheEQSSer-
vices component indicates services provided by EQS, while the MTUSer-
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vices component indicates services provided by MTU. EQSServices relates
to quality procedures which have to be followed during patient care, while
MTUServices relates to the retrieval of observations and measurements from
MTU. These observations and measurements are automatically registered in
the EOC-system.
ObservationChartStorage stores patient information in the EOCs,
while PatientChartForm stores observation chart templates. Observa-
tionChartStorage is the same component as ObservationChartStorage in the
Navigation Caremap subsystem.
Similar to the Navigation Caremap subsystem, the Fac¸ade pattern is
used in this subsystem. The InfoIntegrator gives coarse-grained access to
information resources, while the SelectionHandler, TransformationHandler
and InsertionHandler give fine-grained access to these resources. In addition,
the ObservationChartTemplate functions as a fac¸ade for the TemplateTrans-
formator. The Fac¸ade pattern is described in Appendix B.
18.2.3 Portal
The Portal subsystem is the main user interface in the target system. All
user accesses are handled by the Portal.
As shown in Figure 18.6, the Portal can be decomposed into the following
components:
PortalUI is the user interface for the target system.
PortalTool handles user related logic in the target system. The Portal
subsystem is responsible for the gathering of all target system functional-
ity, and the PortalTool component is therefore dependent on the Navi-
gationCaremapTool (from the Navigation Caremap subsystem) and the
PatientChartFormTool (from the Patient Chart Form subsystem). The
PortalTool component makes use of the NavigationCaremapTool to present
an overview of the patient care. The PatientChartFormTool is used to reg-
ister measurements and observations in the observation charts and to create
different observation charts based on some templates. In addition, short-
cuts to the environment systems should be provided in this subsystem. The
PortalTool is therefore dependent on the ShortcutHandler component.
The ShortcutHandler makes shortcuts to different parts of the tar-
get system easily accessible. These shortcuts are provided by the compo-
nents EPRShortcut, PASShorcut, RoSShortcut, MedicationShort-
cut, EQSShortcut and MTUShortcut.
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Figure 18.6: System Decomposition Model showing the Portal subsystem of
the target system.
18.2.4 Access Control
The Access Control subsystem preserves the security concern Access Con-
trol, which is described in Section 15.1. As shown in Figure 18.7, this sub-
system consists of several components.
The LoginUI component provides the user interface for login in the
target system.
The LoginController handles the user related logic for login. It serves
as an authentication component which verifies against the SSOStorage com-
ponent that login information is correct. If this information is incorrect the
LoginUI component will be used to inform the user about the login failure
and suggest a second try.
AccessManager is responsible for the mapping of users towards re-
sources on the basis of the users’ role and access rights. It is dependent on
the RoleManager and ObservationChartStorage. The AccessManager knows
which access rights a certain user has on an information resource. The Ac-
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Figure 18.7: System Decomposition Model showing the Access Control sub-
system of the target system.
cessManager is also dependent on the SSOManager for the purpose of access
control during single sign-on. In addition, the AccessManager is dependent
on the AccessService component for the retrieval of access rights within
the environment systems. AccessService is a service provided by each of the
environment systems for the purpose of ensuring the access control mecha-
nism within the environment systems. Refer to the requirement viewpoint
where requirement R2.2.1.4.13 states that the target system shall ensure the
access control mechanism within each of the environment systems.
RoleManager handles administration of roles and access rights. It
retrieves roles and access rights from GrdRoleAndUserStorage, which is a
guard for the RoleAndUserStorage component, and maps these towards one
another. It also handles role assignments by mapping users to correct roles
dependent on the patient in care. For this task, the RoleManager needs
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information about the user and the environment where the user operates.
Therefore, it is dependent on the UserEnvService component for the re-
trieval of user environment information, such as rosters, employee relations,
ward belonging, etc. The UserEnvService component might be dependent
on several environment systems such as a roster system, employee system,
etc. But, in Figure 18.7 only a Roster system is shown.
RoleAndUserStorage is guarded and needs to be accessed through
its guard, GrdRoleAndUserStorage. RoleAndUserStorage stores infor-
mation about users, roles and access rights defined in the Access Rights
Administration subsystem, hence labeled with (from AccessRightsAdminis-
tration).
SSOManager is responsible for the mapping of userIDs from the target
system towards the corresponding userIDs in the environment systems, so
that the user only has to authenticate himself once per session, i.e. single
sign-on. The SSOManager is dependent on SSOService and SSOStorage for
the retrieval of usernames and passwords in the environment systems and
the target system.
SSOService is a service provided by each of the environment systems,
and it is therefore dependent on these systems, i.e. EPR-system, PAS, RoS,
Medication, EQS and MTU.
SSOStorage is guarded and needs to be accessed through its guard,
GrdSSOStorage. SSOStorage stores all usernames and the belonging pass-
words for all users of the target system, i.e. it stores usernames and pass-
words of all the users who are using the target system in addition to user-
names and passwords in the environment systems of the target system.
ObservationChartStorage stores all patient information stored in an
EOC. This information is stored in the Navigation Caremap subsystem or
in the Patient Chart Form subsystem, hence labeled with (from Navigation-
Caremap).
As indicated in the description of the AccessManager and RoleManager,
the Role-based access control pattern is used in this subsystem. The inten-
tion of this pattern is to assign rights to users according to their roles in the
organization. This pattern is described in Appendix B.
Login
Figure 18.8 shows how the Access Control subsystem handles logins. As
stated in requirement R2.2.1.4.2 in the requirement viewpoint, the target
system shall provide a two-factor user authentication. This is shown in
the figure where the user has to authenticate himself with username and
password, in addition to a digital certificate.
Target system users, mainly Health Personnel, log in to the system
through the LoginUI. Login information is forwarded to the LoginCon-
troller which separates the certification information and forwards it to the
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Figure 18.8: Sequence diagram for target system login.
SignatureManager. The SignatureManager is described in further detail
in Section 18.2.5. The certificate is validated through the method verifyC-
ertificate() by checking the Certification Authority’s (CA’s) digital signa-
ture by means of the CA’s public key. If the certificate is valid, the public
key is stored in the PublicKeyStorage, also described in Section 18.2.5.
Through the method checkPassword() the LoginController validates the
rest of the login information. Username and password are validated against
the SSOStorage by the SSOManager.
When login information is correct, the LoginController informs the user
and starts a session, which is handled by the SSOManager. When the user
logs out, a logout message is sent to the SSOManager, and the session is
terminated.
Figure 18.9 shows three different scenarios for how the Access Control
subsystem handles failed logins.
In Scenario A, the certificate is not valid and the user is notified before
he has to type in username and password.
In both Scenario B and Scenario C it is assumed that the certificate is
valid. In Scenario B, the username is not found in the SSOStorage and
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therefore assumed to be incorrect. The user is notified that the password is
not valid. In Scenario C, the username is found and its belonging password
is compared with the password the user typed in. The two passwords do
not match and the user is notified.
Figure 18.9: Sequence diagram for target system failed logins.
Select
Figure 18.10 shows how the AccessManager component in the Access Control
subsystem handles selection of authorized information. The AccessManager
first has to retrieve access rights for the selected information. Then, it has
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Figure 18.10: Sequence diagram for selection of authorized information.
to decide what information to retrieve based on the user’s request and access
rights, e.g. it is only allowed to retrieve a subset of the requested informa-
tion. After that the AccessManager has to decide where the information
can be retrieved, e.g. in one of the environment systems. Single sign-on is
handled by the SSOManager, and the information is then retrieved. The re-
trieved information is tagged with meta-information, indicating which parts
of the information that only can be read or edited. In addition, the meta-
information might indicate where it is allowed to add new information.
Transform
Figure 18.11 shows how the AccessManager component in the Access Control
subsystem handles transformation of authorized information. Before any
transformation is allowed, the AccessManager retrieves the access rights for
the particular user and maps these access rights to the inquired information.
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Figure 18.11: Sequence diagram for transformation of authorized informa-
tion.
It then has to check if the transformations are allowed pursuant to these
access rights. If the transformations are allowed, the user has to digitally
sign the transformation. The method requestSignature() and its response
Signature are shown in red because it is further depicted in Figure 18.14 in
Section 18.2.5. If the user is allowed to sign this transformation, the actual
transformations are performed and the transformed information is stored in
the ObservationChartStorage.
Insert
Figure 18.12 shows how the AccessManager component in the Access Control
subsystem handles insertion of authorized information. The AccessManager
first has to retrieve the access rights for the particular user and check if he is
allowed to insert information to this patient’s observation chart. If the user is
allowed to insert information, the target system requests him to digitally sign
the insertion. The method requestSignature() and its response Signature
are shown in red because it is further depicted in Figure 18.14 in Section
18.2.5. If the user is allowed to sign the insertion, the information is inserted
in the ObservationChartStorage.
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Figure 18.12: Sequence diagram for insertion of authorized information.
18.2.5 Digital Signature
The Digital Signature subsystem is related to the security concern Digital
Signing described in Section 15.1. To preserve digital signing in the target
system, this subsystem is decomposed into two components. This is shown
in Figure 18.13.
SignatureManager creates signatures, verifies certificates and stores
public keys in the PublicKeyStorage. For the creation of signatures, it is
dependent on LoginController from the Access Control subsystem, which
is described in Section 18.2.4. For the verification of certificates, it is de-
pendent on a Certification Authority, CA. The CA is a trusted third party
which signs the certificate with its private key. The SignatureManager ver-
ifies the certificate using the CA’s public key.
PublicKeyStorage stores public keys obtained from the certificates.
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Figure 18.13: System Decomposition Model showing the Digital Signature
subsystem of the target system.
Transformation and insertion
Figure 18.14 gives a more detailed illustration of how digital signing of trans-
formations and insertions is handled by the SignatureManager. This fig-
ure has to be seen in relation to Figure 18.11 and Figure 18.12, and arrows
depicted in both figures are shown in red.
The SignatureManager receives a request from the AccessManager, re-
questSignature(). The SignatureManager then requests the LoginCon-
troller for the user’s username and password. The user digitally signs the
insertion by typing in his username and password, and the LoginController
verifies the password and forwards it to the SignatureManager if it is valid.
The SignatureManager then creates an authenticator, which is a small block
of bits of the transformed or inserted information that is hashed, in method
createAuthenticator(). The authenticator is encrypted with the user’s
private key, more precisely his password, in method createSignature().
The encrypted authenticator serves as a signature that verifies the origin
of the information, and the SignatureManager sends this Signature to the
AccessManager.
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Figure 18.14: Sequence diagram for for digital signatures when authorized
information is inserted.
18.2.6 Access Rights Administration
Together with the Access Control subsystem, the Access Rights Administra-
tion subsystem shows how the security concern Access Control is preserved.
Figure 18.15 illustrates how the Access Rights Administration subsystem
can be further decomposed into components.
AdminUI is the user interface in the Access Rights Administration
subsystem.
System administrators or other users which have the right to admin-
istrate access rights have to log in through the AdminTool. The Single
access point pattern is chosen for the Access Rights Administration subsys-
tem, and the AdminTool serves as the single access point. The Single access
point pattern is described in Appendix B.
The RoleAndUserAdm component supports definition of users, roles
and access rights. In this component it is possible to attach/detach users to
roles and access rights.
The RoleAdm component supports initiation and administration of
roles and access rights. Roles and access rights are retrieved and stored
in the RoleAndUserStorage component, which is accessed through its guard
GrdRoleAndUserStorage.
The UserAdm component supports initiation and administration of
user accounts. User accounts and their belonging user information are also
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Figure 18.15: System Decomposition Model showing the Access Rights Ad-
ministration subsystem of the target system.
retrieved and stored in the RoleAndUserStorage component. UserAdm also
has the possibility to retrieve external user accounts through the Exter-
nalUserAdm component. ExternalUserAdm makes it possible to integrate
user administration with the environment systems’ user databases. Exter-
nalUserAdm is therefore dependent on each of the environment systems.
The RoleAndUserStorage stores information about users, roles and
access rights. This component is labeled with 〈〈guarded〉〉, and can only be
access through its guard GrdRoleAndUserStorage.
Delegation of access rights
Figure 18.16 shows how delegation of access rights is handled by the Access
Rights Administration subsystem. Access Rights Administration is depen-
dent on some of the components in the Access Control subsystem. These
components, AccessManager and RoleManager, are shaded grey in the fig-
ure.
Scenario A shows a sequence for delegation of access rights where one user
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Figure 18.16: Delegation of access rights.
delegates access rights to another. The user’s identification is first retrieved
based on one particular patient, before rights are delegated by adding a role
to the user for a certain time period. The user can also be delegated access
rights for specific information resources for a certain period.
In Scenario B, access rights are delegated to a user based on a particular
role. For example, if the doctor in charge sends a referral to a specialist,
the referral is dependent on the user’s role, not the user himself. Therefore,
users with the particular role are first retrieved. Then, one particular user
is chosen based on rosters and the patient in care. The chosen user is then
assigned access rights for specific information resources belonging to the
particular patient.
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18.2.7 Auditing
The Auditing subsystem shows how the security concern Auditing, which
is described in Section 15.1, is preserved. For this purpose, the Auditing
subsystem is further decomposed into components, as shown in Figure 18.17.
Figure 18.17: System Decomposition Model showing auditing as a subsystem
of the target system.
The LoginUI component is the user interface from the Access Control
subsystem, as shown in Figure 18.7.
AuditingUS and AuditingBS respectively audit service accesses on
the user service tier and business service tier, i.e. AuditingUS audits target
system logins, while AuditingBS audits target system operations.
The AuditingManager coordinates both audit logs from AuditingUS,
AuditingBS and AuditingService, and stores them in theAuditLogStorage.
The AuditingService component provides a service for auditing of in-
voked services provided by environment systems. Refer to the requirement
viewpoint where requirement R2.2.1.3.1 states that the service which re-
ceives the request is responsible for auditing.
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18.3 System Collaboration Model
Model System Collaboration Model
Purpose Describe the main interactions in the system as a set
of collaborating components.
Input Target System Interface Model (Requirement view-
point).
Output UML class diagram, UML activity diagram, UML se-
quence diagram, UML collaboration diagram, Textual
description (area of concern).
Table 18.3: System Collaboration Model as described in the generic
MAFIIA.
Figure 18.18 shows a conceptual UML class diagram which represents
main concepts in the target system’s domain. Concepts are shown as classes,
while collaborations between the concepts are shown as associations and op-
erations. Each concept is related to one or more health information systems,
shown as colored rectangles behind each concept. The colored rectangles are
not UML convention, but they indicate where the particular patient informa-
tion is received, and therefore which health information systems CARDIAC’s
EOC-system has to include. The only concepts without any corresponding
health information system are Referrals and Epicrisis. No particular
health information system handles these concepts. Referrals and epicrisis
are usually messages which are manually handled.
The EOC-system should mainly consist of three parts; navigation caremap,
patient chart form and portal. The EOC-system shall manage informa-
tion about the patient care, including information about the patient, the
patient’s diagnosis,measurements, observations, requisitions and re-
sponses, referrals and epicrisis andmedication prescriptions. Figure
18.18 also shows that health personnel treats the patient in accordance
with certain quality procedures.
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Figure 18.18: System Collaboration Model showing a set of collaborating
components.
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The System Collaboration Model is further detailed in Figure 18.19 and
Figure 18.20, where the sequence diagram in Figure 18.20 is a continuation
of the one in Figure 18.19. Because of lack of space the sequence diagram
had to be divided in two. Figure 18.19 mainly displays interactions in the
navigation caremap part, while Figure 18.20 mainly displays interactions in
the patient chart form part.
Health personnel should access the EOC-system through the portal and
choose a patient. Information for the particular patient will then be retrieved
in the navigation caremap. The retrieval of the navigation caremap will
involve:
- retrieving CAVE information from the EPR-system,
- retrieving biographical data, diagnosis and information about patient
care incidences from PAS,
- retrieving observations and measurements from the patient chart form,
- retrieving responses to requisitions and referrals,
- retrieving textual documentation about the patient from the EPR-
system,
- retrieving information about the patient’s medication history from the
Medication system,
- showing a lifeline over patient care incidences from birth to the present
moment.
After retrieving the navigation caremap for the particular patient, health
personnel should be able to zoom the lifeline in and out or scroll the lifeline
backward and forward. This is shown in Figure 18.19 with the operations
showLifeline(time) and scrollLifeline(time). Health personnel should
also be allowed to write requisitions, referrals and prescriptions from the
navigation caremap.
For each patient, health personnel should be allowed to configure one or
several observation chart templates. This is shown in Figure 18.20. Mea-
surements from MTU will either manually or automatically be registered in
the observation chart. Health personnel should also be allowed to register
other observations such as fluid intake, and to scroll the observation chart
backward or forward. As mentioned earlier, health personnel will have to
follow some quality procedures during the continuity of patient care.
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Figure 18.19: System Collaboration Model showing how components collab-
orate to perform main interactions in the navigation caremap.
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Figure 18.20: System Collaboration Model showing how components collab-
orate to perform main interactions in the patient chart form.
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18.4 Component and Interface Specification Model
Model Component and Interface Specification Model
Purpose Describe each of the main components and interfaces
of the target system, including operation signatures
and behavior.
Input Requirement viewpoint. System Decomposition
Model, System Collaboration Model (Component
viewpoint).
Output UML and UMLsec class diagram, UML state chart
diagram, Textual description.
Table 18.4: Component and Interface Specification Model as described in
the generic MAFIIA and MAFIIA/RBAC.
Component and Interface Specification Model describes the interfaces
between the main components in the target system. The diagrams in this
model are based on UML 2.0 and the use of composite structures. UML 2.0
presents two concepts for describing interfaces between components, namely
ports and interfaces. A short introduction to ports and interfaces is given
below, while they are described further in Appendix C in Section C.9.1.
A port is a property which specifies a distinct interaction point between
a component and its environment or between the internal ports within one
component. A port may specify the services which the component pro-
vides/offers and the services which the component expects/requires.
An interface is a declaration of a set of public features and obligations.
An interface specifies a contract - any instance that realizes the interface
must fulfil that contract. The obligations may be constraints such as pre-
conditions, post-conditions, protocol specifications or others.
Component and Interface Specification Model shows security, service and
shortcut interfaces in the target system. The security, service and shortcut
interfaces are shown in separate figures. These figures follow the same struc-
ture; the left side of the figures illustrates main components of CARDIAC’s
EOC-system, while the right side illustrates the environment systems.
The components on the left side represent different subsystems, which
are already described in the System Decomposition Model in Section 18.2.
RoleManager, SSOManager and AccessManager components are de-
fined in the Access Control subsystem. TheAuditingManager component
is depicted in the Auditing subsystem, while the UserAdm component is
depicted in the Access Rights Administration subsystem. The ServiceInte-
grator component is introduced in both the Navigation Caremap subsystem
and the Patient Chart Form subsystem. The ShortcutHandler component
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belongs to the Portal subsystem.
In cases where the interface(s) of the environment systems’ classes does/do
not match the needed interface, Adapter pattern should be used. This is
not shown in any of the following figures because it complicates the figures.
Still, the Adapter pattern should be adapted on the components Security,
Services and Shortcuts, respectively shown in Figure 18.21, Figure 18.22
and Figure 18.23. Adapter pattern is described in Appendix B.
Figure 18.21 shows the main components and interfaces regarding secu-
rity in the EOC-system. Each environment system, shown on the right side
of the figure, provides some security services through the interface Envi-
ronmentSecurity. They are required to provide information about their
users and access control mechanism.
The Security component, shown in the middle of the figure, utilizes the
EnvironmentSecurity interface. In addition, it offers target system compo-
nents interfaces for the retrieval of audit logs, AuditLog, and external user
information, ExternalUsers, through the Security port. Single sign-on
and access control logic are also provided through the Security port.
The target system components RoleManager, SSOManager, Ac-
cessManager, AuditingManager and UserAdm utilize interfaces on
the Security port.
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Figure 18.21: Component and Interface Specification Model showing how
security is handled in the EOC-system.
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Figure 18.22 gives an overview of the main functionality provided in
the target system. Information is retrieved from the environment systems,
and users are allowed to access RoS and Medication system when writing
requisitions and prescribing medication. When information is retrieved or
when RoS or Medication system are accessed, single-sign on is required. In
addition, the access control within the respective environment system has
to be ensured and an audit log has to be generated.
In Figure 18.22, all environment systems provide services for informa-
tion retrieval through their DataRetrieval interface. RoS and Medication
also provide a service for writing requisitions or for prescribing medication,
respectively. These services are provided through the UI interface.
Services provided by the environment systems are utilized by the Ser-
viceIntegrator, accessed through the UIService and RetrievalService
interfaces provided by the Service component.
The Service component also ensures single sign-on, access control and
auditing through its InternalSecurity port. Single sign-on, access control
and auditing is respectively provided by the SSOManager, AccessMan-
ager and AuditingManager.
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Figure 18.22: Component and Interface Specification Model showing how
integration of services is handled in the EOC-system.
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As mentioned earlier, it shall be possible to access environment systems
through the Portal subsystem, described in Section 18.2.3. The Portal sub-
system provides shortcuts to the environment systems through its Short-
cutHandler component. When shortcuts are used, single sign-on to the
environment systems is required. Single sign-on is provided by the SSO-
Manager component in the Access Control subsystem, described in Section
18.2.4.
Figure 18.23 gives an overview of how ShortcutHandler and SSOMan-
ager interface the Shortcuts component in order to access the environment
systems. The environment systems have to provide their user interface to
the Shortcuts component in order to enable shortcuts.
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Figure 18.23: Component and Interface Specification Model showing short-
cuts to environment systems is the EOC-system.
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18.5 System Security Model
Model System Security Model
Purpose Describe how security concerns are handled by the
components.
Input Requirement viewpoint. System Decomposition
Model (Component viewpoint).
Output UML and UMLsec class diagram, UML sequence dia-
gram, UML state chart diagram, Textual description.
Table 18.5: System Security Model as described in MAFIIA for IIS.
Stereotypes from the reference architecture are UserInterface, UserSer-
vice, BusinessService, ResourceService and EnvironmentInterfacing. Fur-
ther generalization of these stereotypes is shown in Figure 18.24.
TheUserService stereotype is a supertype with LoginControlled and
AuditingControlledUS as subtypes. The key idea with generalization is
that everything about the UserService - associations, attributes, operations
- is true also for LoginControlled and AuditingControlledUS. Because Au-
ditingControlledUS is a subtype of LoginControlled everything about the
LoginControlled is true for AuditingControlledUS.
Similarly, everything about the BusinessService stereotype is true
for AccessControlled, AuditingControlledBS and DigitallySigned. In
addition, everything about AccessControlled is true for AuditingControlledBS
and for DigitallySigned, and so on.
The EnvironmentInterfacing stereotype is a supertype for SSOFul-
filled, EnvACFulfilled and EnvAuditing, which in turn are supertypes
for EnvSecured. The EnvironmentInterfacing stereotype is also a supertype
for the ApplServer stereotype.
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Figure 18.24: Generalization of reference architecture stereotypes.
Stereotypes are used to show how security concerns are handled by the
components described in the System Decomposition Model in Section 18.2.
The figures in the following sections, Figure 18.25, Figure 18.26 and Figure
18.27, indicate the semantics of the stereotypes introduced in the figure
above. After these stereotypes are defined, they are used to show how the
subsystems Navigation Caremap, Patient Chart Form, Portal and Access
Rights Administration handle security related concerns. This is shown in
Figure 18.28 - Figure 18.31.
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18.5.1 Access Control
In Figure 18.25 stereotypes for controlling login and access are defined.
Figure 18.25: Definition of stereotypes for UserService, BusinessService and
EnvironmentInterfacing components which employ components in the Ac-
cess Control subsystem.
LoginControlled defines a stereotype for UserService components which
utilizes the login or authentication mechanism in the target system, Login-
Controller. Components stereotyped with LoginControlled provide for con-
trolled and valid logins.
AccessControlled defines a stereotype for BusinessService components
which utilizes the access control mechanism in the target system, which in
this particular case also includes the access control mechanisms in the en-
vironment systems. AccessControlled provides for controlled and legitimate
accesses according to the underlying access control mechanisms.
EnvACFulfilled defines a stereotype for EnvironmentInterfacing com-
ponents which ensures the access control mechanism within the particular
environment system.
SSOFulfilled also defines a stereotype for EnvironmentInterfacing com-
ponents. Components stereotyped with SSOFulfilled provide for single sign-
on.
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18.5.2 Auditing
In Figure 18.26 stereotypes for auditing are defined.
Figure 18.26: Definition of stereotypes for UserService, BusinessService and
EnvironmentInterfacing components which employ components in the Au-
diting subsystem.
AuditingControlledUS defines a stereotype for UserService compo-
nents which provides for auditing of all logins.
AuditingControlledBS is similar to AuditingControlledUS, but it is
defined on the Business Service tier. All BusinessService components which
read, update or make insertions in the EOC have to be stereotyped with
AuditingControlledBS.
Components stereotyped with EnvAuditing ensure that auditing is per-
formed by the consumed service.
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18.5.3 Digital Signature
In Figure 18.27 a stereotype for digital signing is defined.
Figure 18.27: Definition of stereotypes for BusinessService components
which employ components in the Digital Signature subsystem.
DigitallySigned defines a stereotype for BusinessService components
which provide for digital signing when information is edited or registered in
the EOC.
18.5.4 Navigation Caremap
Figure 18.28 shows how the Navigation Caremap subsystem handles security
related concerns such as single sign-on, access control, auditing and digital
signing.
All logins to the Navigation Caremap subsystem have to be audited.
This is shown by the AuditingControlledUS stereotype, which is a subtype
of LoginControlled, meaning that AuditingControlledUS ensures both con-
trolled login and auditing.
Accesses performed by the InfoIntegrator or the ServiceIntegrator need
to be controlled, but not necessarily audited, hence stereotyped with Ac-
cessControlled. In addition to ensuring controlled access to the information
resources and services the TransformationHandler and the SelectionHandler
access, auditing of the operations they perform is needed. Transformations
also need to be digitally signed, hence TransformationHandler is stereotyped
with DigitallySigned, while SelectionHandler is stereotyped with only Au-
ditingControlledBS.
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Figure 18.28: The Navigation Caremap subsystem handles security related
concerns such as single sign-on, access control, auditing and digital signing.
Single sign-on needs to be fulfilled before any environment system ser-
vice is accessed. Accessing these services also requires that the access control
mechanism within the particular environment system is ensured and that au-
diting by the accessed service is done. EnvironmentInterfacing components
requesting environment system services are therefore of stereotype EnvSe-
cured. EnvSecured is a generalization of the stereotypes SSOFulfilled, En-
vACFullfilled and EnvAuditing, meaning that it ensures single sign-on, ac-
cess control and auditing in the environment systems.
18.5.5 Patient Chart Form
Figure 18.29 shows how the Patient Chart Form subsystem ensures single
sign-on, auditing and controlled access to resources and environment sys-
tems.
Similar to the Navigation Caremap subsystem, all logins to this sub-
system have to be controlled and audited. The components InfoIntegrator
and ServiceIntegrator are stereotyped with AccessControlled, while Trans-
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Figure 18.29: The Patient Chart Form subsystem ensures single sign-on,
controlled access to resources and environment systems and auditing.
formationHandler is stereotyped with DigitallySigned and SelectionHandler
is stereotyped with AuditingControlledBS.
Unlike the Navigation Caremap subsystem, which is read-only, the Pa-
tient Chart Form subsystem supports insertions and template configura-
tions. Before any insertions are allowed, the observation chart has to be con-
figured. Access rights have to be controlled before allowing users to do this.
Hence, the components ObservationChartFactory, ObservationChartTem-
plate and TemplateTransformator are stereotyped with AccessControlled.
The InsertionHandler is stereotyped with DigitallySigned because insertions
have to be authorized and audited, in addition to being digitally signed.
Similar to the Navigation Caremap subsystem, EnvironmentInterfacing
components are stereotyped with EnvSecured which ensures single sign-on,
the access control mechanism within environment systems and auditing by
the invoked service.
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18.5.6 Portal
Figure 18.30 shows how the Portal subsystem ensures controlled access to
Navigation Caremap and Patient Chart Form and single sign-on to environ-
ment systems.
Figure 18.30: The Portal subsystem ensures controlled access and single
sign-on to Navigation Caremap, Patient Chart Form and environment sys-
tems.
All logins to the Portal subsystem, which is the user interface in the
target system, have to be controlled and audited. Logins to the Navigation
Caremap subsystem and the Patient Chart Form subsystem need to be con-
trolled, not audited. Further access control and auditing are handled within
each of these subsystems, as described in the two previous sections.
The Portal provides shortcuts to environment systems, and these short-
cuts provide automatic logins. Hence, the EnvironmentInterfacing compo-
nents are stereotyped with SSOFulfilled. Access control and auditing are
then handled by each of the environment systems.
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18.5.7 Access Rights Administration
Figure 18.31 shows how the Access Rights Administration subsystem ensures
controlled login and access.
Figure 18.31: The Access Rights Administration subsystem ensures con-
trolled login and access.
In the Access Rights Administration subsystem, controlled login and ac-
cess are required in addition to auditing of all insertions, updates and dele-
tions. Hence, UserService components and Business Service components are
stereotyped with AuditingControlledUS and AuditingControlledBS, respec-
tively. The EnvironmentInterfacing component ExternalUserAdm requires
single sign-on to environment systems. This component is therefore stereo-
typed with SSOFulfilled.
18.6 System Access Control Model 169
18.6 System Access Control Model
Model System Access Control Model
Purpose Describe the relationship and properties of compo-
nents in the system that form the access control-
subsystem and how they enforce the security policy.
Input Business Aspects Model, Requirement viewpoint, Sys-
tem Decomposition Model, System Collaboration
Model.
Output UMLsec activity diagrams, UMLsec use case diagram,
UML state chart, Textual description.
Table 18.6: System Access Control Model as described in MAFIIA/RBAC.
MAFIIA/RBAC defines a model with special concern on access control.
Since this thesis also has focus on other security mechanisms in addition
to access control, this model will not be taken into account here. Instead,
access control is described in the System Decomposition Model through the
subsystems Access Control and Access Rights Administration respectively
described in Section 18.2.4 and Section 18.2.6.
18.7 Summary
In this viewpoint, the target system has been decomposed into subsystems
and components. Each subsystem or component is described in relation to
their function, collaboration with other subsystems or components and to
the security mechanisms they ensure.
The components identified in this viewpoint will, after further prepa-
rations in the distribution and realization viewpoint, be the basis for the
implementation of the architectural description.
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Chapter 19
Distribution Viewpoint
The distribution viewpoint describes the logical distribution of system com-
ponents. This viewpoint also documents which components must be sepa-
rated and which cannot.
The following models are part of the distribution viewpoint:
• System Distribution Model describes the logical distribution of all com-
ponents that are a part of the target system.
• Role Distribution Model documents the distribution of stakeholders.
• System Security Model discusses the distribution of security related
components.
19.1 System Distribution Model
Model System Distribution Model
Purpose Shall describe logical units or components that must
be distributed and deployed together.
Input System Decomposition Model, System Collaboration
Model (Component viewpoint).
Output UML and UMLsec deployment diagram, Textual de-
scription (rationale).
Table 19.1: System Distribution Model as described in the generic MAFIIA
and MAFIIA/RBAC.
Figure 19.1 is a UML deployment diagram showing the logical distrib-
ution of components in the target system, independent of the tiers in the
reference architecture.
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User interface components and some user logic are hosted on the Client.
PortalUI is dependent on bothNavigationCaremapUI,PatientChart-
FormUI and LoginUI to form the user interface of the EOC-system. Por-
talUI is also dependent on PortalTool for the purpose of user logic behind
the user interfaces.
Figure 19.1 shows that the Single access point pattern is chosen to create
only one way to get into the EOC-system. The PortalTool serves as the
single access point, and this component verifies the information collected in
LoginUI in a check point. PortalTool is dependent on the LoginController
for authentication verification. The Check point pattern is therefore used
with LoginController as authentication check point. The Single access point
pattern and the Check point pattern are described in Appendix B.
The Client, or more precisely the PortalTool component, communi-
cates with the Application Server through its components Navigation-
CaremapTool and PatientChartFormTool. These two components are
dependent on the AccessManager for controlled access to resources. The
AccessManager can be seen as a check point for authorization, indicating
that the Check point pattern is used here as well.
The Application Server hosts all system logic. The components In-
sertionHandler, TransformationHandler and SelectionHandler are
dependent on AuditingBS because auditing should be performed during
information registration, editing and retrieval. Other dependencies within
the Application Server are shown in the System Decomposition Model in
Section 18.2.
The Application Server communicates with the Security Server for the
purpose of access control, auditing and digital signing. It also communicates
with its database, SystemDB and environment systems for the purpose of
information retrieval.
The Environment System node is different from the rest of the nodes
in Figure 19.1, because it includes all environment systems and environment
system components. Similar to the target system, each environment system
also has its own internal distribution.
The Security Server hosts all security logic which includes access con-
trol, auditing, digital signing and access rights administration.
SecurityDB and AuditingDB are depicted in Figure 19.1. Compo-
nents within the SecurityDB node, belong to single sign-on, access control,
access rights administration and digital signature components hosted in the
Security Server, while the component within the AuditingDB belongs to
auditing components hosted in the Security Server.
The AdminClient hosts user interface logic for the administration of
users and access rights. It communicates with the Security Server for the
purpose of accessing the RoleAndUserStorage through RoleAndUser-
Adm, UserAdm or RoleAdm.
Links between the different nodes indicate communicating nodes.
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Figure 19.1: System Distribution Model showing the logical distribution of
components.
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19.2 Role Distribution Model
Model Role Distribution Model
Purpose Describe the distribution of the different roles that are
part of the target system.
Input Business Aspects Model (Context viewpoint), System
Distribution Model (Distribution viewpoint).
Output UML deployment diagram, Textual description.
Table 19.2: Role Distribution Model as described in the generic MAFIIA.
For the Role Distribution Model, three roles are identified:
• System user
• Owner of the EOC-system
• Administrator of the EOC-system
System users are health personnel in one particular hospital within the
Health Region for Central Norway. System users shall not have access to
the EOC-system outside the hospital network. Hence, system users are only
distributed inside a hospital.
The owner and administrator of the EOC-system is probably HEMIT.
How the administration of the environment systems is organized is out-
side the scope of this thesis. However, the environment systems are most
likely owned by HEMIT.
19.3 System Security Model
Model System Security Model
Purpose Describe the effects of the security concern on the
other models defined in the system distribution view-
point.
Input System Security Model (Component viewpoint)
Output UML use case diagram, UML collaboration diagram,
Textual description.
Table 19.3: System Security Model as described in MAFIIA for IIS.
System Security Model gives a suggestion for how components identified
in the System Distribution Model can be distributed in order to ensure the
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security within the target system. For better understanding of the target
system and to get an overview of its components, the security components
are separated from other system components in the System Distribution
Model, shown in Figure 19.1. Security logic components are grouped into one
logical node, while security relevant information and audit logs are logically
separated onto two different nodes.
The Security Server should be separated from the Application Server
primarily because of reliability requirements. This separation will also pro-
vide for compartmentalization, i.e. the possibility to limit access on different
levels between the Application Server and the Security Server. Thus, the
Security Server comes behind another barrier in relation to the Application
Server, and defense in depth is practiced. The practice of defense in depth
also requests protection through firewalls and encryption. In this particular
case, a corporate wide firewall should keep intruders out of the hospital net-
work, while encryption should protect information that travels across this
network.
Distribution of components into several nodes also prevents that the
entire system is compromised if only parts of the system are compromised.
Separating security components from other system logic components, also
ensures special control on security.
For best possible protection of the system, the physical distribution of
security components is essential. A suggestion for how the security compo-
nents can be distributed physically is shown in Figure 20.1 in the realization
viewpoint.
19.4 Summary
The models in the distribution viewpoint describe how the system compo-
nents are logically distributed, independent of existing infrastructure, which
is considered in the realization viewpoint in the next chapter.
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Chapter 20
Realization Viewpoint
The realization viewpoint describes how the target system should be imple-
mented and deployed into its environment. Although the distribution view-
point is the input for this viewpoint, there is not necessarily a direct map-
ping between these two viewpoints. The distribution viewpoint describes
logical distribution of components, while the realization viewpoint describes
physical distribution of components. For example, two logically distributed
components can be deployed at the same physical node. However, two com-
ponents not logically distributed should be deployed at the same node.
The realization viewpoint requires three different models to describe the
realization of the target system:
• System Deployment Model shows physical relationships among soft-
ware and hardware components in the target system.
• Technology Mapping Model specifies how components are related to
or implemented by technology solutions.
• System Integration Test Model describes a set of test scenarios.
Only a brief description of the System Deployment Model and Technol-
ogy Mapping Model will be given in the subsequent sections. Realization of
the target system is not the main focus in this thesis. The aim is to create
a security focused integration architecture for CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
For a proper description of the realization viewpoint, there is a need for
extensive system documentation on the health information systems which
shall be integrated with the EOC-system. This information has not been
available for this project.
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20.1 System Deployment Model
Model System Deployment Model
Purpose The purpose of this model is to describe the set of system
deployment configurations.
Input System Distribution Model (Distribution viewpoint), Re-
quirement Model (Requirement viewpoint).
Output UML deployment diagram, Textual description.
Table 20.1: System Deployment Model as described in the generic MAFIIA.
Input to System Deployment Model is System Distribution Model, and
the nodes identified in this model are physically distributed in the System
Deployment Model. Figure 20.1 shows how the target system is distributed
onto physically nodes. Even if the System Distribution Model shows that the
Client and ClientAdmin are distributed onto separate nodes, the realization
of the target system allows them to be deployed on one and the same node,
the Web Server.
Figure 20.1: System Deployment Model showing how the target system is
physically distributed onto nodes.
Since today’s database solutions provide separation of databases within
the same machine, all database nodes are physically distributed onto one
node, the SAN, in Figure 20.1. A database solution for the EOC-system
will most likely be a Storage Area Network (SAN), meaning that the actual
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information stored in SecurityDB, AuditingDB and SystemDB will be local-
ized on the same storage solution (SAN) with different zones so that they
are separated.
The Database Server, most likely Oracle in a system with this calibre,
contains the database software for processing information stored in the SAN.
TheApplication Server fetches information from the Database Server,
processes the information and presents it to the Web Server where it
becomes available for the users.
As described in the System Security Model in Section 19.3, defense in
dept through encryption should be practiced. In addition, requirement
R2.2.1.2.3 in the Requirement Model requests that the EOC-system pro-
vides secure transmission of information, i.e. encryption, between entities
participating in the communication.
This may be solved by using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) for encryption
of communication between clients and the Web Server and between the Web
Server and the Application Server in the network. Encryption between the
Application Server and the Security Server, and encryption between the
Application Server and the Database Server may be solved by IPSec. En-
cryption of XML data between the Application Server and the environment
systems may be solved by the encryption algorithm Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). Since SANs most often use fibre channel technologies, the
Fibre Channel Security Protocol is proposed for secure transmission of in-
formation between the Database Server and the SAN. Communication links
are therefore labeled with either SSL, IPSec, AES or Fibre Channel Security
Protocol in Figure 20.1.
The Data Inspectorate recommends an encryption algorithm with min-
imum 128 bits key or stronger when personal health data is transferred
outside the data controller’s control [56]. Thus, communication links are
also labeled with Minimum 128 bits in the figure.
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20.2 Technology Mapping Model
Model Technology Mapping Model
Purpose Shall describe how system components map to technological
solutions, concepts and mechanisms.
Input Requirement Model (Requirement viewpoint), Component
and Interface Specification Model (Component viewpoint),
System Distribution Model (Distribution viewpoint), Sys-
tem Deployment Model (Realization viewpoint).
Output UML component diagram, UML deployment diagram, Tex-
tual description (rationale).
Table 20.2: Technology Mapping Model as described in the generic MAFIIA.
The Technology Mapping Model is not described in detail in this archi-
tectural description because implementation of CARDIAC’s EOC-system is
outside the scope of this thesis. In order to specify the mapping of compo-
nents to technological solutions one also needs to have detailed knowledge
of the environment systems and the technology platforms used in these sys-
tems. Still, some technology recommendations were given in the System
Deployment Model. In addition, some technology solutions are certain.
CARDIAC aims to implement the EOC-system within the Health Region
for Central Norway. This health region requests a service-oriented architec-
ture where all health information systems offer functionality through Web
services. The chosen technology is Microsoft .NET. Microsoft .NET is a
Web-based middleware solution developed by Microsoft. It is described as
a prefabricated infrastructure connecting information, people, systems and
devices [63].
The target system should also be based on the IMATIS Platform, which
is a middleware platform developed by CARDIAC. The IMATIS Platform
was described in Section 6.6.
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20.3 System Integration Test Model
Model System Integration Test Model
Purpose Shall describe a set of test scenarios to be conducted during
system deployment (subsystem integration).
Input Requirement Model (Requirement viewpoint), System De-
ployment Model (Realization viewpoint).
Output Textual descriptions.
Table 20.3: System Integration Test Model as described in the generic
MAFIIA.
System Integration Test Model is outside the scope of this thesis because
it is too implementation specific.
20.4 Summary
The realization viewpoint is partly outside the scope of this thesis because
it shall describe the realization of the target system. Still, a suggestion of
the physical distribution of components is given. Additional, some of the
required technology solutions are mentioned.
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Chapter 21
Summary
Security and integration are highlighted throughout this architectural de-
scription by decomposing the EOC-system into subsystems and components.
The EOC-system is divided into seven subsystems. Each of them is described
throughly in the component viewpoint.
For example, one of the security related subsystems, the Access Con-
trol subsystem, contains business logic for the management of role-based
and context-based access control within the EOC-system. This is actually
handled by the components AccessManager and RoleManager within the
Access Control subsystem. Integration is mainly handled by the Navigation
Caremap subsystem and the Patient Chart Form subsystem through the
components InfoIntegrator and ServiceIntegrator. Additionally, the envi-
ronment systems have to provide certain interfaces and services for making
the integration possible.
The context and functionality of the EOC-system are also important
aspects of the architectural description. The EOC-system shall run within
a somatic hospital, primarily within the Health Region for Central Norway.
It is an integration between several other health information systems, and
it shall support read, write and edit actions.
A discussion of the choices made for the architectural description and
the experiences gained during this work is given in the next part.
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Part V
Discussion, Conclusion and
Further Work

Chapter 22
Discussion
This chapter contains a discussion of how the goals of this thesis are met,
what experiences are gained during the work with this thesis and finally
what choices and decisions are made in the architectural description.
22.1 Goals
The overall goal of this thesis was to create an architectural description for
CARDIAC’s EOC-system. This architectural description was also supposed
to show how information security could be ensured in the integration.
The overall goals were achieved, and the result of this thesis is a se-
curity focused architectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system. The
architectural description has identified important concepts which must be
taken into account when integrating health information systems. In ad-
dition, relevant legal issues and important security aspects concerning the
EOC-system were identified. When implementing the EOC-system within
the Health Region for Central Norway, this architectural description will
hopefully contribute to the implementation process for CARDIAC.
A subgoal of this thesis was to try out the architectural description frame-
work MAFIIA/RBAC on a specific case. MAFIIA/RBAC has given some
useful suggestions for access control. MAFIIA/RBAC extends the generic
MAFIIA with two new models, Target Organization Security Policy Model
and System Access Control Model. In this architectural description, the
Target Organization Security Policy Model has not been adequate, because
little was known about the target organization’s security policy. The System
Access Control Model became superfluous in this architectural description
because we chose to document access control together with the other secu-
rity mechanisms in the System Decomposition Model and System Security
Model in the component viewpoint. Although the two new models in MAFI-
IA/RBAC turned out to be less important, other concepts introduced in
MAFIIA/RBAC were maintained. Among other things role-cards, UMLsec
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and security patterns were utilized. The overall impression of MAFIIA/R-
BAC was that it was far too general for an integration case as complex as
CARDIAC’s EOC-system. MAFIIA for IIS, which is specially targeted to-
wards system integration, was a much better support during the creation of
this architectural description.
In addition to being useful for CARDIAC, this architectural description
may be advantageous for other parties. SINTEF, who originally created
the MAFIIA architectural framework, may have interest in the experiences
gained by using MAFIIA for IIS and MAFIIA/RBAC. Neither MAFIIA for
IIS nor MAFIIA/RBAC have been tried out on an integration specific case
before, and the results of this thesis may therefore influence further use of
MAFIIA in architectural descriptions for integrated systems.
22.2 Experiences
When integrating several systems, regardless of being health information
systems or not, it is important to have certain information about each sys-
tem. It should be clarified whether or not the system supports integration. If
it does, information about what kind of integration architecture the system
supports should be available.
It has been difficult to obtain enough information about the health in-
formation systems that were chosen for integration with CARDIAC’s EOC-
system. We have experienced that such documentation is often kept secret
and unavailable for student projects. Because of this difficulty, we were
forced to assume that the health information systems chosen for integration
provided their functionality as services. Present technology development
and the strategies explored make this assumption reasonable. When assum-
ing that system functionality was provided as services, lack of information
was no longer such a problem.
Service-oriented system integration requires that most, if not all, sys-
tems are changed to provide their functionality as services. Clearly, this is a
drawback because changing systems is a very costly proposition. However,
service-oriented system integration was chosen as integration architecture
because sharing services represents a tremendous benefit. Web services are
both platform and language independent; it is possible to deploy it on any
platform. Web services can also be accessed by any other information sys-
tem, regardless of either’s platform or language.
A combination of a service-oriented and portal-oriented integration ar-
chitecture was chosen because CARDIAC aims to use their IMATIS Plat-
form for the implementation of the EOC-system. HEMIT’s two strategies
also recommend a service-oriented architecture where services are presented
through a portal. These strategies are followed throughout this architectural
description because CARDIAC’s first implementation of the EOC-system is
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supposed to be within the Health Region for Central Norway where these
strategies prevail.
Nevertheless, it should be discussed if a service-oriented and portal-
oriented integration architecture is the optimal choice. Strictly speaking,
the architectural description should have had the possibility to integrate
health information systems supporting other integration architectures than
service-oriented. Information-oriented system integration has been the most
common and widely used integration architecture, and some health infor-
mation systems still support this kind of integration only.
Probably the best way to integrate health information systems would be
business process oriented system integration. This integration architecture
is complimentary to both information-oriented, service-oriented and even
portal-oriented system integration, meaning that system services and sys-
tem information are encapsulated into a single controlling business process
model and presented through a portal. Business process oriented system
integration therefore seems like the most optimal integration architecture.
When using business process oriented integration architecture on this par-
ticular case, business processes within several wards or hospitals would be
supported and the flow of information would most probably be improved.
Another advantage with this integration architecture is that there is no need
to change the participating systems when a change in a process flow or logic
is required, only the business process model needs to be altered. Still, a
great disadvantage of using this integration architecture in the health do-
main is the creation of the business process model. Defining the business
processes within a hospital is a rather complex and time-consuming task. In
addition, business process oriented system integration seems to be difficult
or almost impossible to implement. No examples for use of this integration
architecture in practice are found.
When it comes to standards, strategies and legal issues, we have experi-
enced that it is quite difficult to show how these directly have affected the
architectural description. Therefore, many standards and strategies are pre-
sented, but only HEMIT’s two strategies are used extensively throughout
the architectural description. When creating an architectural description of
a health information system it is important to identify laws and regulations
relevant for the system. The identified laws and regulations were used for
the selection of security mechanisms which are ensured in the integration
architecture. Several other security mechanisms such as database security
and concurrency control could have been covered in the integration archi-
tecture, but because of the large extent of this thesis and limited amount of
time only the most relevant security mechanisms were chosen.
We have experienced that security in an integration of several health
information systems is a complex issue. Specially the access control mecha-
nism within the integrated system becomes complex. The reason for this is
that the number of users increases when integrating several health informa-
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tion systems. In spite of the large number of users, information relevant for
proper patient care should still be available for those users who have a need
for it. In addition, new aspects such as single sign-on should be regarded
when several systems are integrated.
In order to reduce the complexity of security in an integration of several
health information systems, only one security mechanism could have been
chosen. Still, an advantage of documenting several security mechanisms in
the architectural description is that security is seen from a broader perspec-
tive already from the beginning of the software development process.
22.3 Choices
As mentioned above, it was difficult to obtain information about any of the
health information systems relevant for integration with CARDIAC’s EOC-
system. Which environment systems we chose for the integration had little
impact on the creation of the architectural description. We only assumed
that the environment systems provided their functionality as services. Still,
six environment systems were identified for integration in the Environment
Systems Model; an EPR-system, PAS, RoS, Medication system, EQS and
MTU. These environment systems were chosen because CARDIAC thought
these were the most relevant ones.
To create a security focused integration architecture, we chose to divide
the EOC-system into seven different subsystems where four of them were
concerning security. The security subsystems covered the identified security
concerns; digital signing, access control and auditing. Security could have
been shown in one subsystem or as a component within any of the other
subsystems, e.g. the Portal subsystem, but this would typically have shown
security as a black box. The decomposition of the subsystems became eas-
ier when the EOC-system was divided into both functionality and security
concerned subsystems.
Each of the subsystems was decomposed further into components, where
the number of components reflected the complexity of the subsystem. Com-
plex subsystems were decomposed into several components, each regarding
different kind of functionality. For example, the Access Control subsystem
was decomposed into an AccessManager component, a RoleManager com-
ponent and a SSOManager component respectively handling the mapping
of users towards resources, the mapping of access rights towards roles and
the mapping of userIDs for single sign-on.
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Conclusion
During this master’s thesis project, we have explored some issues which were
used as guidance while creating the architectural description. Exploring laws
and regulations has resulted in restrictions on processing and storing sensi-
tive information and on information security in health information systems.
On the basis of these restrictions, secure communication, digital signing,
auditing and access control were chosen as security mechanisms covered in
the architectural description.
When investigating prevailing strategies, we discovered that there are
several ways to integrate different health information systems. In integrat-
ing health information systems it is important to adapt the integration ar-
chitecture to the existing systems, but still be future-oriented and create
an architecture which may be able to evolve with changes in the environ-
ment. This resulted in the choice of a service-oriented and portal-oriented
integration architecture for the EOC-system.
The result of this thesis is a security focused integration architecture
of CARDIAC’s EOC-system. During the creation of the architectural de-
scription, we have identified useful requirements for the EOC-system. For
emphasizing the security within the integration architecture, we chose to
divide the EOC-system into several security subsystems which were further
decomposed into security components. The systems chosen for integration
with CARDIAC’s EOC-system have less significance for the architectural
description since we have assumed that each integrated system provides its
functionality as services.
During the design and implementation of the EOC-system, this archi-
tectural description will be a useful contribution for CARDIAC.
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Further work
CARDIAC implementing the EOC-system based on the proposed architec-
tural description, is a future goal for this thesis. But, before implementing
the EOC-system, the realization viewpoint has to be emphasized and further
detailed. For example, documentation of the System Integration Test Model
has been omitted in the proposed architectural description because imple-
mentation of the EOC-system is outside the scope of this thesis. Thus, this
model has to be described for the implementation purpose. In addition, the
six health information systems proposed for integration have to be further
examined for making an integration possible.
Further work on the architectural description also includes some other
extensions. First of all, the architectural description should be extended to
cover both read and write access to the environment systems. For example,
users should be able to add new patient information such as diagnosis in
PAS through the EOC-system.
Another extension is to integrate all EOC-relevant health information
systems into the EOC-system. This thesis only covers an integration of six
relevant health information systems.
The architectural description should also be extended to cover an inte-
gration across several hospitals within the Health Region for Central Nor-
way. Users outside the hospital where the EOC-system runs, should be able
to access the EOC-system. This means that users not connected to the
hospital network should have permission to access the EOC-system over a
regional health network. Then, an extension across regional boarders could
be considered.
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Figure A.1: Contents of a paper-based patient record.
Appendix B
Patterns
This appendix gives a representation of the patterns recommended for use
when creating the architectural description for CARDIAC’s EOC-system.
B.1 Adapter
The description of the Adapter pattern is mainly from the overview over
relevant patterns in MAFIIA for IIS [16].
B.1.1 Intent
The intention of Adapter pattern is to convert the interface of a class into
another interface clients expects. Adapter lets classes work together that
could not otherwise because of incompatible interfaces [9].
B.1.2 Also known as
• Wrapper
B.1.3 Applicability
The adapter pattern is applicable when there is a need to use one or more
existing resources, but the interface(s) of their classes do not match the
needed interface. To solve the problem one or more adapter classes are
created that implement the required interface, and map this interface to the
classes of the existing resources.
B.1.4 Structure
Figure B.1 shows the structure of the Adapter pattern.
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Figure B.1: Structure of the Adapter pattern [16].
B.1.5 Consequences
The implementation of an adapter is often straightforward, e.g. when the
target interface and the adaptee interface only differs in operation names
and ordering of parameters. The complexity is increased if the interfaces
differ more fundamentally, or if the adapter is made more generic to allow
configuration to work with different adaptee classes.
B.2 Fac¸ade
The description of the Fac¸ade pattern is mainly based on the overview of
relevant patterns in MAFIIA for IIS [16].
B.2.1 Intent
The intention of Fac¸ade pattern is to provide a unified interface to a set of
interfaces in a subsystem. Fac¸ade defines a higher-level interface that makes
the subsystem easier to use [9].
B.2.2 Applicability
The Fac¸ade pattern is applicable when a subsystem originally consists of
many interfaces, and are complicated to use. When the pattern is applied,
a fac¸ade interface is constructed. The clients access the subsystem only
through the fac¸ade, and the fac¸ade uses the original interfaces of the sub-
system in its implementation.
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B.2.3 Structure
Figure B.2 shows the structure of the Fac¸ade pattern.
Figure B.2: Structure of the Fac¸ade pattern [16].
B.2.4 Consequences
When the fac¸ade pattern is used, direct dependencies on the internal, com-
plex parts of the subsystem from the clients are avoided. In addition to
making the subsystem easier to use for the client, it also makes it easier to
do internal changes in the subsystem without affecting the clients.
B.3 Single access point
B.3.1 Intent
The intention of Single access point pattern is to create only one way to
get into the system. This is done by creating a login screen which collects
information about the user and verifies it in a check point. The result of
this action is a session which keeps track of the user’s privileges and his
interactions with the system [30].
B.3.2 Also known as
• Login Window
• One Way In
• Guard Door
• Validation Screen
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B.3.3 Motivation
Most computer systems today are connected to other systems. This means
that one system may be accessible for other systems through several different
entry points. Just like it is difficult for one person to guard 4 different doors
in a castle, it is very difficult for a security system to guard many entry
points [30].
Single access point handles this problem by providing only one way to
get into the system and creates a secure place for user validation.
B.3.4 Applicability
This pattern is applicable to most applications, or complete systems, which
need to communicate with external entities [29]. It is used in login screens by
secure Web servers. The Internet connection of most organizations reflects
this pattern [25].
B.3.5 Structure
Figure B.3 shows the structure of the Single access point pattern.
B.3.6 Consequences
The Single access point pattern works a bit like a double-edged sword. A
single access point is easy to control, but it is also easy to attack [27]. This
pattern may also result in a bottleneck since it does not allow multiple entry
points to simplify the access to an application [30].
The advantage of this pattern is that it guarantees that all values are
initialized in a correct way. It also simplifies control flow since everything
goes through a single point of responsibility [30].
B.3.7 Related Patterns
The Single access point pattern is related to the Check point pattern which
is used to initialize user’s role and session [30].
B.4 Check point
B.4.1 Intent
The intention of the Check point pattern is to give a way to handle and
organize security checks [27], incoming requests and to handle violations
[29]. This pattern verifies the information that comes in through single
access point.
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Figure B.3: Structure of Single access point pattern. Adapted from the
paper Security Patterns [29].
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B.4.2 Also known as
• Access Verification
• Authentication and Authorization
• Holding off hackers
• Validation and Penalization
• Make the punishment fit the crime
B.4.3 Motivation
Single access point pattern is useful for keeping unwanted visitors from gain-
ing access to parts of the system which they are not authorized for. But
the checks that are done in single access point can sometimes cause more
trouble then necessary for regular non-malicious users. Some users make
mistakes which the system may interpret as an intent to attack the system
(e.g. mistyped password). The system has to allow users to sometimes make
these mistakes. Check point provides a structure for all the checks and how
to handle requests and violations [30].
B.4.4 Applicability
This pattern may be applied to any system that needs to monitor commu-
nication. A security policy is needed for performing the checks [29].
B.4.5 Structure
Figure B.4 show the structure of the Check point pattern.
B.4.6 Consequences
Not all security checks can be done at startup, so check point needs a sec-
ondary interface for those parts of the application that need this kind of
checks. Although check point might be a complex algorithm, it is isolated
in one location so it makes the security algorithm easier to change [30]
B.4.7 Related Patterns
The following patterns are related to the Check point pattern [29]:
• Single access point
• Role-based access control
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Figure B.4: Structure of Check point pattern. Adapted from the paper
Security Patterns [29].
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B.5 Role-Based Access Control
B.5.1 Intent
The intention of this pattern is to assign rights to users according to their
roles in the organization. For security reasons, the users should only get as
much information as they need to perform their tasks, neither more nor less.
This security policy is also known as “need-to-know principle”, explained in
the book Secure Computing: Threats and Safeguards [15].
B.5.2 Also known as
• Roles
• Actors
• Groups
• Projects
• Profiles
• Jobs
• User types
B.5.3 Motivation
Most organizations have different job functions which require different skills
and responsibilities. Users should get rights according to their responsibili-
ties and the job functions they are supposed to perform. Job functions may
be implemented as roles that people play while performing their tasks [22].
Granting rights to individual users is too time consuming and requires
storage of many authorization rules. The solution lies in grouping the users
in to groups which are assigned roles. One user may have more than one
role, and role hierarchies, with inheritance of rights, are also allowed.
B.5.4 Applicability
This pattern is applicable to any application which has different users who
need different access to resources. Web-based systems often have a huge va-
riety of users (e.g. company employees, customers, partners, search engines)
[22]. Health information systems also have several kinds of users and require
a strict security policy for giving the users access to information.
B.5.5 Structure
Figure B.5 shows the structure of the Role-based access control pattern.
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Figure B.5: A pattern for role-based access control. Adapted from the paper
A pattern language for security models [22].
B.5.6 Participants
The following elements are in [29] identified as participants in the RBAC-
pattern:
• Protection Object
• Right
• Role
• Roles
• User
B.5.7 Collaborations
Roles are associated to a set of objects. These objects define properties
of each relationship. Each user is associated with a role which determines
his privileges. Information about access privileges can be queried by other
system components [29].
B.5.8 Consequences
One of the greatest advantages of Role-based access control pattern is that
it reduces complexity of security. Roles may directly reflect the organization
in a company. Users may have several roles at a time, but some roles can
also be mutually exclusive, which means that one user cannot be assigned
to two different roles in the same set of roles [22].
One disadvantage that might be seen with this pattern is that it adds
additional complexity to the system.
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B.5.9 Related Patterns
The Check point pattern is relevant to this pattern.
Appendix C
UML
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a standard for specifying object-
oriented or component-oriented software systems. It is a modeling language
that may be used to specify architectural and behavioral aspects of software.
UML diagrams describe various views on different parts of a system
design. There are several kinds of UML diagrams, each describing different
aspects of a system at a different level of abstraction. The following sections
describe some of the most common UML diagram types.
C.1 Use case diagrams
Use case diagrams are diagrams which describe a set of scenarios which are
tied together by a common user goal [12]. A scenario is a sequence of steps
describing the interaction between a user and the system. An example of a
use case diagram is shown in Figure C.1.
Figure C.1: Example of a use case diagram following the UML convention.
An actor is a role that a user plays with respect to the system. The
actor does not necessarily have to be a human being - it may as well be a
system or a system component. The 〈〈include〉〉 relationship is used when
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several use cases have similar behavior. The 〈〈generalization〉〉 relationship
is used when one use case has similar behavior as another use case, but is
still does a bit more. The 〈〈extends〉〉 relationship is essentially similar to
generalization, but it adds more rules to it [8].
C.2 Misuse case diagrams
A misuse case is the inverse of a use case. A misuse case often shows func-
tions that the system should not allow. In other words, a misuse case may be
defined to be a completed sequence of actions which result in loss for the or-
ganization or some specific stakeholder [28]. Misuse case diagrams introduce
a special type of actor, namely the bad guy or the crook, who performs the
malicious operations towards the system. In addition to the 〈〈extend〉〉 and
〈〈include〉〉, misuse cases also define 〈〈prevents〉〉 and 〈〈detects〉〉 relations
as shown in Figure C.2.
The 〈〈prevents〉〉 relation shows which use cases prevent certain threats
to the system. Equivalently, the 〈〈detects〉〉 relation is used to emphasize
the use cases which detect certain threats.
Figure C.2: Example of a misuse case diagram.
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C.3 Class diagrams
Class diagrams define the class structure of a system. They show attributes,
operations, signals and relationships between classes [12]. An example of a
class diagram is shown in Figure C.3.
Figure C.3: Example of a class diagram following the UML convention [31].
Attributes are usually characteristics of a class object. Operations are
the processes that a class can carry out. Operations usually have a visibil-
ity type, a return type and a name. Associations represent relationships
between the instances of classes. Each association end has multiplicity,
which indicates how many objects participate in the given relationship. The
arrows on the association lines indicate navigability. Generalization is
used when several classes have similarities. One can then place all the simi-
larities in one superclass and leave the other functionality in the subclasses.
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C.4 Sequence diagrams
Sequence diagrams describe interactions between objects or system compo-
nents through message exchange [8]. Figure C.4 shows an example of a
UML sequence diagram. The vertical line below each object is the object’s
activation line.
Figure C.4: Example of a sequence diagram following the UML convention
[31].
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C.5 Activity diagrams
Activity diagrams show the flow of control between several components or
actors in the system [31]. Figure C.5 shows an example of a UML activity
diagram.
An action state is a state of doing something, i.e. a software routine.
A fork has one incoming transitions and several outgoing transitions which
are all activated at the same time. A join has several incoming transitions
and only one outgoing transition. The actions between a fork and a join are
parallel actions.
A branch has a single incoming transition and several outgoing transi-
tion. But, in this case, only one of the outgoing transitions can be chosen,
i.e. the outgoing transitions are mutually exclusive. A merge marks the
end of conditional behavior which is started by a branch.
Figure C.5: Example of an activity diagram following the UML convention
[31].
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C.6 Package diagrams
A package diagram is a UML diagram composed only of packages and the
dependencies between them. A package is a UML construct that makes
is possible to organize model elements, such as use cases or classes, into
groups [31]. The groups within one package often have responsibilities that
are strongly related. Packages are depicted as file folders (see Figure C.6)
and can be applied on any UML diagram.
A dependency is in package diagrams visualized as a dashed line be-
tween the packages.
Figure C.6: Example of a package diagram following the UML convention
[31].
C.7 Component diagrams
Component diagrams show the software components of a system and how
they are related to each other. These relationships are called dependencies.
The component diagram contains components and dependencies. Compo-
nents represent the physical packaging of a module of code. The dependen-
cies between the components show how changes made to one component may
affect the other components in the system. Dependencies in a component
diagram are represented by a dashed line between two or more components.
An example of a dependency between components is shown in Figure C.7.
Component diagrams can also show the interfaces used by the components
to communicate to each other.
C.8 Deployment diagrams
Deployment diagrams describe the physical relationships among the software
and hardware components in a system. Each node on a deployment diagram
represents some kind of computational unit, i.e. a piece of hardware. Figure
C.7 shows an example of a UML deployment diagram.
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Figure C.7: Example of a deployment diagram following the UML conven-
tion [31].
Each node on a deployment diagram represents a computational unit or
a piece of hardware. Connections among nodes show the communication
paths over which the system will interact [8].
C.9 Composite structures
One of the disadvantages with earlier versions of UML has been the gap
between the classes created and the system which is being built. It has been
possible to graphically define the building blocks, but in order to specify the
way these blocks go together, one had to drop down to obscure code [24].
In order to avoid this problem, the Object Management Group (OMG)
has delivered UML 2.0, a new version of the standard that addresses the
above mentioned gap by introducing composite structures and more specif-
ically “Structured Classes”.
C.9.1 Ports and interface
In structured classes, each class has a set of ports, and all interactions (calls
or asynchronous messages) go through them [24]. An object still has one-
way encapsulation, because it does not know who called it (although it can
know which port a message came from). It also has two-way encapsulation,
because it calls or sends messages through a port. It knows the port, but
not what is behind it. Ports are optional; simple data classes often do not
need them, and calls are made straight to the object.
A port can have two types of interfaces - provided and required [24].
A provided interface is a set of operations the port makes available to the
outside world. The provided interface is modeled by a lollipop shape as
shown on the left side of Figure C.8.
A required interface is a set of operations the port may use on the
outside world. An example of a required interface is shown on the right side
of Figure C.8.
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Figure C.8: Example of composite structures in UML 2.0.
A port can have zero or more of each type of interface. Most often, a
port will have a single provided interface and a single required interface that
are the two sides of a protocol. Port compatibility is statically verified: each
port at one end of a connector must provide every operation that is required
by a port at the other end of the connector. This allows “plug-and-play”
composition of parts [24].
C.10 UML extensions
UML defines three extension mechanisms allowing modelers to tailor UML
to specific application domains without having to modify the underlying
modeling language. The three mechanisms are stereotypes, tagged values
and constraints.
A stereotype is an extension to the vocabulary of the UML, allowing the
modeler to add new building blocks derived from existing ones. Stereotypes
are normally shown as text strings surrounded by brackets. Stereotypes can
be used to create collections of constructs which are specialized toward given
needs. Such collections of constructs are called profiles.
A tagged value is used to store information about an individual model
element. Tags can be defined for existing elements of UML or for individual
stereotypes. Its value applies to the element itself and not its instances, and
does thus not correspond to a class attribute. A tagged value is represented
as a string enclosed by braces and placed below the name of the element
it belongs to. The string includes a name of some property the modeler
wants to record (the tag), a separator (an equal sign), and the value of that
property for the given element.
A constraint is an extension of the semantics of a UML element, provid-
ing the possibility to add new rules or modifying existing ones. Constraints
specify conditions that must be true for the model to be well-formed.
A profile puts stereotypes, tagged values and constraints all together.
C.10.1 UMLsec
UMLsec is a profile, allowing security-related information and concepts (e.g.
smart cards, encryption, secrecy, access control, integrity, etc.) in UML
models. The profile contains stereotypes with tags and constraints to com-
municate security requirements and security attainment.
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UMLsec defines several secure stereotypes - this appendix only presents
two of them in Table C.1. Stereotypes are in UML indicated with 〈〈stereotype〉〉
and tags with {tag}.
Stereotype Tags Constraints Description
rbac protected, Only permitted activities Enforces role-based
role, right executed access control
guarded guard Guarded object
Table C.1: UMLsec stereotypes, together with tags and constraints [12].
The 〈〈rbac〉〉 stereotype contains the following tags: {protected} indi-
cates what should be protected, {role} contains user/actor memberships in
roles and {right} indicates access right to protected resource for an indi-
cated role. The constraint for 〈〈rbac〉〉 is that actors in the diagram only
perform activities for which they are authorized.
The 〈〈guarded〉〉 indicates that objects with this stereotype can only be
accessed through components indicated with the stereotype’s {guard} tag.
228 UML
